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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters analyzing the sources of business
cycles and the role of monetary policy. Taking both closed- and open-economy perspectives,
I study the importance of expectations for the empirical identification of economic and policy
shocks, the nature of business cycle fluctuations, and the optimal conduct of monetary
policy.
The first chapter is titled “International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of
Monetary Policy,” and is joint work with Vito Cormun. Motivated by the observation
that exchange rate fluctuations largely influence small open economies, we propose a novel
approach to separately identify the effects of domestic and external shocks on exchange
rates and other macroeconomic variables, thereby uncovering a set of new empirical find-
ings. A first finding is that external shocks account for most of exchange rate fluctuations.
Relatedly, the bulk of external shocks is strongly correlated with measures of global risk
aversion and uncertainty (e.g. the VIX), and a country’s net foreign asset position largely
explains the exposure of its exchange rate to external disturbances. A second finding is that
domestic and external disturbances generate very different comovement patterns between
interest rates and exchange rates. In particular, unlike domestic shocks, external shocks
are associated with large and significant deviations from uncovered interest parity. As a
result, an econometrician that fails to properly distinguish between sources of exchange rate
fluctuations is bound to obtain puzzling estimates of the exchange rate effects of domestic
monetary policy shocks.
These empirical findings have profound implications for models of small open economy
and exchange rate determination. In particular, they favor theories in which exchange rates
are jointly determined by the risk-bearing capacity in financial markets as well as the extent
of a country’s financial imbalances. For this reason, we develop a model of the international
financial sector that satisfies these features, and embed it in an otherwise standard general
equilibrium two-country small open economy model. The key mechanism of the model
consists of risk averse traders in the foreign exchange markets that require a premium to
hold the currency risk of the small open economy. We show that the proposed model is able
to reproduce all the empirical findings documented in the empirical analysis, including the
cross-country differences in exposure to external shocks, the role of a country’s net foreign
asset position, the different responses of interest rates, exchange rates, and currency excess
returns across different shocks, as well as the emergence and resolution of the so-called
exchange rate response puzzle across different identification approaches.
The second chapter is titled “Should Central Banks Target Investment Prices?” and is
joint work with Susanto Basu. The question posed in the title is motivated by the obser-
vation that central banks nearly always state explicit or implicit inflation targets in terms
of consumer price inflation. To address the question, we develop an otherwise standard
dynamic general equilibrium model with two production sectors. One sector produces con-
sumption goods, while the other produces investment goods. In this context, we show that
if there are nominal rigidities in the pricing of both consumption and investment goods
and if the shocks to the two sectors are not identical, then monetary policy faces a tradeoff
between targeting consumption price inflation and investment price inflation. In a model
calibrated to replicate the estimated processes of sectoral total factor productivities as well
as a set of unconditional business cycle moments, ignoring investment prices typically leads
to substantial welfare losses because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in invest-
ment is much higher than in consumption. Based on the model’s predictions, we argue
that a shift in monetary policy to targeting a weighted average of consumer and investment
price inflation may produce significant welfare gains, although this would constitute a major
change in current central banking practice.
The third chapter is titled “Information Acquisition and Self-Fulfilling Business Cycles,”
and is sole-authored work. To study the implications of imperfect information on economic
fluctuations, I develop an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle model with endogenous
information acquisition, which generates countecyclical firm-level uncertainty and endoge-
nously procyclical productivity, as empirically documented in the literature. The main
contribution of this chapter is the observation that this model displays aggregate increasing
returns to scale and, potentially, an indeterminate dynamic equilibrium. In fact, an aggre-
gate representation of the model is observationally equivalent to earlier theories of endoge-
nous fluctuations based on increasing returns to scale, but its microeconomic foundations
are consistent with empirically observed firm-level returns to scale. In a model calibrated
to replicate a set of moments of the empirical distribution of firm-level productivity, self-
fulfilling fluctuations are possible. In addition, a Bayesian estimation of the model suggests
that non-fundamental shocks explain a significant fraction of aggregate fluctuations.
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Chapter 1
International Spillovers and the Exchange
Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
Exchange rate fluctuations play a key role in small open economies. Therefore, understand-
ing their sources is central to drawing accurate conclusions about transmission mechanisms.
To this end, we propose a novel identification scheme designed to decompose the interest
rate and exchange rate effects of domestic and external shocks. Our results rationalize
the emergence of recent puzzling estimates of the exchange rate effects of monetary pol-
icy, shed light on the determinants of international spillovers, and provide guidance on the
mechanisms underlying the cyclical behavior of exchange rates and currency excess returns.
We begin by showing that typical identification approaches within vector autoregressions
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(VARs) are bound to confound the endogenous response of domestic variables to external
shocks with the effect of domestic shocks. To make our point, we document that the struc-
tural shocks identified through recursive ordering and typically interpreted as “monetary
policy shocks” of the small open economy predict significant future movement in external
variables, including U.S. interest rates and output. Since shocks originating from within
a small open economy should not alter world interest rates and incomes, this observation
points to a particular misspecification problem: standard identification schemes do not
account for a set of external shocks that have a delayed effect on the external variables
included in the VAR. We refer to this set of disturbances as “anticipated external shocks.”
For this reason, we propose an alternative to the recursive identification scheme. Our
identification procedure is based on the premise that shocks originating from within a small
economy should not influence world variables at any horizon. We identify anticipated exter-
nal shocks as those that explain most of expected future movements in external variables,
and require domestic shocks to be orthogonal to all external disturbances. To identify ex-
pected future movements in external variables, we exploit the forward looking nature of
interest rates and exchange rates of small open economies. Our main identifying assump-
tion is that small open economies respond to external shocks, but not the reverse. In this
context, we demonstrate that typically identified “monetary policy shocks” of small open
economies contain a bias if anticipated external shocks contemporaneously spill over into
domestic interest rates and exchange rates, and this bias is larger for countries that are more
susceptible to external shocks. In this case, an econometrician would confound the mone-
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tary policy innovations with the central bank’s endogenous response to anticipated external
shocks, potentially leading to incorrect conclusions about key transmission mechanisms.
We implement our identification scheme on monthly data for a large set of small open
economies and uncover important differences in the comovement patterns implied by differ-
ent types of shocks. This observation is associated with three related empirical findings.
Our first set of results pertains to the exchange rate response to domestic monetary
policy innovations, on which existing empirical evidence is far from conclusive. In par-
ticular, Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh (2016) document that the domestic currency tends
to appreciate in advanced countries but depreciates in developing and emerging countries
in response to a monetary tightening. This evidence, labeled “the exchange rate response
puzzle,” is primarily based on recursive identification schemes within the framework of
VARs, and presents critical challenges for standard open economy theories. We find that
the exchange rate response puzzle disappears after accounting for the spillover effects of
anticipated external shocks: in most countries, a monetary policy contraction is associated
with a significant appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, with a somewhat larger quan-
titative effect for advanced economies: after a 1% increase in the interest rate the exchange
rate appreciates by around 2.5% in advanced economies and by around 1% in developing
and emerging economies. Instead, a puzzle arises under a recursive identification scheme be-
cause it commingles domestic and external shocks, which give rise to opposite comovements
between interest rates and exchange rates. A related finding is that domestic monetary
policy shocks are not the main driver of exchange rate fluctuations, especially in developing
3
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and emerging economies.
The second set of results have a bearing on the nature of external shocks and the cross-
country heterogeneity in their spillover effects. We document that anticipated external
shocks explain a large fraction of the fluctuations of interest rates and exchange rates in
our sample of small open economies. These shocks are strongly correlated with the VIX,
a proxy for global risk aversion and uncertainty, as well as U.S. macroeconomic variables.1
In addition, an external shock that signals an improvement in the U.S. economic outlook
spills over into small open economies in the form of a significant currency appreciations and
interest rate declines – the comovement the literature had attributed to domestic monetary
policy shocks. Crucially, we find considerable heterogeneity in spillover effects across coun-
tries. In particular, exposure to anticipated external shocks is stronger for countries that
feature large net foreign liabilities (usually developing and emerging economies).
The third set of empirical results concerns the sources of cyclical deviations from uncov-
ered interest parity (UIP). UIP deviations are often used as a metric to discriminate across
different classes of open economy models, with potentially different policy implications.
While the relevant literature has generally documented their unconditional properties, we
provide new conditional evidence indicating that external shocks are the main source of
UIP deviations. In fact, we find robust evidence of large deviations from UIP in response
to anticipated external shocks, but not in response to domestic (monetary policy) shocks,
1 Anticipated external shocks give rise to a positive comovement among U.S. output, inflation, and Federal
Funds rate. Thus, the bulk of international spillovers (operating through the exchange rate) do not appear
to be driven by U.S. monetary policy shocks.
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suggesting that country-specific UIP shocks are not a satisfactory representation of the
data.2
Taken together, these findings indicate no considerable differences in the way the trans-
mission mechanism of domestic monetary policy works across different countries. On the
contrary, we find substantial differences in countries’ exposure to external shocks, and
present evidence pointing to financial imbalances as being an important element of the
transmission of international shocks to the domestic economy.
Our findings provide new disciplining evidence for models of international business cycles
and exchange rate determination. Thus, we present a model that highlights the drivers
and transmission mechanisms that are necessary to reproduce our findings. We build a
two-country small open economy model based on Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli
(2009), in which economic developments in the large economy (the U.S.) affect the small
economy, but not vice versa.3 Importantly, we depart from the standard framework by
assuming that international financial markets are segmented and financial traders are averse
to hold currency risk along the lines of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015).4 In addition to the
path of interest rate differentials, equilibrium exchange rates are determined by global risk
aversion and the net foreign asset position of the small open economy – the relevant measure
of external imbalances in our model.
Besides monetary policy innovations in both countries, we model a shock to global risk
2 Thus, we find limited evidence of the “delayed overshooting puzzle” (see Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995) in
small open economies.
3 This environment is consistent with our main empirical identification restrictions.
4 See also Jeanne and Rose (2002).
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aversion that influences the static and dynamic decisions of U.S. traders and households.
We show that this shock generates responses that closely mimic those that we find in the
empirical analysis for anticipated external shocks, including the dynamic pattern of cur-
rency excess returns and the cross-country heterogeneity in exchange rate responses. When
global risk aversion declines, U.S. output and inflation increase, and this brings about a
gradual increase in the Federal Funds rate (due to interest rate smoothing). Notwithstand-
ing the expected increase in the Federal Funds rate, higher traders’ risk-bearing capacity
and improved domestic net foreign asset position lead to a large currency appreciation in the
small open economy, accounted for by a sharp decline in ex ante excess returns. Crucially,
this effect is larger for net-debtor countries (usually developing and emerging economies),
as they are more susceptible to changes in traders’ risk aversion. In response to this shock,
domestic central banks cut their policy rate to avoid excessive fluctuations in consumer price
inflation, in line with our empirical evidence. In this framework, domestic monetary policy
shocks have no effect on global risk aversion, and a small impact on a country’s financial
imbalances. As a result, a monetary policy contraction leads to an impact appreciation
of the domestic currency, and to very small deviations from UIP. Overall, this parsimo-
nious framework is therefore capable of reproducing the comovements that we document
empirically, including the dynamic patterns of UIP deviations. We emphasize that asset
imbalances and global risk aversion are central to understand exchange rate fluctuations
and the role of monetary policy.
Furthermore, we use the model to test the empirical approach we take in decomposing
6
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the various sources of shocks. To do so, we simulate data from our estimated model and
perform a Monte Carlo estimation exercise. We find that our identification strategy suc-
ceeds in recovering the effects of both external and domestic shocks: the identified monetary
policy shock maps into the small open economy monetary policy shock in the model, while
the anticipated external shock maps into the innovation to global risk aversion, providing
further support for our identification scheme. To the contrary, a recursive VAR analysis
on model generated data reproduces the exchange rate puzzle, exactly because it conflates
domestic and external shocks.
Related literature This paper is related to several strands of the literature concerned
with understanding open economy fluctuations.
First, we aim to shed light on the empirical evidence on the exchange rate response to
domestic monetary policy. In their seminal article, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) show that
an orthogonalized contractionary shock to the Federal Funds rate leads to a persistent and
significant appreciation of the U.S. nominal exchange rate. Using a structural VAR approach
along the lines of Sims and Zha (2006), Kim and Roubini (2000) find that contractionary
monetary policy innovations induce nominal appreciations of the exchange rates in the non-
U.S. G7 economies.5 Recently, using a recursive VAR analysis, Hnatkovska, Lahiri and
Vegh (2016) document a new pattern of the exchange rate response: they confirm that
the exchange rate appreciates in industrial economies, but it depreciates in developing and
5 See also Cushman and Zha (1997) and Faust and Rogers (2003).
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emerging countries after a monetary policy contraction.6,7
We contribute to this literature by highlighting the challenge to identification represented
by anticipated external shocks. These are shocks that originate in the global economy,
immediately spill over into small open economies, but have no immediate effect on the
external variables – such as U.S. macroeconomic variables – included in the VAR. We
propose a method to address this challenge, and show that anticipated external shocks are
responsible for the bulk of the puzzling exchange rate responses. By and large, this reveals
that the so-called exchange rate response puzzle is likely to be a product of misspecification
rather than a data fact.8
Second, this paper is related to the literature on the empirical importance of spillover ef-
fects of external shocks, recently exemplified by Bruno and Shin (2015) and Rey (2015), who
document large financial spillovers associated with variations in global risk aversion.9 While
we also emphasize the role of global risk aversion, our paper highlights that the spillover ef-
fects of external shocks into exchange rates are associated with a country’s net foreign asset
position. Our results are thus in line with Della Corte, Riddiough and Sarno’s (2016) evi-
6 The results of Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh (2016) are robust to controlling for a large set of domestic
variables as well as using alternative identification strategies that allow for a non-zero contemporaneous
response of the interest rate to exchange rates.
7 Using a high frequency identification scheme, Kohlscheen (2014) finds similar puzzling responses for three
developing countries.
8 Cushman and Zha (1997) also warn about the importance of accounting for external shocks in the VAR
identification of domestic monetary policy innovations. Their paper focuses on Canadian data and assumes
block exogeneity, which is rejected in small-scale VARs.
9 Other papers that study the effect of various U.S. or global shocks on small open economies include Canova
(2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), Mackowiak (2007), Akinci (2013), Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015),
Ben-Zeev, Pappa and Vicondoa (2016), Vicondoa (2016), Davis and Zlate (2017), Iacoviello and Navarro
(2018), Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero and Rebucci (2018), Bhattarai, Chatterjee and Park (2017), and Ferna´ndez,
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)
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dence that investors’ exposure to countries’ external imbalances explains the cross-sectional
variation in currency excess returns. We highlight the joint role of financial markets’ risk
bearing capacity and domestic monetary policy in generating these patterns.
Third, our paper is related to a literature concerned with the ability of structural DSGE
models to account for the substantial influence of external disturbances. Related to our
paper, Georgiadis and Jancokova´ (2017) show that many estimated New Keynesian DSGE
models produce “monetary policy shock” series that are significantly correlated across coun-
tries.10 They interpret this evidence as indicating that these models erroneously label foreign
monetary policy shocks as domestic because they lack mechanisms of international financial
spillovers. Unlike Georgiadis and Jancokova´ (2017) and the related literature, we focus on
small-scale VARs and study the implications for the identification of the exchange rate chan-
nel of monetary policy. In this context, we find that recursive identification schemes within
VARs produce “monetary policy shock” series that predict significant changes in external
variables because these VARs contain an external shock that is not properly accounted
for.11
Fourth, our paper is related to the vast literature that aims to rationalize the observed
cyclical deviations from UIP. We provide new evidence on UIP deviations pointing to these
being predominantly due to global shocks.12 Using these targets in our analysis, we reach
10 See also Justiniano and Preston (2010), Guerron-Quintana (2013) and Alpanda and Aysun (2014)
11 Ja¨a¨skela¨ and Jennings (2011) and Carrillo and Elizondo (2015) use data simulated from specific models to
examine the performance of different VAR schemes in recovering the effects of monetary policy in small open
economies.
12 Using data from Turkey, di Giovanni et al. (2017) document the presence of significant UIP deviations at
both firm and country level, and show that these are strongly correlated with movements in the VIX.
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similar conclusions to Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) on the key drivers of exchange rate fluctu-
ations. In particular, our global risk aversion shock is a specific microfoundation to Itskhoki
and Mukhin’s financial shock (see also Gabaix and Maggiori, 2015). By solving our model
around a non-zero steady-state net foreign asset position, we show that this shock influences
small open economies differently according to their degree of external indebtedness, in line
with our empirical findings.
Last, our paper’s identification procedure is related to the rapidly growing literature on
the VAR identification of anticipated (“news”) shocks (see Beaudry and Portier, 2014, for
a recent survey of the literature). In particular, our identification scheme is analogous to
Barsky and Sims (2011). While this literature focuses on the closed economy effects of
anticipated TFP movements, we are interested in identifying the role of the spillover effects
of the whole set of anticipated external shocks on a large set of small open economies. To
do so, we exploit the fact that the Federal Funds rate is inherently endogenous to U.S.
economic conditions and plausibly exogenous to idiosyncratic economic conditions of small
open economies. In addition, we are equally concerned about identifying the variation in
the domestic interest rate that is orthogonal to the whole set of external shocks, and how
it is related to shocks extracted using a recursive identification scheme. This methodology
is likely applicable beyond the specific questions addressed in this paper.13,14
13 This method of identification of domestic monetary policy shocks is not confined to a three-variable VAR.
In fact, we apply it to larger VARs by imposing additional identification restrictions on the effect of various
domestic shocks.
14 Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2015) recently adopt a similar approach to cleanse an expectational variable
from unanticipated and anticipated TFP shocks.
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1.2 Econometric strategy
In this section, we begin by describing our dataset. We then illustrate the problems asso-
ciated with common identification strategies of monetary policy in small open economies,
and propose an alternative identification strategy designed to resolve these problems.
1.2.1 Dataset
Our data construction and sample selection largely follows the approach of Hnatkovska,
Lahiri and Vegh (2016). We use a large sample of countries over the period 1974:1-2010:12
for which monthly data on exchange rates and interest rates are available, focusing on
countries and time periods that are characterized by a flexible exchange rate regime, fol-
lowing Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) classification. Further details on data sources and
selection criteria are reported in Appendix A.1. The overall dataset features 25 industrial
country-episode pairs and 45 developing and emerging country-episode pairs, for a total of 70
country-episode pairs. While we present the main results for this extended sample of coun-
tries, our impulse response analysis focuses on six of the G7 economies (United Kingdom,
Canada, Japan, Italy, Germany and France) and the six largest developing and emerging
economies in our sample (South Africa, Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea and
Mexico).15
15 We follow the relevant literature in grouping developing and emerging economies together, and use “devel-
oping” to refer to this group of countries.
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1.2.2 A three-variable small open economy VAR
Our baseline is a three-variable VAR, featuring (home and foreign) interest rates and the
exchange rate. In later sections, we will also present findings obtained from larger VARs,
featuring additional macroeconomic and financial variables. We focus on a three variable
VAR as the baseline, since adding variables does not affect our key points about identifica-
tion. In addition, a three-variable VAR allows us to transparently compare the implications
of different identification strategies, as well as relate to results obtained in standard UIP
regressions.
Consider a three-variable VAR with the Federal Funds rate (r?), the policy-controlled
interest rate of small open economy k (rk), and the logarithm of the bilateral nominal
exchange rate between country k’s currency and the U.S. dollar (s). Exchange rates are
in domestic currency units per US dollar, so that an increase is a depreciation of local
currency relative to the US dollar. The model is specified in levels and the number of lags
is chosen according to the Akaike information criterion. Unlike the case of a vector error
correction model, the estimators of the impulse responses of a VAR in levels are consistent
in the presence of nonstationary but cointegrated variables where the form of cointegration
is unknown. Furthermore, estimators are consistent even in the absence of a cointegrating
relations among the variables, provided that enough lags are included in the VAR (see
Hamilton, 1994).
Thus, let yt ≡ [r?t rk,t st]′ be the 3 × 1 vector of observable variables that have length
T . The Federal Funds rate is ordered first, the policy-controlled interest rate of country k
12
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is ordered second, and the log of the nominal exchange rate is ordered last. Denote by
yt = B(L)ut
the reduced-form moving average representation in the levels of the observable variables,
formed by estimating an unrestricted VAR in levels. The relationship between reduced-form
innovations and structural shocks is given by:
ut = A0εt (1.1)
which implies the following structural moving average representation:
yt = B(L)A0εt. (1.2)
We assume that the structural shocks are orthogonal with unitary variance, so that the
impact matrix A0 satisfies A0A
′
0 = Σ, where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of innova-
tions. In order to identify A0, one needs to impose n(n−1)/2 additional restrictions, where n
is the number of variables included in the VAR.
A common recursive identification scheme. The typical exclusion restrictions consist
13
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in assuming that the impact matrix is lower triangular, that is
ut =

a1 0 0
a2 a3 0
a4 a5 a6
 ε˜t (1.3)
which is estimated with the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. From Eq. (1.2), the restrictions
on the impact matrix A0 imply that the Federal Funds rate can respond contemporaneously
only to its own innovations which are captured by the first element of the vector ε˜t. The
policy controlled interest rate of the small open economy is not allowed to react on impact to
movements in the nominal exchange rate while it can respond to unanticipated movements
in the Federal Funds rate. The second element element of the vector of structural shocks
ε˜t is thus typically interpreted as the monetary policy shock of the small open economy.
In this context, a domestic monetary policy shock influences the policy rate of the small
open economy (and possibly the exchange rate) contemporaneously, has no effect on the
Federal Funds rate contemporaneously, and leaves the response of the Federal Funds rate
unrestricted in the months following the shock.
Before discussing the estimated exchange rate response to monetary policy, we ask
whether the identified monetary policy shocks are consistent with the assumptions of a
small open economy. To this end, Figure 1.1 depicts the median impulse response of the
Federal Funds rate to a domestic monetary policy shock. Under a recursive identification, a
contractionary domestic monetary policy shock leads to a significant and persistent decline
14
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
Figure 1.1: Federal Funds rate response to a 1% contractionary domestic monetary policy
shock (recursive identification scheme)
Note: The shaded areas are the 90% confidence intervals from 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications of
the reduced-form VAR.
of the Federal Funds rate, the external variable of our VAR.
In addition, in Appendix A.2.1 we perform a test of Granger causality that consists in
regressing the Federal Funds rate or the cyclical component of U.S. industrial production on
up to 36 lags of the identified monetary policy shock. The monetary policy shock identified
through recursive ordering appears to systematically predict future movements in both
external variables, especially when longer horizons are part of the regression.16
There are two possible interpretations of the results in Figure 1.1. First, the U.S. economy,
and, in turn, the Federal Reserve, may respond to disturbances that originate in small
open economies, and in particular to their monetary policy innovations. Second, monetary
policy in small open economies may respond to external shocks that affect the world interest
rate with some delay. While both interpretations are valid in principle, we note that the
16 For the regression with the Federal Funds rate, we reject the null of no Granger causality in all countries
at 5% level of significance with the exception of South Africa and Brazil. Somewhat similar figures appear
when we perform the Granger causality test using the cyclical component of U.S. industrial production.
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first interpretation is both contrary to conventional wisdom and inconsistent with the very
premise of a small open economy by which domestic shocks do not alter world interest rates
and incomes.
We thus subscribe to the second interpretation, and argue that the domestic monetary
policy shocks identified through recursive schemes partly capture the endogenous response
of domestic central banks to external shocks that influence the world interest rate with
some delay. For this reason, we will refer to these shocks as “anticipated external shocks.”
In addition, we note that these results question the applicability of the common block
exogeneity restriction. In the context of the baseline VAR, block exogeneity is equivalent
to setting the coefficients on domestic variables in the Federal Funds rate equation to zero.
Under the null of no anticipated external shocks, these coefficients are in fact zero. However,
if anticipated effects exist, as documented in Figure 1.1, these coefficients are not zero, and
applying block exogeneity would be equivalent to imposing a counterfactual restriction.17
While block exogeneity implies a restriction on the reduced-form parameters of the VAR,
our identification strategy imposes a restriction on the propagation of shocks.
1.2.3 An alternative identification scheme
Within the above three-variable VAR, we propose an identification strategy designed to
disentangle the effects of anticipated external shocks from those of monetary policy innova-
tions of country k. Our approach is agnostic in that we impose a minimal set of restrictions
17 It is important to stress that the above statements are conditional on the information set spanned by the
three variables included in the three-variable VAR outlined above.
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consistent with virtually all small open economy models. The economic meaning of these
restrictions is that shocks that originate in the small open economy have no influence on
the world interest rate at any horizon. Specifically, we assume that the external variable in
the VAR, the Federal Funds rate, is properly characterized as following a stochastic process
driven by unanticipated and anticipated shocks, and that the latter display no contempora-
neous effect on the Federal Funds rate.18 We refer to anticipated movements in the Federal
Funds rate as anticipated external shocks. The domestic monetary policy shock of the small
open economy is then identified as the linear combination of the VAR innovations that is
orthogonal to unanticipated and anticipated external shocks.
To implement our identification scheme in the three-variable VAR presented above, we
note that the impact matrix A0, defined in Eq. (1.1), is unique up to any rotation D
of the structural shocks. Specifically, for any 3 × 3 orthonormal matrix D, the entire
space of permissible impact matrices can be written as A˜0D, where A˜0 is an arbitrary
orthogonalization (e.g. the one implied by a recursive identification scheme).
Here, the h-step ahead forecast error is
yt+h − Et−1yt+h =
h∑
τ=0
Bτ A˜0Dεt+h−τ
where Bτ is the matrix of moving average coefficients at horizon τ . The share of the forecast
18 We find that the results are robust to relaxing this contemporaneous restriction.
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error variance of variable i attributable to the structural shock j at horizon h is then:
Ωi,j(h) =
∑h
τ=0Bi,τ A˜0γγ
′A˜′0B′i,τ∑h
τ=0Bi,τΣB
′
i,τ
where γ is the j-th column of D, while Bi,τ corresponds to the i-th row of Bτ .
Our primary objective is to identify the monetary policy shock of country k such that
it is orthogonal to unanticipated and anticipated external shocks. To do so, we adopt a
procedure that extends the identification scheme proposed by Barsky and Sims (2011) and
that can be explained as composed of two steps.19 First, we recover the unanticipated
and the anticipated movements in the Federal Funds rate. The former is identified as
the orthogonal innovation in r?. The latter is identified as the shock that maximizes the
contribution to the forecast error variance of the Federal Funds rate up to a truncation
horizon H, subject to the restriction that this shock has no contemporaneous effect on the
Federal Funds rate. Formally, the identification of the anticipated external shock boils down
to solving the following maximization problem:
γ∗ = arg max
H∑
h=0
Ω1,2(h) =
∑h
τ=0Bi,τ A˜0γγ
′A˜′0B′i,τ∑h
τ=0Bi,τΣB
′
i,τ
s.t.
A˜0(1, j) = 0 ∀j > 1
19 In using a maximum forecast error variance approach, Barsky and Sims (2011) build on earlier work by
Faust (1998), Uhlig (2004), and Francis et al. (2014).
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γ(1, 1) = 0
γ′γ = 1
where the first two constraints ensure that the anticipated external shock has no contem-
poraneous effect on the Federal Funds rate, and the third restriction narrows the solution
space to the one of possible orthogonalizations of the reduced form, by preserving the or-
thonormality of the rotation matrix D. By imposing that γ must be a unit vector, the
second column γ of matrix D is identified. The second step consists in recovering the do-
mestic monetary policy shock of small open economy k. This shock can be identified by
making use of the condition that the matrix D must be orthonormal, i.e. DD′ = D′D = I.
More specifically, letting γ∗ = [0 γ1 γ2] where γ2 = −
√
1− γ21 , then one can express D as:20
D =

1 0 0
0 γ1 γ2
0 −γ2 γ1
 (1.4)
where the first column ensures that the unanticipated external shock (ε?t ) is the orthogonal
innovation to the Federal Funds rate, the second column results from the maximization
problem above and therefore captures the whole set of shocks that induce future movements
in the Federal Funds rate (ε??t ), and the third column identifies the monetary policy shock
20 The negative sign in front of γ2 is just a normalization. Specifically, to preserve the orthonormality of D, one
needs the 2×2 lower right submatrix of D to have either opposite diagonal elements or opposite off-diagonal
elements.
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of country k (εmpt ) that may affect both the nominal exchange rate and the policy controlled
interest rate, while it has no contemporaneous or future impact on the external variable
(r?).21 Last, for any orthogonalization A˜0 of residuals ut which satisfies the first constraint
of the above maximization problem, the structural shocks can be recovered from the relation
ut = A˜0Dεt. (1.5)
where D is the rotation matrix previously identified, and εt ≡ [ε?t ε??t εmpt ]′.
1.2.4 Comparison between identification schemes
What is the relation between the shocks identified using a recursive identification and the
ones identified with the proposed alternative? By combining equations (1.1) and (1.5) one
can show that
ε˜mpt = γ1ε
??
t + γ2ε
mp
t (1.6)
where ε˜mpt is the domestic monetary policy shock under a recursive identification, whereas
ε??t and ε
mp
t are the anticipated external shock and the domestic monetary policy shock
identified under the proposed alternative identification, respectively. Equation (1.6) implies
the following. If the restrictions underlying a recursive identification were correct, both
identification strategies would recover exactly the same set of shocks. In that case, the
estimated value of γ1 would be zero. However, if anticipated external shocks exist and
21 By construction this condition is subjected to the maximization above, therefore results can still deliver that
a monetary policy shock has some, but likely insignificant, future effects on the Federal Funds rate.
20
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
spill over into the small open economy (that is, if estimated γ1 6= 0), standard recursive
identification schemes fail to correctly recover the true monetary policy shock.
The empirical evidence reported below is the result of estimating a set of VAR models
using the approach just described. We begin by showing the results for the effect of a
country-specific monetary policy shock (Section 1.3), and then present the impulse responses
associated with an anticipated external shock (Section 1.4). We will also document the
conditional behavior of ex ante excess returns (Section 1.5). We frame our main results in
the form of impulse response functions (IRFs). Bias-corrected bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals are based on 1000 replications (see Kilian, 1998).
1.3 Effects of a domestic monetary policy shock
Table 1.1 reports the results for the identified exchange rate response to monetary policy
innovations in our sample of countries. To determine whether a domestic monetary contrac-
tion results in a currency appreciation, we follow Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh (2016) and
report whether the response of the exchange rate after an interest rate shock is negative
on impact, at the end of the first month, and at the end of the first quarter. Based on
country-by-country VARs we compute the share of developing countries that have experi-
enced appreciations of their exchange rates following a 1% positive shock to the interest
rate, under the two identification schemes discussed here. For each country we also record
the size of the (log) exchange rate response and report the median of these responses. Table
1.1 clearly indicates that accounting for anticipated movements in the external variable (the
21
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Federal Funds rate) matters: under the identification strategy proposed in this paper, the
share of economies that see their exchange rate appreciating after a positive interest rate
shock is much larger than under the recursive identification scheme. This occurs on impact
(70% of developing countries relative to 27%), one month after (70% relative to 27%) and
three months after (67% relative to 30%). In terms of median magnitudes of the exchange
rate responses, we find that the exchange rate appreciates by 0.76% on impact, 1.18% after
one month and 1.33% after three months, in developing and emerging countries. For indus-
trial countries, the share of countries that experience an appreciation is around 90% and
the median magnitudes of appreciation are around 2.5%. All these figures are statistically
significant. Overall, we argue that accounting for spillovers of external shocks goes a long
way in resolving the puzzling exchange rate responses found in the literature.
Figure 1.2 reports the exchange rate responses to a 1% policy-induced increase in the
interest rate obtained by applying our econometric framework to each of the countries in
our sample. Panel 1.2a features the IRFs for the non-US G7 economies, while Panel 1.2b
reports the IRFs for the six largest developing and emerging economies in our sample.
We find that the exchange rate response puzzle does not emerge under our proposed
identification strategy. In fact, in nearly all countries, regardless of their development status,
a policy-induced interest rate hike leads to a significant impact appreciation of the local
currency, with the only exception being Brazil, whose exchange rate response resembles the
one obtained under a recursive identification scheme.22 The quantitative impact response
22 In overviewing the recent experience of Brazil, Blanchard (2004) attributes the apparent exchange rate
depreciation after an interest rate increase to a higher probability of default on government debt induced by
22
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Recursive iden. (γ1 = 0) Alternative iden.
Impact 1 month 3 months Impact 1 month 3 months
Industrial countries
Share with appreciation 78% 83% 78% 91% 91% 91%
Median of st response -0.31 -0.48 -0.39 -2.40 -2.93 -2.82
(0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.33) (0.42) (0.44)
Developing countries
Share with appreciation 27% 27% 30% 70% 70% 67%
Median of st response 0.25 0.30 0.21 -0.76 -1.18 -1.33
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.33) (0.34)
Table 1.1: Empirical exchange rate response to a 1% contractionary monetary policy shock
Notes: The table reports the fraction of countries that experience an appreciation of their exchange rate
following a 1 percent positive shock to the domestic policy rate, and the size of the (log) exchange rate
responses. Standard deviation of the median responses are reported in parentheses. The impulse responses
on the impact, first month, and first quarter (three months) are reported based on a country-by-country
VAR analysis.
of the nominal exchange rate to a 1% policy-induced increase in the interest rate differs
notably from country to country. In fact, the impact appreciation of the exchange rate that
we observe ranges from around 1% to around 10%. These numbers are largely in line with
other estimates from the VAR literature on advanced economies.
Figure 1.2 also reports the IRFs that result from a monetary policy shock identified
through a recursive scheme. This identification scheme produces the exchange rate response
puzzle: the impact response of most developing countries’ exchange rate to a monetary con-
traction is positive (i.e., a nominal depreciation), unlike for most industrial countries whose
impact response is either negative (i.e., a nominal appreciation) or statistically insignificant,
higher interest rates.
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(a) Industrial countries
Figure 1.2: Empirical exchange rate response to a 1% contractionary monetary policy
shock
Note: The red solid lines are the estimated IRFs to our identified 1% interest rate increase from the
baseline three-variable VAR. The blue dashed lines are the estimated IRFs to 1% interest rate increase
from the baseline three-variable VAR identified using a recursive scheme. The shaded areas are the 90%
confidence intervals from 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR.
with the only exception being Canada.23
Alternative identification in multivariate VAR with domestic output and infla-
tion. We ask whether the exchange rate response to monetary policy innovation is robust
23 The impulse responses that we obtain under the Cholesky identification scheme are slightly different from
those reported in Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh (2016) because they run a bivariate VAR with interest rate
differential and bilateral exchange rate. Instead, we separate the two interest rates and run a trivariate VAR.
24
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
(b) Developing and emerging countries
Figure 1.2: Empirical exchange rate response to a 1% contractionary monetary policy
shock
Note: The red solid lines are the estimated IRFs to our identified 1% interest rate increase from the baseline
three-variable VAR. The blue dashed lines are the estimated IRFs to 1% interest rate increase from the
baseline three-variable VAR identified using a recursive scheme. The shaded areas are the 90% confidence
intervals from 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR.
to controlling for the dynamics of domestic output and inflation. To do so, we extend our
baseline VAR to include industrial production (in log changes) and CPI inflation. To extend
our identification of domestic monetary policy shocks we need to impose additional identi-
fication restrictions on the effect of various domestic shocks. We thus follow Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) in assuming that innovations in output and inflation affect interest rates
25
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and exchange rates contemporaneously, while domestic monetary policy shocks influence
these variable with a (one month) lag (See Appendix A.2.6 for further details). Our re-
sults, reported in Figure A.2.3 in Appendix A.2.6, reveal that accounting for the influence
of output and inflation does not substantially affect the response of the exchange rate to
a domestic monetary policy innovation. Besides, a monetary contraction brings about a
(short-lived) decline in output, in line with standard macro models. The inflation response
to a monetary contractions appears insignificant in developing countries, while it generates
the so-called price puzzle in industrial economies, as often observed in the related literature.
1.4 Effects of an anticipated external shock
What are the effects of anticipated external shocks? What explains a country’s exposure
to their spillover effects? In this section, we present a set of empirical results that aim at
answering these questions.
Figure 1.3: Empirical IRFs to an anticipated external shock
Note: The lines denote median IRFs by group of countries with corresponding 90% confidence intervals
from 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR.
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Figure 1.3 shows the effects of a shock that signals a future increase in the Federal Funds
rate, by reporting the median IRFs to an anticipated external shock by country group,
while Appendix A.2.4 reports the same IRFs country by country.24,25 An external shock
that anticipates a future increase in the Federal Funds rate induces a nominal apprecia-
tion and interest rate decline, the comovement that was originally attributed to domestic
monetary policy shocks. Further inspection reveals that the quantitative effect of these
international spillovers is larger in developing countries relative to industrial ones; in fact,
developing countries’ median exchange rates and interest rates are considerably more sen-
sitive to external shocks that signal a similar future increase in the Federal Funds rate.
More specifically, a shock that leads the Federal Funds rate to increase by about 10 ba-
sis points in the following ten months leads to a 0.5% and 2% median impact exchange
rate appreciations in industrial and developing countries, respectively, as well as a 15 basis
points impact interest rate decline in industrial countries, compared to a 60 basis points
impact interest rate decline in developing countries. At this point, recall that a recursive
identification scheme would confound these correlations for the monetary policy innovation
(see Section 1.2.4). Since these two shocks induce opposite correlations between exchange
rate and interest rate a recursive identification scheme is subject to producing estimates of
the exchange rate channel of monetary policy that feature an opposite sign relative to those
implied by our proposed identification. Given our empirical results, this outcome should ob-
24 In Figure 1.3, IRFs are normalized to obtain a similar-size expected increase in the Federal Funds rate.
25 In Appendix A.2.2, we show that the informational content in the baseline VAR is sufficient to identify the
anticipated external shock.
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tain for countries that are more susceptible to anticipated external shocks. A forecast error
variance decomposition of our VAR (Figure A.2.1 in Appendix A.2) reveals that anticipated
external shocks explain a substantial fraction of policy interest rates and nominal exchange
rates in small open economies, and this fraction is larger (around 50%) in developing and
emerging economies.26 In other words, anticipated external shocks largely account for the
positive unconditional covariance between interest rates and exchange rates that appears in
developing and emerging economies, and has been documented by Hnatkovska, Lahiri and
Vegh (2016). It is natural at this point to ask what anticipated external shocks capture.
1.4.1 The nature of anticipated external shocks: global risk aversion
We study the effects of anticipated external shocks on a larger set of external variables, in-
cluding U.S. industrial production, inflation in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), and
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), a forward-looking measure
of uncertainty and risk aversion. Figure 1.4 shows that an anticipated external shock that
signals a future increase in the Federal Funds rate is associated to a hump-shaped increase
in U.S. industrial production, temporarily higher U.S. CPI inflation, and a temporary de-
cline in the VIX. These statistically significant comovements are typical of demand-driven
business-cycle fluctuations, associated with movements in risk aversion, and do not appear
to be driven by U.S. monetary policy shocks.
In this sense, our estimated anticipated external shocks are largely associated to move-
26 In addition to the results emphasized in the text, Figure A.2.1 shows that the anticipated external shocks
shocks explains around 15% of the variation of the Federal Funds rate at a two-year horizon.
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Figure 1.4: Empirical IRFs to an anticipated external shock (Other external variables)
Note: This figure features the estimated IRFs to the anticipated external shock on a set of external
variables from a four-variable VAR with the three baseline variables and U.S. industrial production, U.S.
CPI inflation, or the VIX ordered fourth. The solid line and the dashed lines denote median IRFs of
industrial and developing countries respectively. The shaded areas are the corresponding 90% confidence
intervals from 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR.
ments in global risk aversion, echoing numerous findings in the literature. In fact, researchers
similarly found that global movements in the VIX are associated with considerable finan-
cial spillovers into small open economies’ asset prices (e.g. Bruno and Shin, 2015, and
Rey, 2015) and currency excess returns (e.g. Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan, 2011 and
Della Corte, Riddiough and Sarno, 2016).
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1.4.2 The role of a country’s net foreign asset position
Does a country’s net foreign asset position matter for its exposure to external shocks? A
natural measure of exposure to external shocks is the fraction of the forecast error variance
of a country’s exchange rate that is explained by the external shock.27 In Figure 1.5, we
show that countries with a higher ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP tend to be more
exposed to external shocks. The line of best fit is significant in both the baseline and
extended samples, and are equal to -1.66 and -0.56, respectively. We take this as evidence
that a country’s net foreign asset position is a key determinant of exposure to external
disturbances. We also note that while a country’s net foreign asset position is correlated
with its development status, there are several exceptions that suggest that the level of
development may not be the key factor that determines exposure to external shocks.28 In
Section 3.2, we introduce a model in which the net foreign asset position is the relevant
measure of international financial market exposure for the small open economy’s currency
risk. In the model, countries with higher net foreign debt are more exposed to exogenous
changes in the risk bearing capacity of financial markets.
27 Other measures, such that the exchange rate response to external shocks lead to similar results.
28 In fact, an advanced country like Canada is both a net debtor and highly exposed to external shock, while
the opposite is true for developing countries such as South Africa and Korea.
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Figure 1.5: Net foreign assets and the exposure to external shocks
Note: Data on annual net foreign asset position to GDP are from the updated and extended version of
dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). “Net foreign assets to GDP” is a country’s average
over its sample period.
1.5 Ex ante excess returns and the exchange rate response
to domestic and external shocks
Do different shocks generate different dynamic patterns of currency excess returns? The
interest in this question is threefold. First, the literature on monetary policy and exchange
rates in industrial economies often finds UIP deviations conditional on monetary policy
shocks (e.g., Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995, and Faust and Rogers, 2003). Second, a strand of
the international finance literature is concerned with the sources of currency excess returns,
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and a decomposition of these across structural shock appears desirable. Third, a satisfactory
explanation of the above empirical findings should be consistent with all aspects of exchange
rates, interest rate differentials, and excess returns (see Section 3.2).
1.5.1 Conditional UIP deviations
We begin by constructing series of excess returns conditional on domestic monetary policy
shocks (εmp) and anticipated external shocks (ε??), and analyze their dynamic behavior. In
line with the relevant literature, the ex ante excess return on the domestic bond held from
period t to period t+ 1, inclusive of the expected currency return, is defined as:
Et xˆt+1 ≡ rˆt − rˆ?t − Et ∆sˆt+1 (1.7)
where hatted variables denote series generated by our VAR, and Et is the expectation oper-
ator conditional on time-t information. Non-zero ex ante excess returns point to violation
of so-called UIP. In fact, under UIP the exchange rate would be expected to depreciate at
a rate that equals the interest rate differential.
Figure 1.6 reports the dynamic responses of one-year ahead ex ante excess returns to our
identified shocks.29 The dynamic response of excess returns appears different across shocks.
After a contractionary domestic monetary policy innovation, excess returns are relatively
small and short lived. In the wake of a 1% impact increase in the domestic policy rate,
29 That is, we report the returns from an investment of one year maturity on the domestic bond. This is given
by: Et xˆt+12 ≡ rˆt − rˆ?t − Et ∆sˆt+12, where interest rates are annualized.
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the domestic currency experiences about a 2% (1%) impact increase in excess returns in
industrial (developing) economies. After 2-3 months, the response of excess returns is largely
insignificant for both set of countries. To the contrary, after anticipated external shocks,
excess returns are relatively large and persistent. In the wake of an anticipated external
shock (re-scaled to cause a 1% impact decline in the domestic policy rate), the domestic
currency experiences significant declines in excess returns for more than two years (about 1
year) in industrial countries (developing countries). Also, peak responses of excess returns
tend to be significantly larger than what we observe conditional on domestic monetary
policy shocks. Figure A.2.4 in Appendix A.2 documents that these patterns hold also
in country-specific VARs, with few exceptions. Overall, we find robust evidence in favor
of large deviations from UIP due to anticipated external shocks, but not in response to
domestic monetary policy shocks. In light of these results, we note that our identified
monetary policy shocks are generally associated with a mild degree of delayed overshooting
(see Appendix A.2.5 for a discussion).
1.5.2 UIP deviations and the exchange rate response to shocks
What do the above patterns of excess returns imply for the exchange rate response to
shocks? We follow Engel (2016) and iterate Eq. (1.7) forward to measure the relation
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(a) Domestic monetary policy shock (b) Anticipated external shock
Figure 1.6: The empirical response of currency excess returns
Note: The figure shows the response of one-year ahead ex ante excess returns to domestic monetary policy
shocks and anticipated external shocks. IRFs are re-scaled so that they reflect responses to a 1% impact
change in the interest rate differential.
between ex ante excess returns and the level of the exchange rate. This implies:30
sˆt = sˆ
UIP
t + Et
∞∑
j=0
xˆt+j+1 (1.8)
where sˆUIPt ≡ −Et
∑∞
j=0
(
rˆt+j − rˆ?t+j
)
is the exchange rate level consistent with UIP.
Besides this component, the current level of the exchange rate is influenced by the infinite
sum of ex ante excess returns. As the above empirical results generally point to differences in
the conditional covariance between the exchange rate level and the interest rate differential
across structural shocks, we note that Eq. (1.8) implies:31
Cov(sˆt, rˆt − rˆ?t ) = Cov(sˆUIPt , rˆt − rˆ?t ) + Cov(Et
∞∑
j=0
xˆt+j+1, rˆt − rˆ?t )
30 In deriving Eq. (1.8) we impose that lim
j→∞
sˆt+j = 0, consistent with the observation that our VAR generates
stationary time series.
31 More specifically, Cov(sˆt, rˆt − rˆ?t | ε??) > 0, while Cov(sˆt, rˆt − rˆ?t | εmp) < 0
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Ant. ext. shocks Dom. mon. pol. shocks
Regression equation βS in (1.9) βM in (1.10) βS in (1.9) βM in (1.10)
Industrial countries
Germany 44.2 -21.2 -125.0 -96.9
(0.88) (0.62) (1.38) (1.42)
Canada 92.2 13.2 -53.3 -53.0
(4.10) (1.44) (2.21) (1.04)
Italy 46.9 -3.9 -49.9 -19.1
(4.40) (0.53) (1.83) (0.45)
France 55.1 -14.2 -81.4 -23.3
(1.58) (0.39) (3.04) (0.56)
Japan 64.3 -34.7 -204.4 -177.4
(0.87) (0.67) (8.20) (5.36)
UK 169.6 -13.6 -36.2 -17.3
(1.92) (0.32) (1.33) (0.35)
Developing countries
Indonesia 13.1 -4.4 -3.0 -8.3
(1.44) (0.44) (0.71) (0.62)
Brazil 39.9 -0.8 9.0 -7.5
(5.57) (1.19) (0.81) (0.48)
South Africa 30.3 -12.2 -93.4 -27.5
(1.95) (0.74) (6.84) (1.48)
Korea 66.2 -22.0 -25.6 -41.9
(2.95) (1.18) (5.32) (4.79)
Mexico 13.0 -3.0 -2.7 -8.5
(0.38) (0.27) (0.69) (0.72)
Philippines 49.7 0.5 -5.9 -5.9
(2.68) (0.55) (3.65) (1.64)
Table 1.2: Contribution of ex ante excess returns to exchange rate level
Notes: The four columns report the estimated values of coefficients βS and βM in regression equations
(1.9) and (1.10), respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These regressions are run on
VAR generated data in which only anticipated external shocks are active (Columns 1 and 2) and VAR
generated data in which only domestic monetary policy shocks are active (Columns 3 and 4). Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
This equation represents a useful decomposition of the covariance between exchange rates
and interest rate differentials. In fact, it allows us to assess to what extent this covariance
differs from the one implied by the path of the UIP-consistent exchange rate. To do so, we
construct series for the three variables in Eq. (1.8) conditional on one shock at a time, and
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run the following two regressions:32
sˆt = αS + βS(rˆt − rˆ?t ) + uS,t (1.9)
sˆUIPt = αM + βM (rˆt − rˆ?t ) + uM,t (1.10)
(a) Domestic monetary policy shock (b) Anticipated external shock
Figure 1.7: Exchange rates and their UIP component
Note: The figure shows the exchange rate response to anticipated external shocks and domestic monetary
policy shocks. It also reports the response of the UIP component of the exchange rate, sUIP , according to
the decomposition in Eq. (1.8).
Coefficient βS in Eq. (1.9) captures the elasticity of the level of the exchange rate to the
interest rate differential, while coefficient βM in Eq. (1.10) captures the elasticity of the
infinite sum of ex ante excess returns to the interest rate differential. The contribution of
ex ante excess returns to the dynamics of the level of the exchange rate are captured by the
difference between βM and βS . Table 1.2 reports the estimated values of these coefficients
conditional on our identified shocks. The main observation is that under anticipated external
shocks the covariance between the level of the exchange rate and the interest rate differential
32 When constructing infinite sums of VAR generated series, we use a sufficiently high truncation horizon.
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appears to mostly reflect the component associated with cumulative excess returns. That
is, under external shocks estimated βS are significantly positive, while estimated βM are
significantly negative.33 This implies that the cumulative sum of excess returns covaries
positively with the interest rate differential and is pivotal in determining the response of the
exchange rate to anticipated external shocks. The behavior of the level of the exchange rate
under domestic monetary policy shocks is instead largely determined by its UIP component.
In fact, except for Brazil, the level of the exchange rate is qualitatively consistent with UIP.
Figure 1.7 depicts the median response of actual exchange rate (sˆt) and its component
consistent with UIP (sˆUIPt ) to both external and domestic shocks. This evidence reinforces
the results presented so far: the bulk of the exchange rate response to external shocks
is accounted for by the behavior of excess returns, while the exchange rate response to
monetary policy shocks is not significantly different from the one predicted by UIP.34
1.6 Interpreting our empirical results
To provide a rationale for our empirical findings, we build a two-country small open economy
dynamic general equilibrium model. After a brief introduction of the model environment,
we present a summary of the equilibrium conditions in log-linear form and highlight the key
mechanisms (Section 1.6.1), while Appendix A.3 contains the full derivation of the model.
Then, we use the model to interpret the empirical IRFs and the observed differences across
33 Canada and Philippines are the only exceptions
34 Median responses for developing countries indicate that the exchange rate tends to react more weakly to a
domestic monetary policy innovation than the response implied by UIP.
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groups of countries (Sections 1.6.3 and 1.6.4). We conclude this section by analyzing the
performance of different VAR identification schemes on data simulated from the theoretical
model (Section 1.6.5).
1.6.1 Environment and equilibrium equations
The core of the baseline framework belongs to the international macroeconomic tradition
initiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). It consists of a two-country dynamic general equi-
librium model with incomplete asset markets, monopolistically competitive producers and
sticky prices, introduced along the lines of Calvo (1983). As prices are set in the producer’s
currency, the model features complete exchange rate pass-through. Asset markets are in-
complete in that agents can only trade nominal riskless bonds denominated in Home and
Foreign currency.35 We assume that foreign-currency-denominated bonds are only traded
in the foreign economy. We depart from the standard small open economy DSGE model
by assuming that all international transactions are intermediated by financial traders who
are averse to large risky positions (Jeanne and Rose, 2002, Gabaix and Maggiori, 2015,
Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2017). Last, we follow De Paoli (2009) in characterizing the small
open economy by taking the limit of the home economy size to zero. The limit is taken
after having derived the equilibrium conditions for the two-country model. Thus, the two
countries, Home and Foreign, represent the small open economy and the large economy,
respectively. The foreign economy represents the United States, and is interpreted as the
35 The implications of this model would obtain in a model in which agents in the small open economy borrow
in foreign currency, but hedge their currency mismatch resorting to international financial markets.
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center of the international financial system.
Households and the financial sector
We consider two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). The world economy is populated
with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the segment [0, n) belongs
to country H and the population in the segment (n, 1] belongs to country F .
Domestic economy. The domestic economy is populated by a representative household
whose preferences are given by
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
[
C1−ωt
1− ω −
N1+ηt
1 + η
]
(1.11)
where Nt denotes hours worked, Et is the expectation operator conditional on time-t infor-
mation, and Ct is a composite consumption index defined by
Ct ≡
[
(ν)
1
θ (CH,t)
θ−1
θ + (1− ν) 1θ (CF,t)
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
where CH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by the CES function
CH,t ≡
[(
1
n
) 1
ι
∫ n
0
CH,t(i)
ι−1
ι di
] ι
ι−1
where i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the good variety. CF,t is an index of goods imported from the
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foreign country given by an analogous CES function:
CF,t ≡
[(
1
1− n
) 1
ι
∫ 1
n
CF,t(i)
ι−1
ι di
] ι
ι−1
Parameter ι > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties (produced within
any given country). Parameter 1 − ν ∈ [0, 1] governs the home consumers’ preferences for
foreign goods, and is a function of the relative size of the foreign economy, 1 − n, and
of the degree of openness, λ, namely 1 − ν = (1 − n)λ. Parameter θ > 0 measures the
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, from the viewpoint of the domestic
consumer.
Domestic households can trade only a one-period nominal bond, which is denominated
in domestic currency. The domestic household’s flow budget constraint is given by
Bt+1
Rt
+ PtCt = WtNt +Bt (1.12)
where Bt+1 denotes the nominal balance of home bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate
on the home bond, Pt is the price index of the composite consumption good Ct, and Wt is
the nominal wage rate. The problem of the domestic household consists in maximizing its
utility (Eq. 1.11) subject to the budget constraint (Eq. 1.12). The first-order conditions of
this problem are standard and therefore relegated to Appendix A.3.
Foreign economy. The foreign economy is populated by a continuum of households.
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At the beginning of each period, all members of a household are identical and share the
household’s assets. During the period, the members are separated from each other, and each
member receives a shock that determines the role of the member in the period. A member
will be a trader with probability mt, and a worker with probability 1−mt. These shocks are
i.i.d. among the members. We follow Cavallino (Forthcoming) in assuming that the share
of members that operate as traders in the international financial market is proportional to
the output of the home economy (that is, mt = µnP
?
H,tYt). This assumption entails that
traders devote a larger part of their balance sheets to bonds issued by larger economies,
and allows us to map the model to data on the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. The
members’ preferences are aggregated and represented by the following utility function of
the household:
Et
∞∑
j=0
β?j
[
mtU(C˜?t ) + (1−mt)U(C?t , N?t )
]
where
U(C˜?t ) ≡
(
C˜?t
)1−ω?t
1− ω?t
(1.13)
and
U(C?t , N?t ) ≡
(C?t )
1−ω?t
1− ω?t
− (N
?
t )
1+η
1 + η
Here, C˜?t is the consumption of traders, C
?
t is the consumption of workers, and ω
?
t governs
the degree of (relative) risk aversion of both household’s members. We assume that foreign
households’ risk aversion is time varying. In particular, ω?t = ω
? exp(ξt) and its time-varying
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component evolves according to the following autoregressive process:
ξt = ρξξt−1 + εξ,t (1.14)
where εξ,t are i.i.d. disturbances drawn from a Normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation σξ? . The problem of the worker-member of the foreign household is
standard, and analogous to the one of the domestic household. Her intertemporal budget
constraint reads
B?t+1
R?t
+ P ?t C
?
t = B
?
t +W
?
t N
?
t −
mt
1−mtT
?
where mtT
? is an intrahousehold transfer that accrues to the trader-members of the house-
holds, while the other foreign variables are interpreted analogously to their domestic coun-
terparts. The first-order conditions of this problem are standard and therefore relegated to
Appendix A.3.
Traders on the foreign exchange market. Traders of measure mt are the only agents
who can trade bonds internationally. Since traders are part of the foreign household, the
foreign economy is interpreted as the center of the international financial system. Traders
collectively take a zero-capital position D˜t+1 in home-currency bonds and short D˜
?
t+1 =
−D˜t+1/St foreign-currency bonds, or vice versa. Here, St is the nominal exchange rate,
defined to be the price of the foreign currency unit (units of home currency per unit of
foreign currency), as in the empirical section. The exchange rate is relevant for the balance
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sheet of international traders because each economy offers a bond in its own currency. A
one U.S.-dollar position generates a U.S.-dollar return of R˜t+1 = R
?
t −Rt StSt+1 . The problem
of each individual trader consists in choosing a position d?t+1 to maximize (1.13) subject to
the budget constraint P ?t C˜
?
t = T
? + R˜t+1d
?
t+1, where T
? denotes an intrahousehold transfer
that ensures that the trader’s consumption is always non-negative. In Appendix A.3.1
we show that the individual trader’s problem is approximately equivalent to maximizing
a mean-variance utility of returns. The resulting demand for home-currency bonds by the
household traders is then
D˜?t+1 =
mt
ω?t
Et R˜t+1
Vart(R˜t+1)
⇒ D˜t+1
St
= −mt
ω?t
Et R˜t+1
Vart(R˜t+1)
(1.15)
The financial market clears when the interest rates Rt and R
?
t are such that Bt+1 +Dt+1 =
0 and B?t+1 + D
?
t+1 = 0, which in particular implies that in equilibrium the net foreign
asset position of home equals net foreign liabilities of foreign, nBt+1 = −(1− n)B?t+1St, in
aggregate per-capita terms.36 Thus, Eq. 1.15 becomes:
− Bt+1
PH,tYt
=
µ
ω?t
Et
(
Rt
St
St+1
−R?t
)
Vart(R˜t+1)
(1.16)
Finally, we follow De Paoli (2009) in taking the limit for n → 0 to portray our small open
economy. This implies that economic developments in the large economy affect the small
open economy, but the reverse is not true. Under this assumption, the mass of household-
36 Here, nDt = D˜t and (1− n)D?t = D˜?t .
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traders mt → 0, ∀t. As a result, traders influence the model’s behavioral equations only
through their pricing of the exchange rate. The resulting profits from their trading activity
are infinitesimally small from the standpoint of the foreign economy, and don’t affect the
household’s budget constraint.
We solve the model by log-linearization around a steady state with a non-zero net foreign
asset position, and use b ≡ B/PHY to denote the steady-state net foreign asset position rela-
tive to GDP of the Home economy. Using the international bond market clearing condition,
the linearized version of the traders’ bond demand (Eq. 1.16) reads
χ (−bξt − bt+1) ≈ rt − r?t − Et ∆st+1 (1.17)
where χ ≡ σ2sµ/ω? governs traders’ risk bearing capacity in steady state.37 Eq. (1.17) is the
exchange rate determination equation of our model economy. The standard UIP condition
obtains as a special case when the risk-bearing capacity of traders χ = 0. In turn, this is true
if traders are risk neutral (ω? = 0), the size of the financial sector µ→∞, or the exchange
rate is non-stochastic (σ2s ≡ Vart(∆st+1) = 0).38 If χ > 0, the model economy features two
sources of UIP deviations - exogenous changes in global risk aversion ξt and endogenous
movements in the net foreign asset position to GDP, bt+1, where bt+1 ≡ Bt+1/PH,tYt −
B/PHY . As emphasized by Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), an equilibrium imbalance that
requires traders to be long in a currency generates an increase in the expected return
37 For illustration purposes, Eq. (1.17) is an approximation in that it ignores the terms arising because of
steady-state UIP deviations.
38 The variance of the innovation to the nominal exchange rate, σ2s , is endogenously determined.
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of this currency. In this simple model, a country’s imbalance is directly related to its
net foreign asset position. A negative net foreign asset position requires traders to be
long in that country’s currency and therefore requires an increased expected return of this
currency. The level of expected excess returns required by traders is proportional to their
risk bearing capacity. Thus, changes in global risk aversion affect the degree of expected
returns demanded by traders in equilibrium. In our linearized model, changes in risk bearing
capacity have a direct effect on exchange rate determination if a country’s steady-state net
foreign asset position is non-zero. If the steady-state net foreign asset position of a country
is negative, traders are long in that country’s currency. In this case, higher global risk
aversion requires higher expected returns on this currency to provide the incentive for risk-
averse traders to keep absorbing the imbalance. The opposite reasoning holds for countries
that are net creditors in steady state. This mechanism is consistent with Della Corte,
Riddiough and Sarno’s (2016) evidence that net-debtor countries experience a significantly
larger currency appreciation during periods of low global risk aversion (proxied by the VIX)
than net-creditor countries.
Firms
Each country features a continuum of firms that produce output under a constant-returns-
to-scale production function. The economy-wide production functions are thus Yt = ANt
and Y ?t = AN
?
t for the domestic and foreign goods, respectively.
We assume that each producer sets its price in her own currency. In this case the law
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of one price holds. Under these conditions, PH,t = StP
?
H,t and PF,t = StP
?
F,t for each t.
However, the home bias specification leads to deviations from purchasing power parity;
that is, Pt 6= StP ?t . Prices follow a partial adjustment rule as in Calvo (1983). Producers
of differentiated goods know the form of their individual demand functions, and maximize
profits taking overall market prices as given. In each period a fraction, α ∈ [0, 1), of
randomly chosen producers is not allowed to change the nominal price of the goods they
produce. The remaining fraction of firms, given by 1 − α, chooses prices optimally by
maximizing the expected discounted value of profits.
Monetary authorities
In each country, the monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor (1993)-type rule with
interest-rate smoothing:
r?t = ρrr
?
t−1 + (1− ρr)φpi?t + εr?,t rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)φpit + εr,t
where εr?,t and εr,t are i.i.d. disturbances drawn from a Normal distribution with mean zero
and standard deviations σr? , and σr, respectively.
39 In line with central banks’ practices,
we assume that they target a measure of consumer price (CPI) inflation.40
39 Monetary authorities are assumed to target a zero inflation steady state.
40 The results presented below hold if the domestic central bank is assumed to respond also to variations in
the nominal exchange rate, as in Monacelli (2004), in line with the evidence of “fear of floating” reported
by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
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1.6.2 Steady state, calibration, and log-linear equations
In our model, the size of traders’ balance sheet depends on risk perceptions. To account
for risk in the computation of the model, we follow Coeurdacier, Rey and Winant (2011) in
deriving the “risky” steady state, defined as a steady state in which agents expect future risk
and the realization of shocks is zero at the current date. The risky steady state differs from
the non-stochastic state only by second order terms related to variances and covariances
of the endogenous variables. These second moments pin down the size of traders’ long-
run balance sheet. To analyze model dynamics, we then look at a first order log-linear
approximation around the risky steady state. Importantly, we allow the steady-state net
foreign assets, b, to be non-zero, in line with the evidence for most developing and emerging
economies. To do so, we allow a difference in the home and foreign countries’ discount
factors, that is β < β?, and thus different steady-state returns on their bonds.
Our benchmark target for b is a net foreign asset position relative to (annual) GDP
of around -35%, the average value in our sample of the largest developing and emerging
economies.41 Our model is calibrated to a monthly frequency. We set β? = 0.9967 which
implies a steady state annual interest rate of about 4%, and η = 1 which implies a unit
Frisch elasticity. Our calibration of the Calvo parameter (α = 0.9167) implies an average
duration of price contracts of one year. We set the consumption share of imports λ = 0.4,
and the trade elasticity θ = 1. The Taylor-rule coefficient on consumer price inflation, φ,
equals 1.5, while the parameter that governs the degree of interest rate smoothing, ρr, equals
41 Data on annual net foreign asset position to GDP are from the updated and extended version of dataset
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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0.947, in line with typically estimated values in the DSGE literature. We set ρξ = 0.90, and
we follow Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) and set the parameter that governs the risk-bearing
capacity of the financial sector, χ = 0.01.42
We choose the variances of our model’s structural shocks so that the model reproduces
three empirical moments in our sample of countries: the unconditional variance of nom-
inal exchange rate changes, the observed unconditional deviation from UIP and the un-
conditional contemporaneous correlation between the exchange rate and the interest rate
differential.43
We report below the model’s log-linear equilibrium conditions, evaluated at the risky
steady state.44 The equilibrium conditions that govern economic dynamics in the large
(Foreign) economy read:
ω? Et ∆c
?
t+1 + ω
? Et ∆ξt+1 = r
?
t − Et pi?t+1 (1.18a)
pi?t = β
? Et pi
?
t+1 + κ
?((η + ω?)c?t + ω
?ξt) (1.18b)
r?t = ρr
?
t−1 + (1− ρ)φpi?t + εr?,t (1.18c)
where κ? = (1−β
?α?)(1−α?)
α? . Given the exogenous processes, the economic dynamics in the
large economy are fully described by the consumption Euler equation (Eq. 1.18a), the New
42 Without loss of generality we normalize the steady state so that ln(C?) = 1.
43 Our model therefore matches Var(∆st), α1 in ∆st+1 = α0 + α1(it − i?t ), and β1 in ∆st = β0 + β1∆(it − i?t ).
44 All variables are expressed as log deviations from their steady state, except for net foreign assets to GDP
(bt), which is expressed as changes from its steady state. Also, β˜ ≡ 1/R.
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Keynesian Phillips curve (Eq. 1.18b), and the monetary policy rule (Eq. 1.18c). Both Eqs.
(1.18a) and (1.18b) are influenced by shocks to foreign households’ (global) risk aversion,
which act in effect as “demand” shocks.
Domestic variables are determined accourding to the following system of log-linear equa-
tions:
ωEt ∆ct+1 = rt − Et pit+1 (1.19a)
piH,t = β Et piH,t+1 + κ(ωct + ηyt + λ(1− λ)−1qt) (1.19b)
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)φpit + εr,t (1.19c)
pit = (1− λ)piH,t + λ(∆st + pi?t ) (1.19d)
yt = θλ(1− λ)−1qt + (1− λ)(1 + b− β˜b)ct +
[
1− (1− λ)(1 + b− β˜b)
]
(c?t + θqt) (1.19e)
β˜ (bt+1 − brt)− bt + b (piH,t + ∆yt) = (1 + b− β˜b)
(
yt − ct − λ(1− λ)−1qt
)
(1.19f)
∆st = ∆qt − pi?t + pit (1.19g)
where κ = (1−βα)(1−α)α . Besides an analogous Euler equation (Eq. 1.19a), a PPI Phillips
curve (Eq. 1.19b), and a CPI-inflation targeting rule (Eq. 1.19c), the small economy is
influenced by global dynamics since it is effectively open to goods and asset trade. For
this reason, marginal costs in Eq. (1.19b) and aggregate demand for domestically produced
goods (Eq. 1.19e) depend upon the terms of trade (which can be expressed as a function
of the real exchange rate, qt). Also, aggregate demand for the Home goods depends on
49
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
Foreign consumption, in proportion to the degree of trade openness, λ. Importantly, com-
plete exchange rate pass-through implies that nominal exchange rate fluctuations directly
translate into changes in Home CPI (Eq. 1.19d), exactly because import prices are de-
nominated in the (Foreign) producer’s currency, and these adjust sluggishly. The exchange
rate is determined according to Eq. (1.17), described above. In this environment, there are
three structural shocks: Home and Foreign monetary policy innovations (εr,t and εr?,t), and
shocks to global risk aversion (εξ,t).
Figure 1.8: Theoretical IRFs to a temporary reduction in global risk aversion
Note: The impulse is an unanticipated 1% reduction in the foreign (large) economy’s degree of risk
aversion.
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1.6.3 Equilibrium dynamics following a shock to global risk aversion
Figure 1.8 depicts the IRFs to a temporary reduction in global risk aversion. In the Foreign
economy, a temporary lower level of risk aversion induces households to increase current
consumption, while firms’ faced with higher demand raise their prices. The Foreign central
bank responds to the ensuing inflationary pressures by gradually raising the nominal interest
rate, as implied by its aversion to inflation and desire for interest rate smoothing. In the
Foreign economy (U.S.), a decline in global risk aversion is therefore associated with rising
consumption (output), higher inflation, and a rising nominal interest rate.
This shock spills over into the domestic economy through its effect on the exchange
rate and external demand for Home goods. Ceteris paribus, a decline in global risk aversion
induces the financial sector to require lower excess returns on the domestic currency, thereby
causing an instantaneous appreciation of the nominal exchange rate (Eq. 1.17). This
effect is reinforced by higher external demand for domestic goods, which improves its net
foreign asset to GDP position and reduces the degree to which international financial traders
are exposed to Home currency risk. These forces dominate over the nominal depreciation
implied by the interest rate differential. In fact, the exchange rate response to this shock is
largely driven by the behavior of excess returns, as depicted in Figure 1.10b. The nominal
appreciation of the small economy’s exchange rate brings about a contemporaneous fall in
import prices (in local currency) which puts downward pressure on domestic CPI inflation
(see Eq. 1.19d). In our calibrated model, the deflationary forces implied by lower (domestic-
currency) prices of imported goods dominate in determining the short-run dynamics of CPI
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inflation.45 As a result, the Home central bank cuts the nominal interest rate. Thus, this
shock acts as a favorable supply shock in the small economy imposing a procyclical response
of an inflation-targeting monetary authority. The unconditional procyclicality of monetary
policy in developing and emerging countries is a widely documented fact (e.g., see recent
survey by Frankel (2010)).
The role of a country’s net foreign asset position
In Figure 1.8, we also report the IRFs of a small open economy that features a zero steady-
state net foreign asset position (b = 0) to represent the response of the typical advanced
economy.46 In this economy, changes in global risk aversion have no direct influence on the
small open economy’s exchange rate, only an indirect one through the equilibrium interest
rate differential and net foreign asset position. As a result, an economy with b = 0 is less
exposed to global risk aversion shocks relative to a net-debtor economy (b < 0). In this
sense, our model is capable of reproducing the empirical IRFs in Figure 1.4 by attributing
the cross-country differences in responses to their observed differences in net foreign asset
positions. This mechanism is consistent with the evidence in Della Corte, Riddiough and
Sarno (2016): higher global risk aversion (proxied by the VIX) is associated with a stronger
dollar, especially against currencies of net debtor countries.
Furthermore, we show that the model’s predictions on exposure and net foreign asset
45 The domestic component of CPI inflation reflects two opposing forces: higher product demand and adverse
expenditure-switching effect due to worsening of the terms of trade.
46 The average long-run net foreign asset position to GDP of the largest advanced small open economies in our
sample is in fact around zero.
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Figure 1.9: Net foreign assets and the exposure to external shocks
The black line denotes the fraction of forecast error variance of st that is explained by ε
?
t ? as we let b take
values that we observe in our baseline sample.
positions align well with the cross-country evidence, as illustrated in Figure 1.9.47 Note
that for
1.6.4 Conditional UIP deviations in the theoretical model
Figure 1.10a depicts the theoretical IRFs of a country’s exchange rate to a temporary 1%
increase in the domestic interest rate. UIP suggests that an unexpected tightening in mon-
etary policy leads to an immediate appreciation of the currency and a future depreciation.
Our model reproduces this pattern qualitatively, but also features deviations from the UIP-
47 Mexico and especially UK represent the only exception.
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consistent exchange rate due to the dynamics of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. In
the baseline model (b < 0), the equilibrium decline in Home GDP increases the real value of
the ratio NFA/GDP. This induces traders to requires higher expected returns on the home
currency (see Eq. 1.17). The outcome is an equilibrium exchange rate appreciation that is
smaller than what is implied by UIP, in line with the evidence for developing and emerging
economies in Figure 1.7a. In industrial economies (model with b = 0), this mechanism is
largely muted and the exchange rate response is generally in line with its UIP counterpart.
Figure 1.10b depicts the theoretical IRFs of a country’s exchange rate to a temporary de-
cline in global risk aversion. The model reproduces the evidence in Figure 1.7b. Deviations
from UIP account for the response of the exchange rate to external shocks.
(a) Domestic monetary policy shock (b) Global risk aversion shock
Figure 1.10: Theoretical exchange rate responses and their UIP component
Note: The figure shows the exchange rate response to domestic monetary policy shocks and global risk
aversion shocks. It also reports the response of the UIP component of the exchange rate, sUIP , according
to the decomposition in Eq. (1.8). The responses of industrial and developing countries reflect a different
calibration of the steady-state NFA/GDP, b (See text)
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1.6.5 Examining the performance of identification schemes
To examine the performance of our empirical approach, a three-variable system identical to
the baseline empirical specification is estimated on model generated data. We show that our
empirical approach performs quite well, whereas a recursive VAR scheme reproduces the
exchange rate puzzle. Figure 1.11 indicates that the IRFs stemming from our alternative
(a) Domestic monetary policy shock
(b) Anticipated external shock and model’s response to global risk aversion shock
Figure 1.11: Model and Monte Carlo estimated IRFs: three-variable VAR
Note: The black starred line shows the theoretical IRF from the model presented in Section 3.2. The solid
lines are the average estimated IRF from a Monte Carlo simulation with 45 repetitions (countries) and 150
observations per repetition. The shaded areas are the 90% confidence intervals from 1000 bias-corrected
bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR. In Panel (a) both the recursive identification scheme
(γ1 = 0) and our proposed alternative are estimated on model-generated data.
55
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
VAR-based identification scheme are generally in line with the theoretical ones. In fact,
the identified domestic monetary policy shock maps closely into the Home monetary policy
shock in the model, while the anticipated external shock maps into the global risk aversion
shock, providing support for our identification scheme. Figure 1.11a also presents the IRFs
implied by a recursive identification. The recursive VAR fails to correctly capture the
exchange rate response to a monetary policy innovation. In contrast to the theoretical
response, the recursive VAR suggests that a policy-induced interest rate increase triggers
a nominal depreciation. In addition, the monetary policy shock series identified under the
recursive scheme predicts significant changes in the Federal Funds rate, as in Figure 1.1.
This happens exactly because the recursive scheme conflates the independent variation in
the domestic interest rates and its endogenous response to changes in global risk aversion.
This evidence, together with that reported in Table 1.3, indicates that our model explains
the reasons behind the emergence of the exchange rate puzzle.
1.6.6 Discussion
While the model explains a large fraction of the exchange rate response to domestic and
external shocks, it should not be interpreted as a comprehensive descriptor of the economics
at play. First, the only source of cross-country heterogeneity in our model are differences in
net foreign asset positions. While this is consistent with the evidence reported in Figures
1.5 and 1.9, other mechanisms can reasonably give rise to heterogeneous responses to ex-
ternal shocks. Some examples are differences in countries’ size (Hassan, 2013), commodity
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Recursive iden. Alternative iden.
Data Model Data Model
Industrial countries
Share with appreciation 78% 100% 91% 98%
Median of st response -0.31 -0.56 -2.40 -2.80
(0.10) (0.03) (0.33) (0.12)
Developing countries
Share with appreciation 28% 0% 69% 67%
Median of st response 0.24 1.24 -0.69 -0.75
(0.07) (0.03) (0.18) (0.10)
Table 1.3: Empirical exchange rate response to a 1% contractionary monetary policy shock
Notes: The table reports the fraction of countries that experience an impact appreciation of their exchange
rate following a 1 percent positive shock to the domestic policy rate, and the size of the (log) exchange rate
impact responses. Standard deviation of the median responses are reported in parentheses.
intensity (Ready, Roussanov and Ward, 2017), monetary policy rules (Backus et al., 2010),
or financial development (Maggiori, 2017). Investigating whether these mechanisms are
capable of explaining part (if any) of the differences in estimated exchange rate responses is
beyond the scope of our paper. Second, we model the domestic central bank as a strict CPI-
inflation targeter, consistent with stated practices of central banks in nearly all small open
economies in our sample. That said, departures from this monetary rule can reasonably
provide complementary explanations for the observed behavior of monetary policy. In the
context of our model, raising the domestic nominal rate in response to a nominal deprecia-
tion can be the optimal policy because it avoids excessive depreciation and the associated
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adverse wealth effects.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper concerns the sources of exchange rate fluctuations in small open economies. We
began by documenting that international spillovers of external shocks present a challenge to
identifying shocks in small open economies, particularly in common VAR settings. In fact,
traditional identification strategies in VARs lead one to confound monetary policy innova-
tions with the central banks’ endogenous response to external shocks. We showed that these
shortcomings are at the heart of recent estimates of puzzling exchange rate responses to
monetary policy. We find that international spillovers (operating through exchange rates)
are larger for net-debtor economies, the countries for which the exchange rate response
puzzle has primarily been documented. In other words, exchange rate fluctuations in these
economies are predominantly explained by external disturbances, and not by domestic mon-
etary policy. In particular, we documented that one external shock drives a large fraction
of exchange rate fluctuations in the typical small open economy, especially in net debtor
countries. This shock is associated with large movements in global risk aversion, and is the
primary driver of cyclical deviations from UIP.
We illustrated that these empirical correlations can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a
two-country small-open economy in which a country’s net foreign asset position and global
risk aversion play a key role in exchange rate determination. The model we introduced
can reproduce all our findings: the evidence on the determinants of countries’ exposure to
58
Chapter 1 International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
international spillovers, the evidence on the origins of UIP deviations, and the emergence
and resolution of the exchange rate response puzzle. In future work, we plan to explore
the policy implications of this model. In particular, the model suggests that countries
with different NFA positions should differently benefit from pegging their currency to the
U.S. dollar. In fact, under fixed exchange rates UIP deviations are nil (due to the absence
of currency risk), while UIP deviations are larger and costlier for net debtor countries.
This observation points to the importance of designing models featuring data-consistent
microfoundations of UIP deviations.48
48 Besides, our model points to one potential limitation of dynamic stochastic models of emerging markets
primarily driven by shocks to the external interest rate. While the present paper suggests that external
shocks are indeed prominent, it also suggests that changes in the external interest rate can have different
effects on exchange rates depending on whether they reflect U.S. monetary policy shocks or the systematic
response of the Federal Funds rate to other types of shocks.
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Should Central Banks Target Investment
Prices?
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, many central banks around the world have adopted inflation targeting as a
means of conducting monetary policy and communicating policy commitments to the public.
Over the years, most countries that have adopted an inflation targeting policy state their
target in terms of an index of consumer price inflation.1 In a recent blog post, Bernanke
(2015) writes, “In practice, the FOMC has long been clear that its preferred measure of
1 The Federal Reserve targets inflation in the core PCE index, but also closely tracks CPI and PPI inflation.
The primary objective of the European Central Bank is price stability and its Governing Council has an-
nounced that “price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.” For comprehensive overviews of the inflation indices targeted
by monetary authorities around the world, see Svensson and Leiderman (1995), Bernanke et al. (1999), and
Svensson (2010).
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inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices, as reflected specifically in the deflator for
personal consumption expenditures (PCE).” Later in the same post, he continues, “Frankly,
I don’t think there is much of a case for ... using the GDP deflator to measure inflation
rather than using overall or core PCE inflation.”
Bernanke summarizes the current state of central bank thinking about the appropriate
price index to target. We believe this consensus should be examined using economic models.
We present a model showing that targeting consumer prices alone leads to significantly larger
welfare losses than targeting an index of consumer and investment-goods prices. We find
that optimal policy in our model puts much more weight on investment price inflation than
does the GDP deflator. In fact, even though investment is only about 20 percent of GDP, in
our calibrated model the central bank should put approximately equal weight on stabilizing
consumer and investment price inflation.
Why do we come to these conclusions? As we will show, targeting consumer prices
alone would be innocuous if either investment-goods prices were fully flexible, or if shocks
to consumer and investment demand were symmetric.2 The evidence does not appear to
support either hypothesis. Our model has nominal rigidities for both consumption and
investment goods and imperfectly correlated shocks to the two sectors, which reproduces
key features of the data. Optimal policy in the model requires that the central bank should
target investment prices. Furthermore, in the model omitting the investment price from the
2 To our knowledge, nearly all New Keynesian models with investment make one of these two assumptions, the
exceptions being Basu, Fernald and Liu (2014) and Ikeda (2015). For example, models based on Smets and
Wouters (2007) implicitly assume a flexible relative price for investment goods, since an investment-specific
technology improvement in their framework immediately increases the number of investment goods that can
be obtained by foregoing one consumption good.
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central bank’s target leads to substantial welfare losses.
Figure 2.1: Inflation dynamics of consumer and investment-good prices
Note: “CORE PCE deflator” corresponds to the price deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures
less Food and Energy, while “Non-resid. Investment Deflator” is the price deflator for Fixed Investment
less Residential Investment, as provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Both variables are
seasonally adjusted.
The intuition for the quantitative result stems from an important economic difference
between consumption and investment goods: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) is likely to be much higher for investment than for consumption demand. The IES
for consumption is relatively small – typical estimates put it around 0.5. Under a plausible
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set of assumptions, the IES in investment is nearly infinite.3 Thus, small changes in the
own real interest rate for investment due to expected changes in the price of investment
goods have huge effects on investment demand, which is not the case for consumption. This
difference in the IES leads to the asymmetry in optimal policy: in order to keep outcomes
close to the social optimum, it is more important to avoid fluctuations in investment price
inflation than in consumption price inflation.
Since our argument depends on the existence of nominal rigidities in the prices of in-
vestment goods, it is fair to ask whether the evidence supports this assumption. Available
microeconomic evidence points to substantial price stickiness in several categories of invest-
ment goods: for example, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Vermeulen et al. (2012)).
So does macroeconomic evidence. For example, Basu et al. (2013) find that consumption
technology improvements lead to expansions in consumption, investment and hours, but in-
vestment technology improvements lead all three key variables to decline in the short run.4
Basu, Fernald and Liu (2014) find that nominal rigidities in both the consumption sector
and the investment sector are crucial for explaining the observed asymmetry of impulse re-
sponses to sector-specific technology shocks, as well as the evidence that the relative price of
investment adjusts slowly to relative technology shocks.5 For our results to hold, in addition
to nominal rigidities, we require that shocks to investment and consumption technology not
be perfectly symmetric. Prima facie evidence to this effect is provided by the fact that the
3 See Barsky, House and Kimball (2007).
4 The importance of investment technology shocks for aggregate fluctuations is stressed by Greenwood, Her-
cowitz and Krusell (2000), Fisher (2006) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010).
5 See also Moura (2018).
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relative price of investment goods not only has a trend, but also fluctuates over time relative
to this trend (in simple models, the relative price of investment reflects relative technology,
at least over long periods of time). In addition, using Basu et al.’s (2013) series for sectoral
technologies we find that investment-specific technology shocks are distinctly more volatile
than consumption-specific technology shocks and the correlation between them is positive
but far from one.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal conduct of monetary policy in an
economy characterized by shocks to both consumption and investment sectors when these
shocks are not identical. To this end, we develop a micro-founded welfare criterion that
allows normative analysis, and we discuss the nature of the trade-off that the central bank
confronts. We characterize the properties of the optimal policy under commitment, and
compare the welfare properties of alternative monetary policy rules.
Our framework is a two-sector, closed-economy model in which one sector produces non-
durable consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. Prices in both mar-
kets are subject to the Calvo pricing friction. Labor and capital are immobile across sec-
tors, and nominal wages are assumed to be flexible. Following the influential analysis of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we obtain a quadratic approximation to the social welfare
function, and show that the deviation of welfare from its Pareto-optimal level depends not
only on the variances of the consumption gap and PCE inflation, but also on the variances
of the investment spending gap and investment price inflation. With two nominal frictions
and only one instrument, the central bank is confronted with a nontrivial trade-off: in-
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deed, it is generally impossible to stabilize inflation and the output gaps in both sectors
simultaneously.6
We document that the optimal policy represents a compromise between the sectoral wel-
fare losses. Most importantly, we find that the second-best policy places disproportionately
high weight on the investment sector, notwithstanding its small relative size in the economy.
Moreover, we find that monetary rules that ignore investment price inflation incur sizable
welfare losses. In our calibrated model, a rule that targets only consumer price inflation
leads to average welfare losses that are considerably larger than those obtained under an
alternative simple rule that targets only investment price inflation.
Extending our study of simple rules, we study the behavior of a hybrid rule that responds
only to the two sectoral inflation rates, and find that its performance is nearly optimal
if the weights on the two inflation rates are chosen correctly. We find that such a rule
places considerable weight on investment inflation, and thus its performance cannot be
approximated by a Taylor rule that targets the GDP deflator. Finally, we document that
our results are robust to empirically plausible calibrations of the degree of price stickiness
in the investment sector.
The literature on optimal monetary policy is vast, but most of its conclusions are drawn
using models that abstract from capital accumulation. Important works include Erceg and
6 As an aside, we note that our model does not display what Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007) term the “divine
coincidence,” even though we assume that both real and nominal wages are fully flexible. This result shows
that the divine coincidence result obtains only due to the strong auxiliary assumption that all production
functions in the economy are hit by the same technology shock. Since this assumption is clearly unrealistic
and made only for modeling simplicity, “divine coincidence” is probably not important for the conduct of
monetary policy.
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Levin (2006), Huang and Liu (2005), Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004), Mankiw and Reis (2003),
and Ikeda (2015). Erceg and Levin investigate the optimal monetary policy properties of
a model that features non-durable and durable consumption goods. Consistent with our
results, they find that the monetary authority should over-weight durable consumption
goods prices in the price index that it targets.7 Huang and Liu document the importance
of targeting the producer price index (PPI) besides the CPI, in a model that features an
input-output production structure. Aoki presents a model with a sticky-price sector and an
otherwise identical flexible-price sector, and show that the optimal monetary policy is to
target sticky-price inflation, rather than a broad inflation measure. This result is generalized
by Benigno, who shows that in a two-country model an inflation targeting policy in which
higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity
is nearly optimal.8 Mankiw and Reis take an analytical approach to characterizing the
optimal price index that a central bank should target as a function of a number of sectoral
characteristics; their main conclusion is that central banks should assign a high weight to
the nominal wage rate.9 In a recent related paper, Ikeda shows that a trend towards a falling
relative price of investment may increase the optimal inflation target up to around 2%. His
work focuses on deriving the optimal inflation target rate on PCE inflation, in the context of
an estimated medium-scale two-sector model with a downward trend in investment prices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the dynamic general equilibrium
7 See also the recent contribution by Barsky et al. (2016).
8 The results of Aoki and Benigno thus generally support the Federal Reserve’s procedure of targeting “core”
rather than “headline” inflation.
9 This particular conclusion depends on their belief that the average allocative wage in the US is very sticky
in nominal terms. For evidence to the contrary, see Basu and House (2016).
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model. Section 2.3 describes the solution method and parameter calibration. Section 2.4
discusses the second-order approximation to the welfare function. Section 2.5 examines
characteristics of the optimal policy, and evaluates the performance of alternative rules.
Section 2.6 presents conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
2.2 The model
Our model consists of two sectors that produce non-durable consumption goods and invest-
ment goods. Labor-augmenting technology in both sectors has a trend, and both production
functions are subject to stationary TFP fluctuations around that trend. Thus, we allow for
the existence of a trend in the steady-state relative price of investment. The relative price
of equipment investment has consistently declined over the past four decades. Both product
markets exhibit monopolistic competition, and nominal prices do not change continuously.
Each household has two types of workers that are permanently attached to their respective
productive sectors. Households display separable preferences in the consumption good and
in hours worked supplied to the two sectors. Labor markets are competitive. To finance
consumption, households invest in riskless bonds and hold the sectoral capital stocks.
2.2.1 Firms
The model economy features two distinct sectors producing non-durable consumption goods
(sector c) and investment goods (sector i). Each sector comprises a continuum of monopolis-
tically competitive firms producing differentiated products. Let Yj,t denote sector-j output
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(real value added), for j = {c, i}:
Yj,t =
[∫ 1
0
(Yj,t(f))
1
1+θj df
]1+θj
where θj > 0 denotes the markup rate in the production composite of sector j. The
aggregator chooses the bundle of goods that minimizes the cost of producing a given quantity
of the sectoral output index Yj,t, taking the price Pj,t(f) of each good Yj,t(f) as given. The
aggregator sells units of each sectoral output index at its unit cost Pj,t:
Pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
(Pj,t(f))
− 1
θj df
]−θj
It is natural to interpret Pj,t as the price index for real value added in each sector. Thus,
Pc,t can be interpreted as the deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) or
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).10 Pi,t, on the other hand, denotes the price level in the
investment sector. One can also define an aggregate price index Pt as:
Pt = (Pc,t)
φ (Pi,t)
1−φ
where φ is the steady-state output share of consumption. The aggregate price index, Pt, is,
to a first-order approximation, the GDP deflator of this model economy.
10 In our model of a closed economy, the two indexes are identical up to a first-order approximation, which is
the order to which we will analyze the model.
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Households’ demand for each good is given by:
Y dj,t(f) =
[
Pj,t(f)
Pj,t
]− 1+θj
θj
Yj,t (2.1)
Each differentiated good is produced by a single firm that hires capital services Kj,t(f)
and a labor index Lj,t(f) defined below. All firms within each sector face the same Cobb-
Douglas production function, with an identical level of technology Zj,t and labor-augmenting
technical progress Γj,t:
Yj,t(f) = Zj,t (Kj,t(f))
α (Γj,tLj,t(f))
1−α
We thus separate total factor productivity (TFP) into two components: Z, the part that
is subject to shocks, and Γ, which grows steadily at a constant rate. Capital and labor
are perfectly mobile across the firms within each sector, but cannot be relocated between
sectors. Each firm chooses Kj,t(f) and Lj,t(f), taking as given the sectoral wage index Wj,t,
and the sectoral rental price of capital Pc,tr
k
j,t, where r
k
j,t is the sectoral real rental rate of
capital in units of consumption goods. The conditional factor demand functions derived
from the cost-minimization problem for labor and capital are, respectively:
Wj,t = MCj,t(f)(1− α)Yj,t(f)
Lj,t(f)
Pc,tr
k
j,t = MCj,t(f) (α)
Yj,t(f)
Kj,t(f)
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Since capital and labor can flow freely across firms within the same sector, and produc-
tion functions feature constant returns to scale, all firms within each sector have identical
nominal marginal costs per unit of output, which are given by:
MCj,t =
α˜
Zj,tΓj,t
(Pc,tr
k
j,t)
α(Wj,t)
1−α (2.2)
where α˜ ≡ α−α(1− α)α−1.
We follow Calvo (1983) and assume that firms change their nominal prices only occa-
sionally, and the probability that a firm changes its price is constant. Once a price is set,
the firm must supply its differentiated product to meet market demand at the posted price.
We follow Yun (1996) in assuming that the new price set in a generic period t is indexed to
trend inflation.11 Hence, even if the firm is not allowed to reoptimize its price, the preset
price grows at the rate of trend inflation.
In Appendix B.1 we show that, under full indexation to trend inflation, the steady state
coincides with the flexible-price steady state: each firm sets its price as a constant markup
over marginal cost. This assumption guarantees that the steady state is not distorted by
trend inflation. Also, in the steady state the monopolistic markup is completely offset by the
subsidy τj . This assumption guarantees that the steady state of the model is not distorted
by imperfect competition. Furthermore, full indexation to trend inflation guarantees that,
in each sector, the log-linearized Phillips Curve is identical to the one obtained under zero
11 Trend inflation in our model is induced by the presence of the trend component of TFP, Γ.
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steady-state inflation.12
2.2.2 Households
We assume that there is a continuum of households indexed on the unit interval, and
that each household supplies homogeneous labor services. Within every household, a fixed
number of νc members work exclusively in the consumption sector, while the remaining νi
members work exclusively in the investment sector. Each member of a given household h
∈ [0, 1] who works in sector j = {c, i} has the same wage rate Wj,t(h) and supplies the same
number of hours Nj,t(h). Households have no market power in the labor market, and the
aggregation in each sectoral labor market is given by:
Lj,t = νj
∫ 1
0
Nj,t(h)dh
In other words, a representative labor aggregator combines individual labor hours into a
sectoral labor index Lj,t using the same proportions that firms would choose. As a result
of competitive labor markets, the sectoral wage index is the same across households within
sector; that is, Wj,t(h) = Wj,t.
In each period, the household purchases Yc,t (or, equivalently, Ct) units of consumption
goods at price Pc,t, and Yi,t (or It) units of investment goods at price Pi,t. Investment
contributes to the formation of new capital stock in either consumption or investment
sector; that is, It = Ic,t + Ii,t. Thus, the households face the following intertemporal budget
12 For an analysis of the implications of trend inflation for New Keynesian models, see Ascari (2004).
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constraint:
(2.3)
Pc,tCt + Pi,tIt +Dt,t+1Bt+1 ≤Wc,t(h)Nc,t(h) +Wi,t(h)Ni,t(h) +
+Pc,tr
k
c,tKc,t + Pc,tr
k
i,tKi,t + Πt +Bt − Tt
where Bt+1 is a nominal state-contingent bond that represents a claim to one dollar in a
particular event in period t + 1, and this claim costs Dt,t+1 dollars in period t; Wj,t(h) is
sector-j nominal wage, Kj,t is the beginning-of-period capital stock in sector j, Πt is the
profit share, and Tt is a lump-sum tax used by the government to finance subsidies to firms.
The capital stock in each sector evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kj,t+1 = (1− δ)Kj,t + Ψ
(
Ij,t
Kj,t
)
Kj,t (2.4)
where the function Ψ(·) represents the adjustment cost in capital accumulation. We assume
that Ψ
(
Ij
Kj
)
satisfies Ψ
(
Ij
Kj
)
=
Ij
Kj
, Ψ′
(
Ij
Kj
)
= 1, and Ψ′′
(
Ij
Kj
)
= −ψ where ψ > 0, and
Ij
Kj
is the share of investment to capital in sector j in steady state.
The household’s expected lifetime utility is given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsWt+s(h) (2.5)
where the operator Et here represents the conditional expectation over all states of nature,
and the discount factor satisfies 0 < β < 1. The period household utility function Wt(h) is
additively separable with respect to the household’s consumption Ct and the leisure of each
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household member:
Wt = U(Ct)− Vc(Nc,t(h))− Vi(Ni,t(h)) (2.6)
The subutility functions are defined as follows:
U(Ct) =
C1−σt
1− σ
Vc(Nc,t) = υc
Nc,t(h)
1+η
1 + η
Vc(Ni,t) = υi
Ni,t(h)
1+η
1 + η
where the parameters σ, υc, υi and η are all strictly positive.
Each household h maximizes (2.5) with respect to each of its components, subject to the
budget constraint in (2.3) and the capital laws of motion in each sector in (2.4). The first
order conditions for the utility-maximizing problem are given by
Pc,tλt = C
−σ
t (2.7)
υjNj,t(h)
η =
wj,t
Cσt
(2.8)
1 = βEt
[
Rnt
Πc,t+1
C−σt+1
C−σt
]
(2.9)
qi,t = q
k
j,t
[
Ψ′
(
Ij,t
Kj,t
)]
(2.10)
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qkj,t = βEt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ {
qkj,t+1
[
1− δ + Ψ
(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)
−Ψ′
(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)]
+ rkj,t+1
}
(2.11)
where wj,t =
Wj,t
Pc,t
is the j-sector real wage, Rnt is the time-t gross nominal interest rate,
EtΠc,t+1 represents the expected gross inflation rate in the consumption sector.
Denote by qkj,t =
λkj,t
λtPc,t
the shadow value of j-sector capital stock in units of consumption
goods. Then, Equations (2.10) and (2.11) become:
qi,t = q
k
j,t
[
Ψ′
(
Ij,t
Kj,t
)]
qkj,t = βEt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ {
qkj,t+1
[
1− δ + Ψ
(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)
−Ψ′
(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)(
Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)]
+ rkj,t+1
}
(2.12)
where the last equation makes use of Equation (2.7) to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier
λt.
The left-hand side of (2.12) represents the cost of acquiring a marginal unit of sector-j
capital today; the right-hand side captures the benefit of holding one extra unit of sector-j
capital which consists of the expected discounted future resale value and the expected rental
value. The discount factor is the intertemporal marginal utility of consumption.
2.2.3 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The government’s budget is balanced in every period: lump-sum taxes equal output subsi-
dies period by period. For simplicity, we assume that there are no government purchases.
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In our analysis, the short-term nominal interest rate is used as the instrument of monetary
policy, and we assume that the policymaker is able to commit to a time-invariant rule. We
consider alternative specifications of the monetary policy rule. As discussed by Sveen (2014),
all the rules that we will consider ensure model determinacy for plausible calibrations of
the parameter that governs investment price stickiness.
2.2.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, the markets for bonds, consumption, investment, capital rentals and labor
all clear. Bond market clearing implies that Bt = 0 for all t. Labor market clearing
implies that
∫ 1
0 Lc,t(f)df+
∫ 1
0 Li,t(f)df = Lt. Capital market clearing implies
∫ 1
0 Kc,t(f)df+∫ 1
0 Ki,t(f)df = Kt. Goods market clearing in the two sectors implies that Yc,t = Ct and
Yi,t = It, where It = Ic,t + Ii,t. Consistent with the current procedure of the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), real GDP is defined as Yt = (Ct)
φ (It)
1−φ, where φ
is the expenditure share of consumption.
2.3 Solution and calibration
Given fiscal and monetary policy, an equilibrium in this economy consists of prices and
allocations such that (i) taking prices and real wages as given, each household’s allocation
solves its utility maximization problem; (ii) taking wages and all other firms’ prices as given,
each firm’s factor demands and output price solve its profit maximization problem; (iii) the
markets for bonds, labor, capital, and sectoral outputs all clear.
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The trends in sectoral technologies render the model nonstationary. We focus on a
stationary equilibrium with balanced growth in which output, consumption, investment,
the capital stock, and the real wage all grow at constant rates, while hours worked remain
constant. Furthermore, if trend growth in technology in the investment sector is faster than
its consumption-sector counterpart, investment and capital will grow at a faster rate than
consumption or GDP, and the relative price of investment will have a downward trend.13
We study the dynamic properties of the model by taking a log-linear approximation of the
equilibrium conditions around the balanced growth path.14
To close the model, we have to specify sectoral inflation dynamics. Sectoral Phillips curves
are expressed by:
pic,t = β˜Etpic,t+1 + κcvc,t (2.13)
pii,t = β˜Etpii,t+1 + κivi,t (2.14)
where the growth-adjusted discount factor β˜ = β(γ1−αc γαi )
1−σ, κj =
(1−ξj)(1−ξj β˜)
ξj
, and
vj,t denotes sector-j real marginal costs. C-sector real marginal costs are expressed in
consumption units, whereas i-sector real marginal costs are expressed in investment units.
The relative price of investment is defined in changes by:
qi,t = qi,t−1 + pii,t − pic,t (2.15)
13 Stationarity is therefore obtained by appropriate variable transformations, as shown in Appendix B.2.
14 The resulting model log-linearized behavioral equations are listed in Table B.2.1 in Appendix B.2.
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As shown in Appendix B.3, under Woodford’s (2003) definition of the natural rate, sec-
toral real marginal costs can be rewritten as a function of consumption, investment, and
relative price gaps:15
vc,t =
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
c˜t
vi,t =
(
α+ η
1− α
)
i˜t + σc˜t − q˜i,t
where x˜t denotes the devation of variable xt from its flexible-price counterpart, that is
xt − x∗t . Then, the sectoral Phillips curves in (2.13) and (2.14) can be expressed as:
pic,t = β˜Etpic,t+1 + κc
[(
α+ η
1− α + σ
)
c˜t
]
(2.16)
pii,t = β˜Etpii,t+1 + κi
[(
α+ η
1− α
)
i˜t + σc˜t − q˜i,t
]
(2.17)
Thus, as in the standard one-sector New Keynesian model, sectoral inflation dynamics re-
spond to their respective measures of slack. In fact, the consumption-sector Phillips curve is
equivalent to the one resulting from the one-sector New Keynesian model. However, in ad-
dition to the investment gap, investment inflation dynamics depend upon the consumption
gap as well as the deviation of the relative price of investment from its flexible-price counter-
part. Intuitively, inefficiently high consumption induces a wealth effect that reduces hours
worked in the investment sector; this leads to inefficiently high investment-sector wages and
creates inflationary pressures. Also, when the relative price of investment is higher than
15 There exist two distinct definitions of the natural rate of output in New Keynesian models with endogenous
capital accumulation. The difference between the two is discussed in Section 2.4.
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its flexible-price level due to suboptimally high markups, investment-good producers adjust
their prices downward to avoid incurring output losses.
The stationary components of sectoral technology follow a bivariate AR(1) process in
logs: zc,t
zi,t
 =
ρzc 0
0 ρzc

zc,t−1
zi,t−1
+
εzc,t
εzi,t

where the innovations are assumed to be i.i.d. and are allowed to have a non-zero contem-
poraneous correlation. The trend growth rates γc and γi are assumed to be constant.
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. We assume that the utility from
consumption takes the logarithmic form (σ = 1). We set η = 1/4, corresponding to a Frisch
elasticity of labor supply of 4. We set α = 1/3, so that the labor share in each sector is 2/3.
We set γc = 1.004 and γi = 1.01. The implied real per-capita consumption growth rate is
γ1−αc γαi = 1.006 or about 2.4% percent per year, which is close to the data. We calibrate δ
so that the steady-state investment-to-capital ratio is about 0.15 per annum. In particular,
the steady-state capital law of motion implies that
δ˜ ≡ Iˆ
Kˆ
= 1− 1− δ
γi
This relation implies that δ = 0.0279 per quarter. We assume that β = 0.995, consistent
with a steady-state real interest rate r = β
(
γ1−αc γαi
)σ
= 1.0111, or about 4.5% per year. We
set the steady-state inflation rate for PCE, Πc = 1.005, or 2% per annual, which implies that
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Πi = 1.0011, or about 0.4% per annual. We set the markup rates such that µc = µi = 1.11,
which are in line with micro studies (Basu and Fernald (1997)). As a benchmark, we set
ξc = ξi = 0.75, implying that price contracts last on average for 4 quarters in each sector.
The share of the investment sector in both output and employment 1−φ is set equal to 0.22,
implying that the output share of consumption φ = 0.78.16 These reflect their empirical
counterparts in the National Income and Product Accounts. Finally, we set ψ = 2, to
reproduce the degree of investment volatility relative to output observed in the data.
To calibrate the variance of shocks, we use the use the consumption- and investment-
sector series on total factor productivity estimated by Basu et al. (2013). The estimated
persistence parameters for sectoral TFPs are ρzc = 0.98 and ρzi = 0.95. The estimated
standard deviations of consumption and investment TFP innovations are σzc = 0.53% and
σzi = 1.33%. Importantly, our estimates indicate that σzi,zc = 4.1342(10)
−5, implying that
sectoral TFP innovations are positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of about
0.58.17 In the benchmark economy, the monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor
rule of the form rnt = 1.5pic,t + 0.5y˜t.
Table 2.1 presents selected business cycle statistics for the benchmark economy: the
unconditional standard deviation of output is in line with its empirical counterpart; also,
16 These determine the employment size parameters υc and υi in the subutility functions for leisure.
17 Basu et al.’s (2013) TFPs are expressed in terms of log differences. We take the cumulative sum to obtain
log levels of sectoral TFPs. To estimate the parameters of the bivariate technology shock process we use a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. Also, we allow for time-varying linear trends, as a Bai-Perron
test indicates that sectoral technologies contain at least one significant trend break in each sector. Finally,
since Basu et al. (2013) provide us with annual data, we take the fourth root of annual persistence parameters
and divide annual standard deviation parameters by four to obtain quarterly figures.
79
Chapter 2 Should Central Banks Target Investment Prices?
Std. deviations 1st order autocorr. Contemp. correlations
y c/y i/y qi/y y c i qi c, y i, y qi, y c, i
Model 1.00% 0.63 2.67 0.50 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.87 0.91 0.94 -0.09 0.71
Data 0.82% 0.45 2.97 0.85 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.75 0.82 0.95 -0.20 0.62
Table 2.1: Business cycle statistics
Note: All variables are in logarithms and have been detrended with the HP filter. The moments in this
table are population moments computed from the solution of the model. We generate 500 simulations,
each with the same number of observations available in the data (224), and report the average HP-filtered
moments across these simulations. The monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor rule of the form
rnt = 1.5pic,t + 0.5y˜t where pic is PCE inflation and y˜ is the aggregate output gap.
consistent with the data, consumption is about half as volatile as aggregate output whereas
investment is about three times as volatile as output.18 The standard deviation of the
relative price of investment implied by the model is somewhat smaller than the one observed
in the data. The persistence generated by the model is high, but weaker than in the
data for real output, consumption and investment, and stronger for the relative price of
investment. In terms of comovements, the model performs remarkably well in capturing the
contemporaneous correlations among the key variables. In line with the data, it captures the
fact that both consumption and investment are highly correlated with output, the modest
countercyclicality of the relative price of investment, and the positive comovement between
the two sectoral outputs.
18 In our model, “consumption” is naturally interpreted as comprising non-durable goods and services, whereas
“investment” includes equipment, structures and residential investment.
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2.4 The welfare function
We formally derive a second-order approximation to the social welfare function, and we
compute its deviation from the welfare of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, following Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997). In our model, a Pareto-optimal equilibrium obtains when both
consumption and investment sectors have fully flexible nominal prices. One should note
that, however, in the context of sticky-price models with capital accumulation, there exist
two distinct definitions of the natural rate of output.19 One can define the natural rate
of output based on the capital stocks implied by the flexible-price model (that is, k∗j,t, for
j = {c, i}), or the capital stocks that actually exists in the economy in that period (that
is, the capital stock from the sticky-price model, kj,t, for j = {c, i}).20 In this paper, we
adopt the latter definition of natural rate, proposed by Woodford (2003): thus, if the model
economy operates under sticky-prices, then it is the period-t capital stock from that model
that determines the current natural rate of output. We opt for this definition of natural
rate of output, based on the actual capital stock, because it closely corresponds to what is
generally thought of as potential output.
19 This difference arises only in models with endogenous capital accumulation. In such models, the natural
rate of output in period-t depends upon the period-t capital stock, in addition to the model’s exogenous
disturbances
20 The first concept has been advocated by Neiss and Nelson (2003), who construct their definition of the
natural rate of output by assuming that the relevant capital stock is the one that which would have been
in place had the economy always existed in a flexible-price world. To be precise, while the initial capital
stock kj,0, for j = {c, i}, is given, the capital stock that defines the natural rate of output in all subsequent
periods is that from the flexible-price model, which is denoted by {k∗t+1}∞t=0.
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As derived in Appendix B.5, the unconditional welfare losses can be expressed as follows:
L ' 1
2
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
var (c− c∗) +
+
1
2
[
1− φ
φ
(
1 + η
1− α
)]
var(i− i∗) + 1
2
(
θc
1 + θc
)(
1− β˜ξc
1− ξc
)
1
κc
var(pic)+
+
1
2
1− φ
φ
(
θi
1 + θi
)(
1− β˜ξi
1− ξi
)
1
κi
var(pii)−
[
1− φ
φ
(1 + η)
]
cov(l∗i , i− i∗) (2.18)
In our two-sector economy the variance of the consumption gap, var (c− c∗), and the vari-
ance of the PCE inflation rate, var(pic), reduce household utility, as they do in models that
abstract from endogenous capital accumulation. In addition, the variance of the invest-
ment gap, var(i − i∗), also reduces household utility. In fact, as stressed by Edge (2003),
the composition of output has welfare implications in models that account for endogenous
capital accumulation. In our two-sector economy, this feature extends to inflation: since
investment-goods prices are sticky in nominal terms, welfare also depends upon the varia-
tion in investment inflation, var(pii).
21
Under the baseline calibration, the two sectors have the same markups and the same degree
of price stickiness.22 Thus, the welfare-function weight of PCE inflation relative to invest-
21 As shown by Woodford (2003) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), inflation variation lowers welfare,
since inflation in a given sector leads to price dispersion, which generates an inefficient allocation of produc-
tion across firms.
22 In each sector, the extent to which inflation variation affects household’s utility is increasing in the degree
of price stickiness and in the elasticity of substitution among goods. For given inflation volatility, higher
price stickiness is associated with higher price dispersion and higher welfare costs. Also, when firms operate
in highly competitive markets, price dispersion becomes particularly welfare diminishing, because even a
relatively small dispersion of prices corresponds to considerable output dispersion.
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ment inflation is determined by the output share of consumption relative to investment
(that is, about 4 to 1). Finally, a positive covariance between the investment gap and the
natural rate of hours worked in the investment sector raises utility. It is difficult to place
an intuitive interpretation on this term which, however, makes only a minor contribution
to the welfare results reported below.23
2.5 Results
In our two-sector model monetary policy is confronted with a non-trivial trade-off if there
are nominal rigidities in the pricing of both consumption and investment goods, and if the
shocks to the two sectors are asymmetric. In this section we begin by formalizing this
result for a simpler version of our model. To generalize, we then illustrate the stabilization
problem faced by the central bank in response to a consumption-technology shock when
both consumption and investment prices are sticky. Our impulse response analysis serves
two purposes. First, it highlights that in response to asymmetric sectoral shocks the attempt
to stabilize fluctuations in one sector inevitably generates larger fluctuations in the other
one. Hence, the second-best equilibrium – the optimal monetary policy that minimizes
unconditional welfare losses under full commitment – represents a compromise between
sectoral fluctuations. Second, our impulse response analysis provides intuition for why
optimal policy places relatively more weight on investment-sector stabilization. Later in
this section, in fact, we examine the welfare properties of alternative monetary rules and
23 In addition, this term is nil whenever the investment gap is closed.
83
Chapter 2 Should Central Banks Target Investment Prices?
show that, in general, welfare losses that arise from the investment sector are one order
of magnitude larger than those stemming from the consumption sector. We finally show
that the degree of rigidity of investment prices crucially affects the implications for optimal
monetary policy.
2.5.1 The monetary policy trade-off
In general, when both consumption and investment prices are sticky the monetary authority
cannot attain the flexible-price equilibrium. Given the complexity of our model, we are able
to show this result analytically only for the special case in which there are no adjustment
costs, and labor supply is infinitely elastic.
Proposition 1 Assume that there are no sectoral adjustment costs (ψ = 0) and thus a
unique capital stock for the economy with law of motion kt+1 = (1− δ˜)kt+ δ˜it. Also, assume
that labor supply is perfectly elastic (η = 0). If prices in both sectors adjust at a finite speed
(ξc > 0 and ξi > 0), then there exists no monetary policy that can attain the Pareto optimal
allocation unless the two sectors are subject to identical disturbances (zc,t = zi,t for all t).
Proof. First, note that the relative price gap evolves according to:
∆q˜i,t = pii,t − pic,t −∆q∗i,t (2.19)
which follows easily from equation (2.15). The assumptions of no adjustment costs and
infinite Frisch elasticity guarantee that rental rates of capital and wages are equalized across
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sectors in each period, in units of consumption goods. As a result, in the flexible-price
equilibrium relative price dynamics are solely governed by productivity differences (that is
q∗i,t = zc,t − zi,t). Thus, the flexible-price dynamics of the relative price gap evolves as:
∆q∗i,t = ∆zc,t −∆zi,t (2.20)
Now suppose there was a monetary policy rule that would make the equilibrium allocation
under sticky prices Pareto optimal. Then, in such an equilibrium, the gaps would be zero
in every period, including the marginal cost gaps and the relative price gap (that is, q˜i,t = 0
for all t). It follows from (2.13) and (2.14) that pic,t = pii,t = 0 for all t. In turn, this implies
that ∆qi,t = 0 for all t, and (2.19) and (2.20) imply that pii,t − pic,t = ∆zc,t − ∆zi,t. This
last equality contradicts the conclusion that pii,t = pic,t = 0 unless ∆zc,t = ∆zi,t for all t.
To provide an intuition regarding the nature of the monetary policy trade-off, we begin
by combining the log-linearized versions of the first-order conditions for bonds, (2.9), in-
vestment, (2.10), and capital, (2.11), together with the definition of the relative price of
investment, (2.15). Using these equations, one can show that the Euler equation for sector-j
Tobin’s Q can be written as:
(2.21)qkj,t− qi,t = β˜Et
(
qkj,t+1− qi,t+1
)
+
(
1− β˜(1− δ˜)
)
Et(rkj,t+1− qi,t+1)− (rnt −Etpii,t+1)
where rnt − Etpii,t+1 denotes the investment-real interest rate. By solving Equation (2.21)
forward one obtains:
(2.22)qkj,t − qi,t =
∞∑
s=0
β˜sEt
{(
1− β˜(1− δ˜)
)(
rkj,t+s+1 − qi,t+s+1
)
− (rnt+s − pii,t+s+1)
}
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The last equation shows that the current Tobin’s Q of sector j (measured in units of in-
vestment goods) depends upon the discounted sum of the rental value of sector-j capital
(in units of investment goods) as well as the discounted sum of the investment-real interest
rate.24 Moreover, for standard calibrations the term 1− β˜(1− δ˜) takes values around 0.05.
Thus, Tobin’s Q is especially sensitive to the path of the investment-real interest rate: the
investment-real interest rate channel dominates the response to capital returns. In turn,
by the log-linearized FOC for investment, (2.10), the Tobin’s Q (in investment good units)
is a sufficient statistic for investment demand. As usual, agents’ demand for investment
depends upon the shadow value of capital, qkj,t, relative to its purchase price, qi,t.
25
Having understood the key forces driving investment demand, we move to analyzing the
dynamic behavior of the model economy in response to disturbances that are not symmetric
across sectors. Figure 2.2 reports the impulse response functions to a one-standard-deviation
consumption-specific technology improvement. As shown by Basu et al. (2013), under flex-
ible prices and logarithmic utility, consumption-specific technology shocks are neutral in
the sense that they have no effect other than increasing the quantity of consumption (and
the relative price of investment) by the amount of the technology improvement. Thus, note
that under flexible prices, both investment and hours worked remain at their steady-state
values. This is the sense in which, under neoclassical conditions, consumption technology
shocks cannot drive economic fluctuations, since they do not produce the comovements
24 Note that the investment-real interest rate can also be expressed as the consumption real interest rate net
of expected capital gains/losses, that is (rnt − Etpic,t+1)− Et∆qi,t+1.
25 Here, both the shadow value of capital and the price of investment goods are expressed in consumption good
units.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses following a consumption-sector technology shock
Note: The correlation between technology shocks is set to zero when computing the impulse responses.
characteristic of business cycles. However, with sticky prices combined with the suboptimal
but realistic policy of a Taylor rule that targets consumer prices, note that consumption
technology shocks do produce positive comovements; the fluctuations in consumption, in-
vestment and labor input are qualitatively characteristic of business cycles, as is the ranking
of volatility among investment, output and consumption.
The intuition behind the impulse responses is as follows. An improvement in consumption
technology naturally increases the output of consumption goods. This raises the marginal
product of capital in the consumption sector, which wishes to invest in capital goods. Under
sticky investment-goods prices, agents know that investment goods are temporarily cheap
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(the increase in demand will drive up their prices over time, but due to the Calvo friction,
the nominal price of investment goods is basically unchanged on impact). Thus, there is
a large spike in the demand for investment, which leads to a surge in investment inflation
and a large increase in labor input.
When both consumption and investment prices are subject to nominal rigidities, an opti-
mizing central bank faces a trade-off among competing ends. In response to a consumption-
specific technology improvement, most firms in the consumption sector are unable to ad-
just prices downward to keep their markups constant. The result is that markups in the
consumption sector rise and therefore consumption becomes inefficiently low, leading to a
negative consumption gap and expected consumer price deflation. As the downward adjust-
ment of consumption prices is imperfect, the relative price of investment is inefficiently low.
This induces agents to demand too many investment goods, thereby generating a positive
investment gap, and investment inflation. The monetary authority is unable to close both
output gaps (or alternatively, to stabilize both inflation rates) because it can influence the
economy only through a single instrument, the nominal interest rate. To stimulate con-
sumption, the central bank must cut the nominal interest rate to offset the deflationary
pressures in the consumption sector. However, this action would generate an even larger
investment gap, by further reducing the investment real interest rate (see Equation (2.22)).
On the other hand, to close the investment gap, the central bank should raise the nominal
interest rate, but this policy would reduce consumption even further.
As potential output cannot be attained in both sectors, the optimal policy is a compromise
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between these two goals. In Figure 2.2, one can notice that the optimal policy succeeds
in minimizing the investment gap by raising the nominal rate significantly. The cost of
achieving a relatively small investment gap is to keep consumption below potential for five
quarters, and aggregate output below potential for about two quarters.26
Through the same lens, we now analyze the dynamic response of the model economy
when the central bank targets only PCE inflation, but chooses the size of the coefficient
on the consumer price inflation rate optimally.27 By solely responding to the consump-
tion sector, the central bank cuts the nominal rate to respond to the c-sector deflationary
outcome. Although this results in nearly optimal consumption dynamics, significantly neg-
ative investment real rates further spur the demand for investment goods, resulting in large
investment gap and investment inflation volatility.
Finally, a hybrid rule which optimally targets both consumption and investment inflation
manages to closely replicate the consumption and investment responses obtained under
optimal policy. This suggests that targeting investment inflation generally has desirable
stabilization properties. In the following section, we analyze this issue in greater depth.
2.5.2 Welfare implications of alternative rules
From both a normative and positive perspective, simple feedback interest rate rules are
often considered effective ways to conduct and communicate monetary policy. The Taylor
(1993) rule, under which the central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate in
26 In fact, under optimal policy the consumption real interest rate is positive.
27 Optimal coefficients of simple Taylor rules are chosen through a grid-searching algorithm.
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response to fluctuations in inflation (and the output gap), is generally viewed as a simple
but realistic description of monetary policy.28 Our model suggests that the standard Taylor
rule implemented with CPI/PCE inflation ignores some important variables in the welfare
function, especially the investment inflation rate. Thus, we now investigate the welfare
effects of various simple rules, and compare their performance to the optimal policy.
Table 2.2 displays the welfare losses under a set of interest rate rules. These allow the
short-term rate to respond optimally to different combinations of PCE inflation, investment
inflation, and sectoral output gaps. The results in Table 2.2 conform to expectations: a
rule that strictly targets PCE inflation results in considerably large welfare losses. Specifi-
cally, under PCE-inflation targeting, the economy incurs welfare losses that are about three
times larger than those of the optimal policy. Somewhat surprisingly, a rule that instead
strictly targets investment inflation performs considerably better than the PCE target-
ing rule, notwithstanding the much smaller size of the investment sector. In other words,
targeting investment inflation as opposed to PCE inflation has more desirable stabilizing
properties.29 Importantly, a Taylor rule that optimally assigns about equal weight to PCE
and investment inflation performs nearly as well as the optimal rule. As data on both PCE
and investment inflation can be observed and communicated readily, we believe that this
rule is a good candidate for realistic policy analysis.
28 Note that in his original paper, Taylor used inflation in the GDP deflator to implement his rule! While
still far from optimal policy, we will show that targeting the GDP deflator performs significantly better in
welfare terms than targeting PCE inflation.
29 Note that adding the consumption (investment) gap to the PCE (investment) inflation rule as an additional
targeting variable does not visibly affect welfare results. This is because the divine coincidence result holds
for each sector in our model, although it does not hold in the aggregate.
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Monetary rule Welfare losses Rel. weights in opt. price index
target(s) Total Rel. to OP pic pii c˜ i˜ piy
Optimal Policy 1.39 1
Monetary rules that target sectoral variables
PCE (pic) 4.23 3.05 1.00
pic, c˜ 4.22 3.04 0.40 0.60
pii 3.05 2.19 1.00
pii, i˜ 3.05 2.19 0.40 0.60
pic, pii 1.65 1.19 0.55 0.45
Monetary rules that target aggregate variables
GDP deflator (piy) 2.08 1.50 1.00
Table 2.2: Welfare costs of alternative policy rules
Note: Total welfare losses are expressed as a percent of steady-state consumption (multiplied by 100). The
third column reports welfare losses relative to those incurred under optimal policy.
At this point one may wonder whether a rule that targets an “aggregate” price index, akin
to the GDP deflator, might be a good approximation of the optimal rule. The bottom line of
Table 2.2 shows that such rule leads to welfare losses of 2.08% of steady-state consumption,
which is about 1.50 times the loss under optimal policy. Therefore, our results suggest that
it is crucial to target investment-specific variables more than proportionally.
To provide further insight on the importance of targeting investment inflation relative to
PCE inflation, Figure 2.3 displays the welfare losses incurred under alternative calibrations
of the Taylor rule coefficients attached to the two inflation indexes. Figure 2.3 (left panel)
delivers a clear message: ignoring the investment inflation index typically creates significant
welfare losses. On the other hand, when a standard Taylor rule accounts also for investment
inflation, the welfare losses are quite close to those obtained under the optimal rule. Figure
2.3 (center and right panel) decompose the welfare losses into their sectoral components. A
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central bank that is solely concerned with PCE stabilization generates sizable welfare losses
in the investment sector. When the monetary authority also targets investment inflation,
the consumption sector becomes relatively more volatile. Overall, our model suggests that
the second option is preferred from a welfare perspective: investment components of welfare
are much larger than those arising from the consumption sector. As a result, their contri-
bution is essential to account for the findings in Table 2.2.
c i c i c i
Figure 2.3: Welfare costs under alternative calibrations of the coefficient in the PCE-
investment inflation hybrid rule
Note: The rule that we consider in these simulations is rnt = φpicpic,t + φpiipii,t. Welfare losses are expressed
as percent of steady-state consumption.
These results stem from the fact that the shadow value of capital is approximately un-
changed in the wake of temporary disturbances. The illustration of this point follows the
insights in Barsky, House and Kimball (2007), who first highlighted the dynamic implica-
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tions of the near-constancy of the shadow value of long-lived goods. In our model, the
shadow value of capital is defined by Equation (2.12). Abstracting from adjustment costs,
Equation (2.12) reads:30
qkj,t = β
[
Et
∞∑
i=1
(
Ct+i
Ct+i−1
)−σ
[β(1− δ)]iMPKj,t+i+1
]
(2.23)
for {j = c, i}. As pointed out by Barsky, House and Kimball (2007), the shadow value of
capital, qkj,t, will be largely unaffected by transitory shocks as long as the depreciation rate
of the capital stock, δ, is sufficiently low. In fact, this would imply a high stock-flow ratio:
even relatively high transitory changes in the production of investment goods would have
little effect on the capital stock, and hence on its shadow value. Also, importantly, a low
depreciation rate implies that the shadow value of capital in (2.23) is largely influenced by
marginal products of capital in the distant future. And these are close to their steady-state
values if shocks are temporary.
The near-constancy of the shadow value of long-lived capital goods implies that the demand
for investment goods displays an almost infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(IES): even a small rise in the price of the investment good today relative to tomorrow
would cause people to delay their investment.31 In contrast, (non-durable) consumption
goods are subject to the consumption smoothing logic of the permanent income hypothesis.
30 Note that Equation (2.12) is also solved forward and we denote MPKj,t = r
k
j,t. Equation (B.7) in Appendix
B.2 represents the version of Equation (2.12) that accounts for trend growth in technology.
31 As discussed above, in their investment decision agents compare the marginal (or shadow) value of capital
(qkj,t) to its marginal cost (qi,t). Since the former is roughly constant, changes in the latter generate sizable
fluctuations in investment demand.
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As a result, consumption is much less responsive to temporary price changes. This intrinsic
difference has profound implications for monetary policy: a small intertemporal distortion in
the price of investment goods generates high investment (and output) fluctuations, resulting
in sizable welfare losses. For this reason, it becomes important to stabilize the investment
sector. On the other hand, PCE targeting in a two-sector model of consumption and
investment is generally incidental.32
2.5.3 The role of investment price rigidity
In this section we ask how sectoral differences in price stickiness affect our results. In
particular, we analyze how the implications for monetary policy change as we change the
degree of investment price rigidity. Figure 2.4 illustrates the outcome of this inquiry. A
PCE inflation targeting rule displays very poor welfare properties as long as the average
duration of investment price contracts is higher than two and a half quarters. With shorter
durations (low values of ξi) investment price dispersion is lower, and ignoring investment
inflation comes at a lower cost. As ξi rises, a PCE targeting rule becomes highly suboptimal
because the investment components of welfare losses dominate those originating from the
consumption sector. This feature of multi-sector models with heterogeneous price stickiness
was first analyzed in Aoki (2001) (Benigno (2004)) who show that, in a two-sector (two-
region) framework with heterogeneous degree of nominal rigidities, it is nearly optimal to
implement an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation of
32 While capital adjustment costs reduce the IES in investment, our quantitative results indicate that the IES
in investment is nevertheless much higher than in consumption when capital adjustment costs are calibrated
to reproduce the empirically-observed volatility of investment relative to output.
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the stickier sector (region). These studies focus on the implications for monetary policy in
models that features two sectors (regions) that are isomorphic to each other. That is, they
are two otherwise identical final-good sectors producing non-durables that differ just with
respect to their degree of nominal rigidity. Instead, in our framework the two sectors produce
goods with intrinsically different characteristics.33 Note that the hybrid rule performance
is nearly optimal along the whole range of ξi. This is not surprising, since its coefficients
are optimally set and it assigns different weights to the two inflation components as the
nominal rigidity in the investment sector differs. Specifically, the coefficient on investment
inflation rises as investment prices become more sticky.
In general, there is little microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price change of
investment goods. However, available evidence supports high price stickiness in several
categories of investment goods, both in the US and the Euro Area. According to Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008), the median implied duration of prices of finished producer goods for
the U.S. is 8.7 months and some categories exhibit an even higher duration: 26.5 months for
machinery and equipment and 19.1 months for furniture and household durables. Similarly,
Alvarez et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2012) summarize the vast evidence on micro
price-setting recently obtained for Euro Area countries, and find that investment goods
are the stickier components of producer prices: they report price stickiness of “capital
goods” of 0.91 at monthly frequency, which would correspond to a quarterly frequency of
as high as 0.75, or four quarters. In light of these studies, we find that price stickiness in
33 In this respect, our results are closer to Erceg and Levin (2006).
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Figure 2.4: Welfare costs under alternative contract durations in the investment sector
Note: The average contract duration in the consumption sector is set equal to 4 quarters. Welfare losses
are expressed as percent of steady-state consumption, multiplied by 100.
investment goods is plausibly at least as important as consumption goods price stickiness.
This reinforces our message that central banks should, at a minimum, include investment-
goods prices in their target inflation indexes.
2.6 Conclusions
Using a model calibrated to reproduce some important empirical features, we asked whether
the optimizing monetary authority should target both consumption and investment price
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inflation. We found that in general the answer is yes, it should. In and of itself, this
result may not be surprising. A variety of previous work suggests that in general monetary
policy should target all prices that are imperfectly flexible. If investment-goods prices are
sticky, then they should also feature in the inflation index that central banks target. The
surprising element of our paper is the relative magnitudes of the costs of consumer versus
investment price inflation. We find that welfare losses arising from markup variability in the
investment sector are generally much larger than those that arise from similar variation in
the consumption sector. This result stems from the fact that investment demand displays an
almost infinite intertemporal elasticity of substitution, whereas intertemporal substitution
of consumption over time is rather limited. Thus, predictable changes in investment-goods
prices lead to large and sub-optimal fluctuations in the quantity of investment, leading to
large social losses.
We find that monetary rules that target solely PCE inflation generate substantial welfare
losses. These are considerably reduced, however, if the central bank includes investment
price inflation as part of its inflation target. In particular, we show that a Taylor rule
that responds to both consumer and investment price inflation can nearly replicate the best
feasible outcome, provided that investment sector stabilization is assigned a significantly
higher weight than the share of investment in GDP. For this reason, a GDP deflator targeting
rule is better but still unsatisfactory. Furthermore, we show that our results hold for any
plausible degree of nominal rigidity in the investment sector. Our results contrast with
standard central banking practice, as monetary policy in most countries currently targets
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only consumer price inflation.
A fully satisfactory treatment of optimal monetary policy should take into account all
three issues that are known to influence welfare losses from price rigidity: differences in
the average duration of prices across sectors; differences in the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity within and across sectors, as emphasized by Carvalho (2006); and differences in
the durability of sectoral outputs, which is our contribution to this discussion. This should
be done in a framework that distinguishes at least four categories of output: non-durable
consumption goods; durable consumption goods; equipment investment output; and the
output of residential and non-residential structures. Fortunately, Basu et al. (2013) provide
measures of technology for all four categories of final demand, so our exercise could be
extended to an elaborate model of this type. We have not done so in order to explain our
argument in a simple framework that can be explained intuitively and analyzed analytically.
We leave this more disaggregated treatment for future research.
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Information Acquisition and Self-fulfilling
Business Cycles
3.1 Introduction
In the presence of informational frictions, agents’ learning effort over the business cycle may
have profound implications for macroeconomic dynamics. The existing literature shows that
the procyclicality of learning, or information available, can go a long way in explaining the
occurrence of business cycle asymmetries, amplify shocks to fundamentals and rationalize
the cyclical behavior of economic uncertainty.1 Building on these insights, this paper shows
that when agents optimally choose to acquire information procyclically, the macroeconomy
may be subject to self-fulfilling fluctuations. That is, periods of expansions and recessions
1 See, for example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009).
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occur solely as a result of changes in agents’ expectations, as in the seminal work of Benhabib
and Farmer (1994).
To this end, I study a real business cycle (RBC) economy that features monopolistic
competition and firm-level uncertainty. In particular, each intermediate good producer
cannot observe the realization of its idiosyncratic productivity shock at the price-setting
stage, but can acquire a costly signal of finite precision about it. In my model, information
acquisition is naturally procyclical because the benefit of more precise information – a lower
average pricing error – is higher during periods of high aggregate demand. Thus, booms
are associated with more precise information about firm-level fundamentals. Lower uncer-
tainty, in turn, leads to a more efficient allocation of production factors across firms, and
this reallocation effect leads to procyclical aggregate productivity and aggregate increasing
returns to scale.2 My main contribution is to show that a higher informational multiplier –
a measure of the degree of returns to scale – exposes the economy to sunspot-driven fluctua-
tions. In fact, to a first-order approximation the aggregate representation of this economy is
isomorphic to the increasing-return economy in the classic paper by Benhabib and Farmer
(1994). In their model with monopolistic competition, firm-level increasing returns generate
an upward sloping labor demand curve that is the source of indeterminacy. In my alterna-
tive microfoundation, firm-level production functions display constant returns to scale and
firm-level labor demand slopes downward, while the informational multiplier represents a
shifter of firm-level labor demand (see Figure ??). As shown by Basu and Fernald (1997),
2 In my model, measured total factor productivity (TFP) contains an endogenous information factor.
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the degree of firm-level increasing returns necessary to obtain sunspot-driven cycles in the
Benhabib and Farmer economy are empirically implausible. For this reason, the procyclical
information mechanism appears desirable in formalizing why self-fulfilling fluctuations may
arise.
The predictions of my model are consistent with a number of empirical facts. First, the
magnitude of increasing returns increases with the level of aggregation, in line with Basu
and Fernald’s (1997) evidence that estimates of returns to scale often rise at higher levels
of aggregation. Second, my model conforms to Basu and Fernald’s (2001) evidence that the
reallocation of factors across uses with different marginal products is an important source
of procyclical productivity. Third, my proposed mechanism hinges upon procyclical infor-
mation acquisition, and resulting countercyclical firm-level uncertartainty. Using survey
expectations data, Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2013) find that business-level uncertainty
tends to rise during recessions. Using plant-level data, Kehrig (2011) shows that the dis-
persion of revenue-based TFP in U.S. manufacturing – a measure of effective uncertainty
in the model economy – is greater in recessions than in booms. As in David, Hopenhayn
and Venkateswaran (2016), the model predicts that steady state output is decreasing in the
cost of obtaining information. David, Hopenhayn and Venkateswaran (2016) convincingly
argue that cross-country differences in information costs can go a long way in explaining
the fact that misallocation accounts for a large fraction of cross-country differences in TFP
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Besides, in my model more costly information also leads to
greater volatility of aggregate output as it implies a larger informational multiplier. This
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is consistent with the evidence that countries with lower mean growth experience larger
growth volatility (see, e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
I show that self-fulfilling business cycles arise for a parameterization of my model that is
consistent with several aggregate and cross-sectional moments, including the cross-sectional
dispersion of firm-level revenue-based measures of TFP, and its standard deviation relative
to output.3 In addition, I estimate the aggregate version of my model using Bayesian tech-
niques (Farmer, Khramov and Nicolo`, 2015) and find that nonfundamental shocks account
for around 30% of the fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables.
A growing literature has explored several implications of endogenous information acqui-
sition in different classes of models. Reis (2006), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2009), Vives (2011), Colombo, Femminis and Pavan (2014), Benhabib, Liu
and Wang (2016), and Chahrour and Gaballo (2017) study the role of information acqui-
sition in static models.4 A common theme across most of these papers is that information
acquisition may generate multiple equilibria. The nature of this multiplicity is distinct
from the one emphasized in this paper. In the aforesaid papers, multiple static equilibria
arise because of complementarity in information acquisition. Instead, my model displays
a unique steady state, in which costly precision gives rise to externalities (to other firms’
profits and consumer surplus) that may generate multiple dynamic equilibria in a general
equilibrium model of business cycles with otherwise standard features.5 In business-cycle
3 This parameterization refers to an extended version of the model with endogenous capital utilization.
4 See also Pavan and Angeletos (2013) and Chamley (1986)
5 In a unified game theoretical framework, Hellwig, Kohls and Veldkamp (2012) discuss which assumptions
about the information choice technology are needed to generate increasing returns or multiple equilibria.
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models, Llosa and Venkateswaran (2015) contrast the equilibrium acquisition of informa-
tion with the efficient acquisition of information; Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) show that
complementarity in information acquisition rationalizes the observed synchronized expan-
sions and contractions across sectors over the business cycle. In Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2006) more economic activity generates more precise information about produc-
tivity, which makes business cycle downturns sharper than recoveries. Straub and Ulbricht
(2015) propose a model where the ability of investors to learn about firm-level fundamentals
declines after financial shocks, because actions of firms under financial distress carry less
information and investors learn less about these firms’ fundamentals. In the context of a
rational-inattention model driven by time-varying, exogenous uncertainty shocks to idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate productivity, Gondhi (2015) shows that when aggregate uncertainty
increases resource misallocation arises because firms’ managers allocate more information
to aggregate shocks and less to idiosyncratic shocks. For the same reasoning, increases in id-
iosyncratic uncertainty generate an expansion. Senga (2015) study the effect of uncertainty
shocks in a heterogenous firm model with Bayesan learning.6 The paper closest to mine
is the recent contribution by Benhabib, Liu and Wang (2016) with whom I share the key
mechanism that links endogenous information acquisition to the reallocation of production
factors. Their focus however is on explaining countercyclical idiosyncratic and aggregate
uncertainty. My paper complements their work and those cited above by showing that
6 In a model in which the equilibrium price system features endogenous information transmission, Ma¨kinen
and Ohl (2015) show that firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been
in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms
share an optimistic belief.
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information acquisition not only can amplify and propagate business cycle shocks, but can
also generate dynamic indeterminacy and thus be a source of business cycles.
The recent financial crisis revived the interest in the literature on sunspot fluctuations.
A number of papers have argued that sunspot fluctuations may stem because of various
forms of financial frictions. In the context of a model with heterogeneous firms and imper-
fect contract enforcement, Liu and Wang (2014) show that a drop in equity value tightens
credit constraints and reallocates resources from productive to unproductive firms, with the
potential of generating dynamic indeterminacy. In their model, the source of reallocation
and increasing returns is procyclical leverage.7 Recently Benhabib, Dong and Wang (2014)
show that adverse selection provides a microfoundation to the aggregate increasing returns
to scale. I propose procyclical information acquisition as a complementary mechanism to
those outlined above.
3.2 A RBC model with endogenous information acquisition
The model is written in continuous time.8 The economy is populated by a large representa-
tive household that has a continuum of identical workers, with unit measure. The household
holds the capital stock in the economy, derives utility from leisure and from consumption of
a composite final good produced with a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods. In
7 In a simple model, Benhabib and Wang (2013) show that procyclical leverage is the key features that allow
financial-friction models to be indeterminate.
8 Continuous time facilitates the stability analysis and the comparison with Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
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each period, each intermediate-good producer is affected by both an idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock and an aggregate productivity shock. While the aggregate shock is perfectly
observable at the beginning of each period, each firm’s information about its idiosyncratic
productivity is limited and costly acquirable before the price-setting stage.
3.2.1 Households
The instantaneous utility of the representative household is given by:
U(Ct, Nt) = logCt − ψN
1+χ
t
1 + χ
where Ct is consumption, Nt is labor supply, and χ ≥ 0. Taking the market interest rate
Rt and wage Wt as given, the representative household maximizes
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(Ct, Nt)dt
subject to
K˙t = (Rt − δ)Kt +WtNt − Ct (3.1)
where Kt is the capital stock and K0 is given. The parameter ρ represents the discount
rate, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are standard and
given by
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C˙t
Ct
= rt − ρ− δ (3.2)
ψNχt =
1
Ct
Wt (3.3)
3.2.2 Firms
Final Goods Producers
The final good is produced by competitive firms facing competitive factor markets under
perfect information, according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate production function:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
θ−1
θ
i,t di
] θ
θ−1
(3.4)
for θ > 1.
The profit-maximizing amount of input Yi,t is thus given by:
Yi,t = P
−θ
i,t Yt (3.5)
where aggregate demand movements act as shifters of the intermediate-good producer
demand function, as usual in the context of Dixit-Stigliz monopolistic competition.
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Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a representative, risk-neutral entrepreneur who owns a continuum of firms with
unit mass. Entrepreneur’s lifetime utility is given by:
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ
etCet dt
where ρe and Cet denote the representative entrepreneur’s discount factor and time-t
consumption, respectively. I assume that the entrepreneur is sufficiently less patient than
the household so that the entrepreneur does not accumulate capital. Thus, entrepreneur’s
consumption consists solely of aggregate firm profits, in each time period.
Firm i is the monopolist of good i with production function:
Yi,t = AtAi,tK
α
i,tN
1−α
i,t (3.6)
Firm i produces Yi,t to maximize its profit under uncertainty about its own productivity
Ai,t. Idiosyncratic productivity is determined according to:
logAi,t ≡ ai,t = a+ i,t
where i,t ∼ N (0, σ2a). I assume that each firm has access to a signal si,t about ai,t such
that:
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si,t = ai,t + ei,t
where ei,t ∼ N (0, σ2e).
Denote by τe,i,t ≡ 1/σ2e the precision of firm-i signal about its time-t productivity. To reduce
uncertainty before price setting, firm i can spend v(τe,i,t) units of the final good to acquire
a signal si,t of precision τe,i,t.
Before proceeding with the problem of the intermediate-good firm it is useful to introduce
the sequence in which events unfold within a time period:
Timeline of events At the beginning of each period, aggregate technology realizes, and,
together with the beginning-of-period capital stock Kt, it is observed by all agents in the
economy. The problem of the intermediate-good firm consists of three stages:
1. Information choice. After observing the aggregate state (At,Kt), each firm i chooses
the precision τe,i,t of its signal si,t.
2. Price setting. After observing the signal si,t of precision τe,t, each firm sets its price
Pi,t.
9
3. Production. After observing the realization of its time-t productivity, each firm hires
capital and labor and produces.
9 Note that, since all firms are ex-ante identical, all choose the same signal precision during stage 1.
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At the end of each period markets clear.
The model is solved backward. Stage 3 – firm-i cost-minimization problem under full
information – implies:
WtN(Yi,t) +RtK(Yi,t) =
1
Ai,t
1
At
(
Wt
1− α
)1−α(Rt
α
)α
Yi,t (3.7)
By looking at the right-hand side of Equation (3.7), one can notice that real marginal
costs under perfect information consist of (the product of) a firm-specific and an aggregate
component. Denote the latter by C(Wt, Rt, At) ≡ 1At
(
Wt
1−α
)1−α (
Rt
α
)α
.
While the input choice occurs under perfect information, the information set in Stage 2 –
price setting – is limited to I2i,t = {At,Kt, si,t}. Firm i profit-maximization problem reads:
max
Pi,t
E
[(
Pi,t − 1
Ai,t
C(Wt, Rt, At)
)
P−θi,t Yt | I2i,t
]
(3.8)
where I used Eqs. (3.5) and (3.7). The optimal price of firm i therefore is:
Pi,t =
θ
θ − 1 Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)
C(Wt, Rt, At) (3.9)
The optimal price consists of the product of the (constant) monopolistic markup and ex-
pected real marginal costs. Since aggregate variables are revealed by the aggregate state,
expectation is formed solely about the idiosyncratic component of real marginal costs.
Before proceeding to Stage 1, it is useful to express the key aggregate variables as a
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function of signals precision. First, recall that under constant returns to scale production
and perfect factor mobility the capital-labor ratio is identical across firms, i.e.
Ki,t
Ni,t
= KtNt .
Therefore, one can write the production function as: Yi,t = Ai,tAt
(
Kt
Nt
)α
Ni,t. As shown in
Appendix C.1, by summing over i on both sides of the last equation, one obtains:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
di
) 1
θ−1
AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (3.10)
By using the process for idiosyncratic productivity and the information structure de-
scribed above, Eq. (3.10) – the aggregate production function – can be rewritten as:
Yt = exp
{
a˜+
1
2τa
θ
1
1 + τaτe,t
}
AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (3.11)
where a˜ = a¯− 12σ2a. Equation (3.11) reveals that measured TFP features an endogenous
component: more precise information reduces mispricing and thus renders the allocation of
production factors across intermediate-good producers more efficient.
I now turn to Stage 1, that is I characterize the optimal information acquisition decision
by the intermediate-good producer. One can show that firm-i realized profits after Stage 3
are:
Πi,t =
(
Pi,t − 1
Ai,t
C (Wt, Rt, At))
)
Yi,t =
1
θ
Yt
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
∫ 1
0 Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
di
(3.12)
I aim to find the value of signal precision for firm i, τe,i,t, that is the best response to all
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other firms choosing τe,−i,t.
By taking firm-i expectations of realized profits (Eq. 3.12) over all possible signal real-
izations, I obtain firm-i ex-ante expected profits:
ΠEi,t (τe,i,t, τe,−i,t, Yt) =
1
θ
Yt
exp
{
(θ − 1)
(
a˜+ + 12τa θ
1
1+ τa
τe,i,t
)}
exp
{
(θ − 1)
(
a˜+ + 12τa θ
1
1+ τa
τe,−i,t
)} (3.13)
Firm-i optimal signal precision satisfies:
τe,i,t = argmax
τe,i,t
ΠEi,t (τe,i,t, τe,−i,t, Yt)− v(τe,i,t) (3.14)
The first-order condition to the above problem is given by:
∂ΠEi,t(·)
∂τe,i,t
=
∂v(τe,i,t)
∂τe,i,t
(3.15)
which states that, at an optimum, the marginal benefit of information acquisition – higher
ex-ante expected profits – equalizes its marginal cost.
The following Lemma states the conditions under which Eq. (3.15) fully characterizes a
unique solution for firm-i information acquisition problem.
Lemma 1 Given aggregate variables, firm-i ex-ante expected profit is strictly increasing in
signal precision, that is
∂ΠEi,t(·)
∂τe,i,t
> 0. If τa >
1
4θ(θ−1), then the expected profit function is also
strictly concave on the whole domain of piEi,t(·), that is
∂2piEi,t(·)
∂τ2e,i,t
< 0. Under this assumption,
and the (weak) convexity of the cost function v(τe,i,t), firm-i information acquisition problem
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has a unique solution which can be fully characterized by Eq. (3.15).
Next, I introduce a functional form for the function that governs the cost of acquiring
information, v(τe,i,t):
Assumption 1 The function that describes the cost of acquiring information is given by:
v(τe,i,t) = φ
(
τe,i,t
τa
+ 1
)ζ
(3.16)
where φ > 0 and ζ ≥ 1.
where the parameter φ governs the efficiency of the cost function, and ζ captures the cost
elasticity of information. One can notice that the cost function in Equation (3.16) satisfies
the conditions in Lemma 1 (weak convexity). Note also that, when ζ = 1, Equation (3.16)
corresponds to the cost function almost exclusively used in the rational inattention literature
(e.g. Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009)).10
Since all firms are ex-ante identical, they will all make the same information acquisition
decision (i.e. τe,i,t = τe,−i,t = τe,t). Thus, invoking symmetry and using Eqs. (3.13) and
(3.16), Eq. (3.15) becomes:
10 More specifically, denote by κt the endogenous information-processing capacity of an agent. Under the
rational inattention paradigm, the information flow constraint of an agent is
I ({Ai,t} ; {si,t}) = 1
2
log2
(
τe,t
τa
+ 1
)
= κt
where the information flow is measured in terms of reduction in conditional entropy. Equation (3.16) is
equivalent to a capacity cost function that reads:
f(κt) = φ
(
22κt
)ζ
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1
2
(θ − 1)Yt = φζτa
{
τe,t
τa
+ 1
}ζ+1
(3.17)
Equation (3.17) describes the optimal information choice as a function of aggregate out-
put. Higher aggregate output is unambiguously associated with lower uncertainty, as firms
will choose to acquire more precise signals about their idiosyncratic state. Optimal infor-
mation acquisition is procyclical because the marginal benefit of more precise information –
higher ex-ante expected profits (see Eq. 3.15) – is higher during booms; in fact, more precise
information increases ex-ante expected profits because it reduces the losses from mispric-
ing. These losses are increasing in the scale of the firm (see Eq. 3.13), which is directly
associated with aggregate output because of monopolistic competition (see Eq. 3.5). Since
the marginal cost of information acquisition is acyclical, optimal information acquisition is
procyclical.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
The formal definition of equilibrium in the baseline model is as follows.
The Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) in this economy is a sequence of aggregate
allocations {Ct, Nt, Yt,Kt,Πt, τe,t}, individual productions Yi,t for intermediate firms, and
prices {Wt, Rt, {Pi,t}}, such that for each realization of At, (i) Ct, Nt, and Kt maximize
households’ utility given the equilibrium prices Wt and Rt; (ii) Eq. (3.5) maximizes the final
goods firm’s profit given equilibrium prices {Pi,t}; (iii) given Wt, Rt and signals si,t, Yi,t
maximizes the expected profits for an intermediate firm; (iv) τe,t solves the representative
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entrepreneur’s problem by maximizing aggregate profits; and (v) all markets clear, namely,
K˙ =
θ − 1
θ
Yt − δKt − Ct (3.18)
Nt =
∫ 1
0 Ni,tdi and Kt =
∫ 1
0 Ki,tdi also hold. The equilibrium conditions are thus given
by:
C˙t
Ct
=
θ − 1
θ
α
Yt
Kt
− ρ− δ (3.19)
K˙t =
θ − 1
θ
Yt − δKt − Ct (3.20)
ψNχt Ct =
θ − 1
θ
(1− α) Yt
Nt
(3.21)
Yt = exp
{
θ
1
2τa
τe,t
τe,t + τa
}
AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (3.22)
1
2
(θ − 1)Yt = φζτa
{
τe,t
τa
+ 1
}ζ+1
(3.23)
The equilibrium conditions (3.19)-(3.21) coincide with those that arise from a standard
RBC model with monopolistic competition. As discussed above, Eq. (3.22) reveals that
measured TFP contains an endogenous component that depends upon the amount of uncer-
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tainty in the model economy, and Eq. (3.23) describes the optimal information acquisition
decision as a function of aggregate output.
The baseline model is one parameter away from a standard RBC model with monopolistic
competition (and idiosyncratic shocks). In fact, if information acquisition is costless (φ = 0),
and thus uncertainty is nil (τe,t = ∞, by Eq. (3.23)), Eq. (3.22) collapses to a standard,
exogenous-TFP production function.
3.2.4 Steady State
I state the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium, and
observe that steady states with more costly information are associated with lower output
and measured TFP.
Lemma 2 (Existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium) Assume that the output
elasticity of capital in the aggregate production function is less than one (i.e., γα < 1, where
γ denotes the degree of returns to scale in the aggregate production function). Also, assume
that φ < φ∗, and that τa is sufficiently large. Then, a unique steady-state equilibrium exists.
Proof. Evaluate the system of equations (3.19)-(3.23) in steady state. As usual, Eq. (3.19)-
(3.21) reveal that Y/K, Y/C and N are constant in a steady-state equilibrium. By using
these values into the aggregate production function (Eq. (3.22)), one can write Y as a
function of τe and parameters. That is,
Y = Y(τe, ·) = exp
{
θ
1
2τa
τe
τe + τa
}
A
(
θ − 1
θ
α
ρ+ δ
)α [θ − 1
θ
1− α
Ψ
(
θ − 1
θ
(
ρ+ δ − αδ
ρ+ δ
))] 1−α
1+χ
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Together with the last equation, Eq. (3.23) in steady state implies that one can obtain
an equation that defines τe implicitly. It is useful to write this as:
φ = T (Y(τe, ·), τe, ·) (3.24)
Note that T (Y(0, ·), 0, ·) ≡ φ∗ > 0, and T (Y(∞, ·),∞, ·) = 0. Given the continuity of
T (·), the intermediate value theorem implies that at least one solution exists. Furthermore,
note that Tτe(Y(0, ·), 0, ·) < 0 on the whole domain of τe as long as τa > 12 θ1+ζ . Thus, the
steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique under the conditions stated in the Lemma.
Lemma 3 (David, Hopenhayn and Venkateswaran (2016)) Steady-state output and mea-
sured TFP are decreasing functions of φ.
Thus, economies where steady-state uncertainty is higher (higher φ or, equivalently, lower
τe) feature higher misallocation of factors of production, and hence lower steady state TFP
and output.
3.2.5 Log-linear equilibrium
I solve the model by taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
its steady state. These read:
c˙t = (ρ+ δ)(yt − kt) (3.25)
yt = (1 + χ)nt + ct (3.26)
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k˙t = δkt +
ρ+ δ
α
yt − ρ+ (1− α)δ
α
ct (3.27)
yt =
(
1
2
θV
)
τe
τe + τa
τˆe,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Vˆt
+(at + αkt + (1− α)nt) (3.28)
τe
τe + τa
τˆe,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Vˆt
=
(
1
1 + ζ
)
yt (3.29)
where Vt = 1τe,t+τa denotes the posterior variance of ai,t, and is interpretable as the
amount of time-t uncertainty faced by intermediate-good producers in the model economy.
3.3 Information acquisition, aggregate increasing returns,
and indeterminacy
In this section, I show that micro-level uncertainty, together with endogenous information
acquisition, is equivalent to a representative-firm economy with increasing returns. To this
end, substitute Eq. (3.29) into Eq. (3.28), and obtain the (log-linearized) reduced-form
aggregate production function:
yt = γ(at + αkt + (1− α)nt) (3.30)
where γ = 1
1− 1
2
θ V
1+ζ
denotes the degree of returns to scale in the aggregate production
function.
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Note that both imperfect information and endogenous information acquisition are neces-
sary ingredients in order for the production function to exhibit increasing returns to scale.
In fact, under perfect information (i.e. φ = 0), uncertainty in the model economy would
be zero in the steady state (and at all times), and the aggregate production function would
feature constant returns to scale (γ = 1). Moreover, endogenous information acquisition is
also necessary to obtain increasing returns. If information is imperfect (φ > 0) but adjust-
ing a firm’s degree of information is infinitely costly (ζ = ∞), the procyclical productivity
mechanism that is conducive to aggregate increasing returns would not be at play and the
economy would display a constant returns to scale aggregate production function (γ = 1).
In light of these observations, I refer to γ as the “informational multiplier” of the model
economy, and summarize the aforesaid result in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 The reduced-form aggregate production function in the model economy ex-
hibits increasing returns if and only if there is a positive informational multiplier (i.e.,
γ > 1)
It is well known, at least since the seminal work of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), that the
equilibrium of economies with increasing returns to scale production functions are prone to
be dynamically indeterminate. The following proposition states the conditions under which
endogenous information acquisition gives rise to equilibrium indeterminacy – and hence the
economy is prone to self-fulfilling fluctuations.
Proposition 3 Assume that the output elasticity of capital in the aggregate production
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function is less than one (i.e., γα < 1). The necessary and sufficient condition for equilib-
rium indeterminacy in the benchmark economy is given by
γ >
1 + χ
1− α
Proof. See Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
The last proposition states that a higher informational multiplier exposes the economy to
self-fulfilling fluctuations, because it enhances the two-way interaction between aggregate
output and uncertainty. To gain further intuition, it is useful to compare the information-
acquisition economy to the representative-firm economy with monopolistic competition and
increasing returns of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). First, note that while the two economies
feature a mathematically isomorphic aggregate representation, they substantially differ in
the micro foundations that lead to aggregate increasing returns. Indeed, in the monopolistic-
competition economy of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), the parameter γ captures the degree
of firm-level returns to scale, whereas in the information acquisition economy all firms pro-
duce under constant returns to scale, and the information-acquisition-induced procyclical
productivity leads to aggregate increasing returns. To conclude the comparison with Ben-
habib and Farmer (1994) and the earlier literature, it is useful to rewrite the indeterminacy
condition of my model as follows:
Corollary 1 The indeterminacy condition in Proposition 3 is equivalent to:
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1
1 + ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt,Yt
>
(
1
2
θ
1 + χ
χ+ α
V
)−1
(3.31)
The left-hand side represents the elasticity of uncertainty (or information acquisition) to
changes in aggregate output. The condition in Equation (3.31) states that the responsive-
ness of information to output fluctuations should be sufficiently high for the economy to
display output fluctuations.
3.4 Empirical plausibility of self-fulfilling fluctuations
I have shown that, to a first-order approximation, the model with endogenous information
acquisition is observationally equivalent to a representative-agent economy with firm-level
increasing returns (Proposition 2). Further, I have shown that the economy is potentially
prone to self-fulfilling fluctuation, provided that the informational multiplier, γ, is suffi-
ciently large (Proposition 3). I now investigate the empirical plausibility of self-fulfilling
business cycles in an extended version of the model with variable capacity utilization.
3.4.1 The model with variable capital utilization
Wen (1998) shows that variable capital utilization leads to indeterminacy in the Benhabib
and Farmer’s model for mild levels of increasing returns. I model endogenous capacity
utilization along the lines of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) by assuming that
households choose the capacity utilization rate Ut. As a result, the total effective capital
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available for production is UtKt. A higher Ut implies that capital is more intensively utilized,
at the cost of faster depreciation (thus δ(Ut), defined below, is a convex increasing function).
The household’s budget constraint (3.1) becomes
K˙t = (RtUt − δ(Ut))Kt + wtNt − Ct (3.32)
The capital depreciation rate varies with capacity utilization according to
δ(Ut) = δ0
U1+ηt
1 + η
(3.33)
where δ0 ∈ (0, 1) is a constant and η > 0 measures the elasticity of the depreciation rate
with respect to capacity utilization. The household’s optimizing choices now include an
additional endogenous variable – the capacity utilization rate Ut.
The next proposition shows that the effect of the information multiplier is now amplified
due to the introduction of variable utilization.
Proposition 4 (Wen, 1998) In the extended model with variable capacity utilization, a 1
percent change in TFP holding input factors constant results in γ˜ percent change in aggregate
output, where
γ˜ ≡ d log Yt
d logAt
=
1 + η
1 + η − αγ γ > γ
Thus, as shown by Wen (1998), capacity utilization has a positive effect on the aggregate
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returns to scale.11 As a result, variable capacity utilization makes indeterminacy more
likely, ceteris paribus.
3.4.2 Parameterization
I set ρ = 0.01, so the quarterly discount factor β = 1/(1+ρ) = 0.99. I follow Hansen (1985)
and Rogerson (1988) and assume infinitely elastic labor supply (χ = 0). The factor share
of capital is α = 1/3. I set η = 0.35, in line with available estimates. I set δ = 0.033 which
is consistent with an average lifetime of new equipment of about 30 quarters.12 I set θ = 8
which implies an average steady-state markup of about 1.14, in line with estimates by Basu
and Fernald (1997).13 I set ζ = 1, so that the information cost function corresponds to the
one commonly adopted in the rational inattention literature (see, for example, Mackowiak
and Wiederholt, 2009). To parametrize the steady-state distribution of idiosyncratic shocks,
governed by σ2a, and the information cost φ (or, equivalently, the degree of uncertainty in the
steady state V), I adopt the following strategy. Following Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson
(2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), define quantity-based TFP and revenue-based TFP
of firm i respectively as:
log(TFPQi) ≡ ai log(TFPRi) ≡ pi − p¯+ ai
and notice that, in my model:
11 This is often referred to as the “returns to scale effect” of capital utilization
12 As a result δ0 = 0.0462, which implies U = 1 in steady state.
13 The preference parameter ψ is calibrated to obtain steady-state hours worked N = 0.3.
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Vari (log(TFPQi)) = σ
2
a Vari (log(TFPRi)) = V
I resort to within industry-year estimates from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the U.S.,
and set σ2a = 0.1560 and V = 0.0420.14
The above parametrization implies that γ = 1.092, in line with Basu and Fernald’s
(1997) evidence that returns to scale are around 1.10 in the manufacturing sector. Besides,
the fundamental uncertainty eliminated from private learning
(
V−σ2a
σ2a
)
is about 73%. David,
Hopenhayn and Venkateswaran (2016) estimate it to be between 30% and 60%. Steady-state
information capacity is around 1 bit. Landauer (1986) estimated that individuals process
about 2 bits per second in the laboratory. The relative standard deviation of uncertainty,
or TFPR dispersion is 0.5. Kehrig (2011) estimates TFPR dispersion to be around 0.9
for durables and and around 1.7 for non-durables. If the model were to parameterized
to match these estimates, self-fulfilling fluctuations would be more likely relative to the
baseline.15 Under the baseline parameterization, the condition in Proposition 4 is satisfied.
The model’s dynamic equilibrium is therefore indeterminate, and self-fulfilling business
cycles are possible.
14 I apply appropriate transformations to obtain quarterly figures from Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) annual
estimates.
15 Note that the model-implied expected profit loss from mispricing are relatively high. These, as a share of
revenues, are given by
(θ − 1)
2
E
(
P ∗i,t − Pi,t
)2
=
(θ − 1)
2
V ≈ 14%
Zbaracki et al. (2004) estimate these to be around 1.22% of revenues. The discrepancy between the model
and the data along this dimension is due to the model’s simplicity: all mispricing, and resulting misallocation,
in the model are due to idiosyncratic uncertainty. A richer model – featuring other sources of misallocation
– would likely bring the expected profit loss from mispricing closer to available estimates.
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3.4.3 Empirical estimation of aggregate model
A discrete-time version of the extended aggregate model with TFP shocks is estimated
using Bayesian techniques (see Herbst and Schorfheide, 2016). TFP is assumed to follow
the autoregressive process in logs:
log(At) = ρA log(At−1) + εA,t
where εA,t are i.i.d. disturbances drawn from a Normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation σA. As I estimate the model economy in its indeterminacy region, the
dynamic equilibrium is not unique, and I introduce sunspots to select the equilibrium. I
follow the insight of Farmer, Khramov and Nicolo` (2015) in specifying an expectation error
to consumption as a new exogenous shock:
ct = Et−1ct + ηc,t
The expectation error, ηc,t, is allowed to be influenced by both fundamental and nonfunda-
mental shocks:
ηc,t = ωAεA,t + εs,t
where ωA governs the influence of technology innovations on the expectation error of con-
sumption, while εs,t are i.i.d. disturbances drawn from a Normal distribution with mean
zero and standard deviation σS . I refer to these shocks as sunspots as they are independent
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of fundamentals.
The observable variables that I use in the estimation are U.S. output, consumption,
investment, and hours worked from 1947:1 to 2015:4.16,17
Prior Posterior
Name Density Mean Std. Dev. Mean 90% interval
γ Beta 1.3 0.1 1.65 [1.57, 1.72]
ρA Beta 0.8 0.1 0.87 [0.84 0.91]
σA Inverse gamma 0.5 Inf 0.21 [0.19 0.23]
ωA Uniform 0 3 0.55 [0.48 0.61]
σs Inverse gamma 0.5 Inf 0.42 [0.35 0.49]
Table 3.1: Prior and posterior distributions for model parameters
The parameters of the extended aggregate economy that are estimated are the reduced-
form informational multiplier γ, the persistence and standard deviation of the shock to
aggregate TFP (ρA and σA), the standard deviation of the sunspot shock (σs), and the co-
variance between the expectational error and the fundamental shock, ωA. Table 3.1 reports
the shape of the priors. I assume a beta distribution for γ with a lower limit that ensures
that the model remains in the indeterminate region. I assume a largely uninformative uni-
form distribution for ωA. The choice of the priors for the other parameters follow common
practice in the literature. I obtain 500,000 draws from the posterior mean for each of the five
chains using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. I adjust the scale in the jumping distribution
to achieve a 25% acceptance rate for each chain. The resulting posterior distribution of es-
16 I filter out the trend components of these variables using a one-sided HP filter.
17 To avoid stochastic singularity, I add two measurement error shocks (to output and hours worked)
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timated parameters, reported in Table 3.1, indicates that these are estimated with precision
and are within empirically plausible ranges, except for the degree of aggregate returns to
scale which appears relatively high. In Figure C.2.1 in Appendix C.2, I follow Pavlov and
Weder (2017) in comparing the estimated series for the sunspot shock to a commonly used
index for U.S. consumer confidence. The fluctuations in the two series is remarkably simi-
lar, suggesting that the estimated sunspot shocks are (at least partially) capturing so-called
consumers’ sentiment. That said, I note that consumer confidence indexes are endogenous
and thus likely reflects consumers’ expectations as a function of fundamental shocks.
Equilibrium dynamics following a sunspot shock and variance decomposition
Figure 3.1 reports the impulse responses of the estimated model to a one standard deviation
sunspot shock. A positive realization of the sunspot leads to a persistent increase of all
macroeconomic aggregates, as well as a reduction in micro-level uncertainty - due to the
procyclical information acquisition.
Table 3.2 reports the unconditional variance decomposition implied by the estimated
model. The estimation attributes around 70% of macroeconomic fluctuations to fundamen-
tal shocks, while around 30% to nonfundamental shocks. An extended version of this model
with more than two structural shocks would be desirable to further decompose the sources
of business cycles.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a sunspot shock from estimated model
Note: The solid lines represent the estimated actual mean responses. Dashed lines represent the 10 percent
and 90 percent posterior interval. Micro dispersion refers to the posterior variance V.
Output Consumption Investment Hours
Technology shocks 70% 71% 69% 69%
Sunspot shocks 30% 29% 31% 31%
Table 3.2: Unconditional variance decomposition
3.5 Conclusions
Measures of firm-level productivity dispersion tend to increase during recessions (Kehrig,
2011), periods in which measured aggregate productivity tends to decline (Basu and Fernald,
2001). In this paper, I interpreted these comovements as the equilibrium of a RBC model
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with idiosyncratic uncertainty and endogenous information acquisition. In particular, I
find that this model displays aggregate increasing returns to scale and indeterminacy of its
dynamic equilibrium becomes a possibility, as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994). I show that
this possibility is empirically plausible as indeterminacy arises in a model parameterized
to replicate a set of moments of the distribution of firm-level productivity. A Bayesian
estimation of the model suggests that non-fundamental shocks explain a significant fraction
of aggregate fluctuations. Endogenous uncertainty thus appears to be a plausible mechanism
behind aggregate increasing returns to scale and business cycle fluctuations.
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Appendix A
International Spillovers and the Exchange
Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
A.1 Dataset
• Nominal exchange rates (st, monthly): the preferred measure of exchange rates are
official exchange rates. If these are not available, we use period average market rates,
or period average principal exchange rates. The main data source is the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• Policy-controlled interest rates (rk, monthly): These rates are measured in the data
as the period average T-bill rates, the closest to the overnight interbank lending
rates. If these are not available, discount rates, or money market rates are used.
The main data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) compiled by the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• U.S. policy-controlled interest rates (r?, monthly): This rate is measured by the Fed-
eral Funds rate.
• Exchange rate regimes: these are determined according to the historical exchange rate
classification in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), recently updated by Ilzetzki, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2017). A country is deemed to have a flexible exchange rate regime if, in
a given year, its exchange rate was either (i) within a moving band that is narrower
than or equal to +/-2 percent; or (ii) was classified as managed floating; or (iii) was
classified as freely floating; or (iv) was classified as freely falling in Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004). For countries that had multiple episodes of flexible exchange rates during this
period, we follow Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh (2016) in considering each episode
separately subject to the restriction that there were at least 24 months of data in each
episode.
• U.S. industrial production (monthly):
• U.S. CPI inflation (monthly):
• Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX, monthly):
• Net foreign asset positions to GDP (annual): Updated and extended version of dataset
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
• Data used for information sufficiency test (monthly): To be written up.
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• List of countries in the dataset: See Table A.1.1.
Country Time period Country Time period
Albania 1994:7-2001:12 Algeria 1988:1-1995:1
Angola 2002:1-2005:5 Australia 1974:1-2010:11
Austria 1974:1-1998:12 Belarus 1994:1-2002:10
Belgium 1974:1-1998:12 Brazil 1999:2-2007:12
Canada 1974:1-2010:11 Chile 1999:9-2001:12
China, P.R. (Mainland) 1990:3-1992:7 Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1994:7-2004:2
Costa Rica 1980:10-1983:10 Czech Republic 1997:6-2001:12
Denmark 1981:5-1988:12 Dominican Republic 2003:11-2007:12
Euro Area 1999:1 - 2010:11 Finland 1974:1-1998:12
France 1974:1-1998:12 Gambia, The 1986:1-1991:9
Germany 1975:7-1998:12 Ghana 1985:4-2001:3
Greece 1983:1-2000:12 Haiti 1994:10-2007:12
Iceland 1987:6-2010:11 Indonesia 1997:8-2007:12
Ireland 1974:1-1998:12 Italy 1977:3-1998:12
Jamaica 1990:10-1992:12 Japan 1974:1-2010:11
Kazakhstan 1994:4-1996:5 Kenya 1987:1-1995:12
Korea, Rep. of 1997:12-2007:12 Kyrgyz Republic 1994:1-1999:11
Lao People S Dem. Rep. 1997:9-2000:3 Lebanon 1984:3-1991:7
Luxembourg 1990:1-1998:12 Madagascar 2002:10-2007:12
Malawi 1983:1-1994:12 Malawi 1997:8 - 2003:8
Malta 1987:11-2000:12 Mexico 1982:2-1988:11
Mexico 1995:1-2007:12 Netherlands 1974:1 - 1990:8
New Zealand 1978:1-2010:11 Nigeria 1991:7-2007:12
Norway 1974:1-2009:5 Peru 1990:1-1993:10
Philippines 1997:7-1999:11 Portugal 1982:4 -1998:5
Romania 1994:3 -2001:3 Serbia, Rep. of 2003:3-2007:12
Sierra Leone 2002:1-2005:6 Singapore 1974:1-2007:12
South Africa 1974:1-1985:8 South Africa 1995:3-2007:12
Spain 1979:1-1998-12 Sweden 1974:1-2010:11
Switzerland 1980:1-2010:11 Syrian Arab Rep. 1982:6-1987:12
Tajikistan 1998:10-2002:10 Thailand 2001:2-2007:12
Turkey 2001:2-2007:12 Uganda 1980:1-1986:8
Ukraine 1992:12-1996:9 United Kingdom 1974:1-2010:10
Uruguay 1991:12-1995:9 Uruguay 2002:5-2005:5
Zambia 1978:1-1983:7 Zambia 1985:11-2007:12
Table A.1.1: Sample used in the empirical work
A.2 Additional results from empirical analysis
A.2.1 Granger causality test
We perform a test of Granger causality that consists in regressing the Federal Funds rate
on up to 36 lags of the identified monetary policy shock. The null of no Granger causality
is rejected if the coefficients associated with the lags of the monetary policy shock series
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are jointly significant. Table A.2.1 shows the p-values of the F-statistic of a regression that
includes up to 36 lags of the monetary policy shock series for each of the largest countries
in our sample. The monetary policy shock identified through recursive ordering appears to
systematically predict future movements in the Federal Funds rate, especially when longer
horizons are part of the regression. Specifically, we reject the null of no Granger causality
in all countries at 5% level of significance with the exception of South Africa and Brazil.
Somewhat similar figures appear when we perform the Granger causality test using the
cyclical component of U.S. industrial production.
Federal Funds rate U.S. industrial prod.
1 lag 12 lags 36 lags 1 lag 12 lags 36 lags
Industrial countries
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Italy 0.03 0.60 0.93 0.06 0.05 0.00
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.20 0.54 1.00
United Kingdom 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01
Developing countries
Indonesia 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.01 0.39
Brazil 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.04 0.81
South Africa 0.92 0.99 0.22 0.73 0.99 1.00
Korea 0.88 0.46 0.00 0.21 0.60 0.83
Mexico 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.86 1.00 0.40
Philippines 0.70 0.03 - 0.87 0.69 -
Table A.2.1: Granger causality test
Notes: The table reports the p-values of the F-statistic of a regression of Federal Funds rate and
HP-filtered U.S. industrial production on up to 36 lags of the monetary policy shock series for each
country. The p-value for Philippines is not reported for 36 lags because of its limited sample size.
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A.2.2 Information sufficiency test
Is the identified anticipated external shock predictable? That is, is the informational con-
tent in the baseline VAR sufficient to identify the anticipated external shock? Following
Forni and Gambetti (2014), we test the null of informational sufficiency of the VAR to
recover the anticipated external shock. The test is implemented as follows. We begin by
computing the principal components of large data set that captures all the relevant U.S.
macroeconomic information, described in Appendix A.1. For each country, we test whether
the first h principal components, where h = 1, . . . , 5, Granger cause the identified an-
ticipated external shock, ε??t . We include four lags of each principal component. If the
null of no Granger causality is never rejected, ε??t is informationally sufficient. Otherwise,
information sufficiency is rejected.
Table A.2.2 shows the p-value of the F-test statistics for the largest economies in our sam-
ple. We include 1, 3, and 5 principal components. We fail to reject the null of informational
sufficiency at 5% level of significance in all countries.
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P-value of F-statistic
Industrial countries Developing countries
P.C. =1 P.C. = 3 P.C. =5 P.C. =1 P.C. = 3 P.C. =5
Germany 0.27 0.51 0.61 Indonesia 0.99 0.99 1.00
Canada 0.24 0.57 0.68 Brazil 0.72 0.97 0.87
Italy 0.21 0.17 0.33 South Africa 0.42 0.82 0.44
France 0.88 0.93 0.47 Korea 0.09 0.36 0.10
Japan 0.30 0.19 0.22 Mexico 0.74 0.52 0.55
United Kingdom 0.83 0.81 0.47 Philippines 0.80 0.97 0.82
Table A.2.2: Information sufficiency test
Notes: The table reports the p-values of the F-statistic of a regression of the identified anticipated external
shock on up to 5 principal components (P.C.) of a large data set capturing all the relevant U.S. macroeconomic
information, described in Appendix A.1.
A.2.3 Forecast error variance decomposition
Figure A.2.1: Fraction of forecast error variance of each variable from identified shocks
Note: The variance decomposition is done with our baseline three-variable specification. The horizontal
axes refer to forecast horizons, while the vertical axes denote the fraction of forecast error variance from
each shock.
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A.2.4 Empirical IRFs to an anticipated external shock (all countries)
Figure A.2.2: Empirical IRFs to an anticipated external shock (all countries)
Note: Lines are the estimated IRFs to a one-standard-deviation anticipated external shock from the
baseline three-variable VAR, for the preferred sample. Solid lines are IRFs for industrial countries; dashed
lines are IRFs for developing and emerging countries. Thick black line is the median IRF for all countries
and the shaded gray areas are the corresponding 90% confidence intervals from 1000 bias-corrected
bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR.
A.2.5 Delayed overshooting
Using recursive identification strategies to identify the effect of monetary policy on exchange
rates, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) find a persistent appreciation of the domestic currency
for periods up to 3 years following a monetary contraction. This empirical finding is known
as the “delayed overshooting puzzle,” and is also reported in Clarida and Gali (1994),
and Scholl and Uhlig (2008), among others.1 The delayed timing of the peak exchange
rate response is interpreted as a puzzle because it is associated to deviations from UIP. In
fact, after a temporary increase in the interest rate differential, the UIP condition implies
1 Faust and Rogers (2003) and Cushman and Zha (1997) instead find no evidence of delayed overshooting.
135
Appendix A International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
that the exchange rate should appreciate on impact and then depreciate until it reaches
its long-run level (Dornbusch, 1976). Our findings about short-lived UIP deviations due
to monetary policy shocks are consistent with the presence of a mild degree of delayed
overshooting. Table A.2.3 reports the interquantile range of peak exchange rate responses
across bootstraps. We find that most peak responses appear to occur within one year, with
the exception of Japan, Canada, and South Africa. In general, the interquantile range is
large, indicating a limited degree of delayed overshooting.
Max Month Max Month
Industrial countries Developing countries
Germany 3 Indonesia 0
[1;69] [0;1]
Canada 28 Brazil 14
[10;94] [1;53]
Italy 5 South Africa 29
[3;34] [10;45]
France 7 Korea 7
[6;34] [2;147]
Japan 116 Mexico 5
[4;332] [5;6]
United Kingdom 9 Philippines 0
[6;14] [0;5]
Table A.2.3: Test of delayed overshooting
Notes: We report the median value of the month of maximum response across bootstrap iterations.
Interquantile range are reported in parentheses.
A.2.6 Multivariate VAR with domestic output and inflation
We extend our baseline VAR to account for the dynamics of domestic industrial production
and CPI inflation, using two separate 4-variable VAR. Following Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995), industrial production (in log difference) an CPI inflation are ordered second. Thus,
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innovations in output and inflation affect interest rates and exchange rates contemporane-
ously, while domestic monetary policy shocks influence these variable with a (one month)
lag. In this setting, we identify four shocks: contemporaneous and anticipated external
shocks, output/inflation shocks, and domestic monetary policy shocks. Accounting for
the influence of output and inflation does not affect the response of the exchange rate to
a domestic monetary policy innovation (under the alternative identification). Besides, a
monetary contraction brings about a short-lived decline in output, in line with all monetary
macro models. The inflation response to a monetary contractions appears insignificant in
developing countries, while it generates the so-called price puzzle in industrial economies.
(a) Multivariate VAR with home output (b) Multivariate VAR with home inflation
Figure A.2.3: Exchange rate, output and inflation responses to a 1% contractionary do-
mestic monetary policy shock
Note: The figure shows the exchange rate response to a 1% contractionary domestic monetary policy shock
(alternative identification), in a multivariate VAR that includes domestic industrial production growth (Panel
A.2.3a) and domestic CPI inflation (Panel A.2.3b)
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A.2.7 Excess returns, by country
(a) Domestic monetary policy shock
(b) Anticipated external shock
Figure A.2.4: Currency excess returns
Note: The figure shows the response of one-year ahead ex ante excess returns to a 1% domestic monetary
policy shock (Panel A.2.4a) and a one-standard deviation anticipated external shock (Panel A.2.4b).
138
Appendix A International Spillovers and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy
A.3 Model details
A.3.1 Traders’s decision problem
This section shows that a CRRA utility has a mean-variance representation.
max
dt+1
Et
[
(T ? + R˜t+1dt+1)
1−ω?t
1− ω?t
]
= Et
exp
{
(1− ω?t ) log(T ? + R˜t+1dt+1)
}
1− ω?t
 (A.1)
where T ? is such that (T ? + R˜t+1dt+1) > 0.
Take second order Taylor expansion around R˜ = 0:
log(T ? + R˜t+1dt+1) ≈ log(T ?) + dt+1
T ?
R˜t+1 −
d2t+1
2 (T ?)2
R˜2t+1 (A.2)
≈ log(T ?) + dt+1
T ?
R˜t+1 −
d2t+1
2 (T ?)2
Vart(R˜t+1) (A.3)
where R˜2t+1 is replaced by the conditional variance of R˜t+1.
2,3 Then Eq. (A.1) is approxi-
mated by:
max
dt+1
Et
exp
{
(1− ω?t )
(
log(T ?) + dt+1T ? R˜t+1 −
d2t+1
2(T ?)2
Vart(R˜t+1)
)}
1− ω?t
 (A.4)
2 Note that Et[R˜t+1]
2 ≈ 0.
3 As the time interval shrinks, the higher order terms that are dropped from (A.1) become negligible relative
to those that are included, and the deviation of R˜2t+1 from Vart(R˜t+1) also become negligible. In particular
in the limit of continuous time the approximation is exact and can be derived using Ito’s Lemma.
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≈ max
dt+1
exp
{
(1− ω?t )
(
log(T ?)− d
2
t+1
2 (T ?)2
Vart(R˜t+1)
)}
Et
[
exp
{
(1− ω?t )
(
dt+1
T ?
R˜t+1
)}]
.
(A.5)
Assume normal distribution of R˜t+1, then
≈max
dt+1
log(T ?)− d
2
t+1
2 (T ?)2
Vart(R˜t+1) + (1− ω?t )
d2t+1
2 (T ?)2
Vart(R˜t+1) +
dt+1
T ?
E[R˜t+1] (A.6)
≈max
dt+1
Et[R˜t+1]dt+1 − ω
?
t
2T ?
Vart(R˜t+1)d
2
t+1 (A.7)
In equilibrium, the individual trader’s asset decisision reads
dt+1 =
T ? Et[R˜t+1]
ω?t Vart(R˜t+1)
(A.8)
Without loss of generality, we set T ? = 1. Then, aggregating over the mt measure of
traders, the overall demand for domestic bonds from traders is
D˜t+1 =
mt
ω?t
Et R˜t+1
Vart(R˜t+1)
(A.9)
which is Eq. (1.15) in the text.
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A.3.2 Model equilibrium equations
Besides each country’s Phillips Curve, the model’s equilibrium equations in levels are given
by:
β? Et
[(
C?t+1
)−ω? exp(ω?t+1) R?t
Π?t+1
]
= (C?t )
−ω? exp(ω?t )
R?t
R?
=
(
R?t−1
R?
)ρR (Π?t
Π?
)(1−ρR)φ
exp (εr?,t)
β Et
[
(Ct+1)
−ω Rt
Πt+1
]
= (Ct)
−ω
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR (Πt
Π
)(1−ρR)φ
exp (εr,t)
Πt = (ΠH,t)
1−λ
(
St
St−1
Π?t
)λ
Yt = Q
θλ
1−λ
t
{
(1− λ)Ct + λQθtC?t
}
Bt+1/PH,tYt
Rt
− Bt/PH,t−1Yt−1 1
ΠH,tYt/Yt−1
= 1−Q−
λ
1−λ
t
Ct
Yt
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St = Qt
Pt
P ?t
−Bt+1/PH,tYt =
µEt
(
Rt −R?t St+1St
)
Vart
(
Rt −R?t St+1St
)
A.3.3 Model solution
We can represent the model outlined in Appendix A.3.2 as the following system of equations:
Et [f(Xt+1)] = 0
where Xt+1 contains all the variables in the model (including variables dated at time t and
t−1) and f has as many rows as endogenous variables in the model. The risky steady state
(Coeurdacier, Rey and Winant, 2011) is obtained by taking a second-order approximation
of f around EtXt+1:
Φ (EtXt+1) = f (EtXt+1) + Et
[
f ′′ [Xt+1 − EtXt+1]2
]
where f ′′ is also evaluated at EtXt+1. The risky steady state, X, is then characterized by
Φ (X) = 0, and the second moments Et
[
f ′′ [Xt+1 − EtXt+1]2
]
are generated by the linear
dynamics around X.
The model’s solution thus consists in a log-linear approximation around a risky steady
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state that is consistent with the second moments generated by the log-linear dynamics
around it. This is achieved through an iterative algorithm, along the lines of Coeurdacier,
Rey and Winant (2011).
143
Appendix B
Should Central Banks Target Investment
Prices?
B.1 Optimal price setting
Denote by 1 − ξj the probability that a firm in sector j can re-optimize price setting. A
firm that can renew its price contract chooses Pj,t(f) to maximize its expected discounted
dividend flows given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
ξsjDt,t+s
[
(1 + τj)Pj,t(f)Y
d
j,t+s(f)− Vj,t+s(f)
]
where τj denotes a subsidy to sector-j output, Dt,t+s is the period-t present value of a dollar
in a future state in period t+ s, and Vj,t+s(f) is the total cost function; in maximizing its
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profits, each firm takes as given its demand schedule (2.1). The resulting optimal pricing
rule is:
Pj,t(f) =
µj
1 + τj
Et
∑∞
s=0 ξ
s
jDt,t+svj,t+s
(
Pj,t+s
Πsj
) 1+θj
θj Yj,t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 ξ
s
jDt,t+s
(
Pj,t+s
Πsj
) 1
θj Yj,t+s
(B.1)
where vj,t denotes the real marginal cost function (in units of the respective sectoral price
index) given by (2.2).
The steady state of (B.1), with constant real marginal costs, reads
Pj,t(f)
Pj,t
=
µj
1 + τj
vj (B.2)
It is important to note that, under full indexation to trend inflation, the steady state
coincides with the flexible price steady state: each firm sets its price as a constant markup
over marginal costs. This assumption guarantees that the steady state is not distorted
by trend inflation. In the steady state, however, the markup is completely offset by the
subsidy τj . This assumption guarantees that the steady state of the model is not distorted
by imperfect competition.
The log-linearized counterpart of (B.1) – the log-linearized optimal price setting rule
equation – is:
p∗j,t − pj,t = (1− ξj β˜)Et
∞∑
s=0
(ξj β˜)
s
[
pij,t|t+s +mcj,t+s
]
(B.3)
where mcj denotes log-linearized sector-j sector-j-real marginal costs. One can show that
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the (sectoral) price level evolves as:
Pj,t =
[
ξj(ΠjPj,t−1)
− 1
θj + (1− ξj)(P ∗j,t)
− 1
θj
]−θj
(B.4)
where 1−ξj denotes the probability of adjusting the price in a given period, and θj represent
the mark-up rate in sector j. One can rewrite (B.5) as:
1 = ξjΠ
− 1
θj
j Π
1
θj
j,t + (1− ξj)
(
P ∗j,t
Pj,t
)− 1
θj
(B.5)
Its log-linearized counterpart – the log-linearized general price level equation – is:
p∗j,t − pj,t =
ξj
1− ξj pij,t (B.6)
Note that both (B.3) and (B.6) are independent from trend inflation and exactly coincide
with their counterparts derived under zero steady-state inflation. As a result, putting them
together, one obtains the usual (sectoral) New Keynesian Phillips curve(s).
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B.2 Stationary equilibrium, the deterministic steady state,
and log-linear equilibrium equations
To induce stationarity we transform variables as follows:1
Cˆt = Yˆc,t =
Yc,t
Γ1−αc,t Γαi,t
Iˆt = Yˆi,t =
Yi,t
Γi,t
Kˆj,t+1 =
Kj,t+1
Γi,t
wˆj,t =
Wj,t
Pc,tΓ
1−α
c,t Γ
α
i,t
qˆi,t =
qi,t
Γ1−αc,t Γ
α−1
i,t
=
Pi,t
Pc,t
(
Γi,t
Γc,t
)1−α mˆci,t
qi,t
=
MCi,t
Pi,t
=
MCi,t
Pc,tqi,t
mˆcc,t =
MCc,t
Pc,t
qˆkj,t = q
k
j,t
(
Γi,t
Γc,t
)1−α
rˆkj,t = r
k
j,t
(
Γi,t
Γc,t
)1−α
Yˆt =
Yt
Γ1−αc,t Γαi,t
The household’s FOCs (2.8)-(2.11) are rendered stationary as follows:
υjNj,t(h)
η =
wˆj,t
Cˆσt
1 = β(γ1−αc γ
α
i )
−σEt
[
Rnt
Πc,t+1
Cˆ−σt+1
Cˆ−σt
]
qˆi,t = qˆ
k
j,t
[
Ψ′
(
Iˆj,tγi
Kˆj,t
)]
qˆkj,t = β˜γ
−1
i Et
(
Cˆt+1
Cˆt
)−σ{
qˆkj,t+1
[
1− δ + Ψ
(
Iˆj,t+1γi
Kˆj,t+1
)
−Ψ′
(
Iˆj,t+1γi
Kˆj,t+1
)(
Iˆj,t+1γi
Kˆj,t+1
)]
+ rˆkj,t+1
}
(B.7)
where γj denotes the growth rate of sector-j technology.
1 Hatted variables are stationary
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Sector-j production function reads:
Yˆj,t = Zj,t
(
γ−1i Kˆj,t
)α
(Lj,t)
1−α
Real marginal costs in the consumption sector:
MCc,t
Pc,t
=
α˜
Zc,t
(rˆkc,t)
α(wˆc,t)
1−α
Investment-real marginal costs in the investment sector:
MCi,t
Pi,t
=
α˜
Zi,t
(rˆki,t)
α(wˆi,t)
1−α 1
qˆi,t
Factor demands are given by:
wˆj,t
rˆkj,t
=
1− α
α
γ−1i Kˆj,t
Lj,t
Capital laws of motion are denoted by:
Kˆj,t+1 =
(1− δ)
γi
Kˆj,t +
(
Ψ
(
Iˆj,tγi
Kˆj,t
))
Kˆj,t
γi
The Euler equation in steady state imply:
Rn = β−1(γ1−αc γ
α
i )
σΠc
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where Πc denotes the steady-state PCE inflation rate. This has to satisfy:
qˆi,t =
Pi,t
Pc,t
(
Γi,t
Γc,t
)1−α
(B.8)
Divide both sides of (B.8) by its previous period counterpart:
1 =
Πi,t
Πc,t
(
γi
γc
)1−α
(B.9)
which states that the relative price of investment decline at a rate that is determined by
the growth rate differential of sectoral technologies. Then, for given sectoral technology
growth rates, we can calibrate one sectoral steady-state inflation rate, and the other would
be uniquely determined, by (B.9).
The capital laws of motion in steady state imply:
Iˆj
Kˆj
= 1− 1− δ
γi
(B.10)
which is the investment-capital ratio in sector j. The log-linearized equilibrium conditions
are reported in Table B.2.1.
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Production functions yj,t = zj,t + αkj,t + (1− α)hj,t
C-sector real marginal costs vc,t = αr
k
c,t + (1− α)wc,t − zc,t
I-sector real marginal costs vi,t = αr
k
i,t + (1− α)wi,t − zi,t − qi,t
Factors demands wj,t = r
k
j,t + kj,t − hj,t
Labor-supply schedules hj,t = (1/η)(wj,t − σct)
Consumption Euler equation Et∆ct+1 = (1/σ)(rnt − Etpic,t+1)
Shadow value of capital qkj,t = qi,t + ψδ˜γi(ij,t − kj,t)
Investment demands qkj,t = −σEt∆ct+1 + β˜(1− δ˜)Etqkj,t+1+(
1− β˜(1− δ˜)
)
Etrkj,t+1+
β˜δ˜ψδ˜γiEt (ij,t+1 − kj,t+1)
Capital laws of motion kj,t+1 = (1− δ˜)kj,t + δ˜ij,t
Labor market clearing ht = φhc,t + (1− φ)hi,t
Investment market clearing it = φic,t + (1− φ)ii,t
Agg. resource constraint yt = φct + (1− φ)it
for j = {c, i}
Table B.2.1: Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
Note: In addition, ct = yc,t and it = yi,t also hold in equilibrium, as well as the definition of relative
price, (2.15), and sectoral Phillips curves, (2.13) and (2.14). I-sector real marginal costs are expressed in
investment units. Also, δ˜ = 1− 1−δ
γi
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B.3 The relationship between marginal cost gaps and output
gaps
By using the log-linearized c-sector marginal costs, capital demand, labor supply, production
function and resource constraint (see Table B.2.1) we have:
vc,t =
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
ct − α 1 + η
1− αkc,t −
1 + η
1− αzc,t
The last equation represents the real marginal costs in the consumption sector under sticky
prices. The following equation defines the real marginal costs when prices are flexible, under
the Woodford’s definition of natural rates:2
v∗c,t =
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
c∗t − α
1 + η
1− αkc,t −
1 + η
1− αzc,t
Recall that, in every time period, the variation in real marginal costs under flexible prices
is nil. That is, prices are set as a constant markup over nominal marginal costs. Thus the
marginal cost equals the marginal cost gap and is given by:
vc,t − v∗c,t =
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
(ct − c∗t )
2 As explained in Section 2.4, the Woodford’s definition of natural rate implies that period-t capital stocks in
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium coincide with period-t capital stocks in the sticky price equilibrium. Note
that this is not true for t+ i if i 6= 0
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Similarly one can show that, under sticky prices, the real marginal costs in the investment
sector, in units of investment goods, are:
vi,t =
[
1 + η
1− α − 1
]
it − α 1 + η
1− αki + σct −
1 + η
1− αzi,t − qi,t
Under flexible prices, these correspond to
v∗i,t =
[
1 + η
1− α − 1
]
i∗t − α
1 + η
1− αki + σc
∗
t −
1 + η
1− αzi,t − q
∗
i,t
The investment marginal costs gap is therefore:
vi,t − v∗i,t =
[
1 + η
1− α − 1
]
(it − i∗t ) + σ (ct − c∗t )− (qi,t − q∗i,t)
B.4 Pareto optimum
Here we outline some flexible-price equilibrium relationships that will prove useful in de-
riving the second-order approximation to the social welfare function. By equating the
marginal rate of substitution to the marginal product of labor in the consumption sector,
under flexible prices, we obtain:
σc∗t + ηh
∗
c,t = c
∗
t − h∗c,t
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Use the production function to substitute out for consumption-sector labor:
h∗c,t =
1
1− αc
∗
t −
α
1− αkc,t −
1
1− αzc,t
1 + η
1− α (αkc,t + zc,t) =
[
1 + η
1− α − (1− σ)
]
c∗t (B.11)
Note that, under Woodford’s definition of natural rate, k∗c,t = kc,t at the beginning of each
time period.
The production function for investment goods, together with the market-clearing condi-
tion in the investment sector, imply:
zi,t + αki,t = i
∗
t + (1− α)h∗i,t (B.12)
B.5 A second-order approximation to the welfare function
The approach adopted in this section largely follows Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)
and Edge (2003).
To provide a normative assessment of alternative monetary policy choices, we measure
social welfare as the unconditional expectation of average household lifetime utility:
Et
∫ 1
0
[ ∞∑
s=0
β˜sWt+s(h)
]
dh
where β˜ = β(γ1−αc γαi )
1−σ, and the term in large brackets is the discounted lifetime utility
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function of household h presented in the paper (Equations (2.5) and (2.6) after appropri-
ate transformations). In this appendix, we follow the seminal analysis of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) in deriving the second-order approximation to each component of the so-
cial welfare function and computing its deviation from the welfare of the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium under flexible consumption and investment prices. We adopt Woodford’s defi-
nition of natural rate of output: as explained in Section 2.4, when we enter period t+1 it is
the capital stock that is actually present that determines how output in t+1 is defined. We
will be more specific on the implications of this assumption below. The approach we take
can be described as follows: we derive the second order approximation for the within-period
welfare function in the sticky price model; we subtract its flexible-price counterpart; we take
sum over t from 0 to ∞ and take the unconditional expectation.
It is useful to decompose household h′s period utility function Wt(h) as follows:
Wt = U(Cˆt)− Vc(Nc,t(h))− Vi(Ni,t(h))
U(Cˆt) =
Cˆ1−σt
1− σ
Vc(Nc,t(h)) = υc
Nc,t(h)
1+η
1 + η
Vc(Ni,t(h)) = υi
Ni,t(h)
1+η
1 + η
We use two approximations repeatedly. If A is a generic variable, the relationship between
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its arithmetic and logarithmic percentage change is
A−A
A
=
dA
A
' a+ 1
2
a2, a ≡ lnA− lnA (B.13)
If A =
[∫ 1
0 A(j)
φdj
] 1
φ
, the logarithmic approximation of A is
a ' Eja(j) + 1
2
φ
(
Eja(j)
2 − (Eja(j))2
)
= Eja(j) +
1
2
φvarja(j) (B.14)
We first consider the subutility functions that involve consumption terms, that is U(Cˆt) and
Vc(Nc,t(h)); first, we approximate U(Cˆt):3
U(Cˆ) ' U+ UCˆCˆ
dCˆ
Cˆ
+
1
2
UCˆCˆCˆ2
(
dCˆ
Cˆ
)2
Making use of Equation (B.13) we have:
U(Cˆ) ' U+ UCˆCˆ
(
c+
1
2
c2
)
+
1
2
UCˆCˆCˆ
2c2 (B.15)
Next we approximate EhVc(Nc,t) :
EhVc(Nc,t(h)) ' Vc + EhVcNcNc
dNc(h)
Nc
+
1
2
(
EhVcNcNcN
2
c
(
dNc(h)
Nc
)2)
3 In this section we suppress the time subscript t for ease of notation.
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Again, by (B.13) we can write:
EhVc(Nc,t(h)) ' Vc + VcNcNc
(
Ehnc(h) +
1
2
Ehnc(h)
2
)
+
1
2
(
VcNcNcN
2
cEhnc(h)
2
)
(B.16)
The aggregate supply of labor in the consumption sector is Lc = νc
∫ 1
0 Nc(h)dh . Therefore,
lc = ln νc + ln
∫ 1
0
Nc,t(h)dh− lnLc ' Ehn(h) + 1
2
varhnc(h) (B.17)
where the constant terms are dropped in the last equation. The aggregate demand for labor
by firms (in the consumption sector) is Lc =
∫ 1
0 Lc(f)df = EfLc(f). Thus,
lc = lnEfLc(f)− Lc ' Ef lc(f) + 1
2
varf lc(f) (B.18)
All firms in the consumption sector choose identical capital labor ratios
(
Kˆc(f)
Lc(f)
)
equal to
the aggregate sectoral ratio KˆcLc because they face the same factor prices, so
Yˆc(f) = Zc
(
Kˆc(f)
Lc(f)
)α
Lc(f) = Zc
(
Kˆc
Lc
)α
Lc(f)
The last equation implies:
yc(f) = zc + αkc − αlc + lc(f)
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which also implies:
Efyc(f) = zc + αkc − αlc + Ef lc(f) (B.19)
and:
varfyc(f) = varf lc(f) (B.20)
Using (B.19) and (B.20) into (B.18), and eliminating Efyc(f) using (B.14) yields:
lc ' 1
1− α(yc − zc)−
(
α
1− α
)
kc +
1
2
(
1
1− α
)(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f) (B.21)
Solving (B.17) for Ehnc(h), eliminating l using (B.21), and noticing that, in absence
of nominal wage rigidities, there is no variation in hours worked across households (i.e.
varhnc(h) = 0), we have:
Ehnc(h) ' 1
1− α(yc − zc − αkc) +
1
2
(
1
1− α
)(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f) (B.22)
Also note that Ehnc(h)
2 = varhnc(h) + [Ehnc(h)]
2 . Thus, taking squares of both sides of
(B.22):
Ehnc(h)
2 '
(
1
1− α
)2
(yc − zc − αkc)2 (B.23)
Replacing (B.22) and (B.23) in (B.16) yields:
EhVc(Nc,t(h)) ' Vc + VcNcNc
[
1
1− α(yc − zc)−
(
α
1− α
)
kc
]
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+
1
2
VcNcNc
(
1
1− α
)(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f) (B.24)
+
1
2
[
VcNcNc + V
c
NcNcN
2
c
] [( 1
1− α
)2
(yc − zc − αkc)2
]
Also, in steady state, if we equate the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal product
of labor in sector j, we have:4
VjNj
UCˆ
= (1− α) Yˆj
Nj
When j = c :
VcNcNc
(1− α) = UCˆCˆ (B.25)
When j = i :
ViNiNi
(1− α) =
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ (B.26)
Also, since Vc(Nc,t(h)) = υc Nc,t(h)
1+η
1+η , we have that V
c
Nc
Nc = υcNc
1+η and VcNcNcN
2
c =
ηVcNcNc. Moreover, given that U(Cˆt) =
Cˆ1−σt
1−σ , it also holds that UCˆCˆ = Cˆ
1−σ and UCˆCˆCˆ
2 =
−σUCˆCˆ. Use (B.25) together with the above relationships into (B.24) and sum the resulting
equation to (B.15). This leads to:5
(B.27)
U(Cˆ)− EhVc(Nc,t(h)) ' U− Vc + UCˆCˆ (zc + αkc) +
1
2
UCˆCˆ (1− σ) c2
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c− zc − αkc)2
]
4 Note that the markup and and subsidy exactly cancel each other out in steady state, in both sectors
5 Here we also used the fact that yc = c which holds in our model since we abstract from government purchases.
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Let’s now consider the component of the utility function related to investment. This
coincides with the term that describes disutility from labor allocated in the investment
sector. The derivation is similar to the one concerning Vc. Thus:
(B.28)
EhVi(Ni(h)) ' Vi + ViNiNi
[
1
1− α(yi − zi)−
(
α
1− α
)
ki
]
+
1
2
ViNiNi
(
1
1− α
)(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)
+
1
2
[
ViNiNi + V
i
NiNiN
2
i
] [( 1
1− α
)2
(yi − zi − αki)2
]
By (B.26) and i = yi we can rewrite (B.28) as:
(B.29)
EhVi(Ni(h)) ' Vi + 1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ [i− zi − αki] +
1
2
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)
+
1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i− zi − αki)2
]
To obtain the within-period welfare function under sticky prices, sum Eqs. (B.27) and
(B.29):
Wt ' U− Vc + UCˆCˆαkc +
1
2
UCˆCˆ (1− σ) c2 −
1
2
UCˆCˆ
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c− zc − αkc)2
]
− Vi − 1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ [i− αki]
− 1
2
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1+η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i−zi−αki)2
]
(B.30)
Consider now the first-order terms in the first line of the above equation:
αkc,t − 1− φ
φ
[it − αki.t]
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Note that it = φic,t + (1− φ)ii,t and for j = {c, i}: kj,t+1 = (1− δ˜)kj,t + δ˜ij,t. Thus:
αkc,t− (1− φ)
δ˜
kc,t+1+
(1− φ) (1− δ˜)
δ˜
kc,t− (1− φ)
2
φδ˜
ki,t+1+
(1− φ)2 (1− δ˜)
φδ˜
ki,t+
(1− φ)
φ
αki,t
(B.31)
The net rental rate of capital in steady state (in units of investment goods) is:
rkj =
γi
β˜
− (1− δ) (B.32)
By the law of motion in the investment sector, evaluated in steady state: IiKi =
Iˆiγi
Kˆi
=
γi − (1− δ). Also, by the investment-sector steady-state capital demand:
rki = α
Yi
Ki
= α
[γi − (1− δ)] I
Ii
= α
[γi − (1− δ)]
1− φ (B.33)
By equating (B.32) and (B.33):
1− φ
δ˜
=
αβ˜
1− β˜(1− δ˜) (B.34)
Use (B.34) in (B.31):
(B.35)
αkc,t − αβ˜
1− β˜(1− δ˜)kc,t+1 +
αβ˜
1− β˜(1− δ˜)(1− δ˜)kc,t
+
(1− φ)
φ
[
− αβ˜
1− β˜(1− δ˜)ki,t+1 +
αβ˜
1− β˜(1− δ˜)(1− δ˜)ki,t + αki,t
]
+
[
α
1− β˜(1− δ˜)
(
kc,t − β˜kc,t+1
)]
+
(1− φ)
φ
[
α
1− β˜(1− δ˜)
(
ki,t − β˜ki,t+1
)]
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Now, recall that the second-order approximation of the overall utility function is given by
the discounted sum of the second-order approximation to the within utility functions. We
can therefore pull together all of the first-order terms that remain after simplification from
each within period utility function to obtain:
α
1− β˜(1− δ˜)E0
[
kj,0 − β˜kj,1 + β˜(kj,1 − β˜kj,2) + ...+ β˜t(kj,t − β˜kj,t+1) + β˜t+1(kj,t+1 − β˜kj,t+2) + ...
]
which when we cancel terms from different periods is just equal to:
α
1− β˜(1− δ˜)kj,0
In other words, all linear terms in the square brackets in (B.35) disappear except for a term
in kj,0, for j = {c, i}, which denote the initial sectoral capital stocks and are assumed to be
fixed and independent of policy.
Thus, the welfare function under sticky prices, (B.30), can be rewritten as:
Wt ' U− Vc + 1
2
UCˆCˆ (1− σ) c2 −
1
2
UCˆCˆ
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c− zc − αkc)2
]
− Vi − 1
2
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)
− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i− zi − αki)2
]
(B.36)
and, the corresponding flexible-price welfare function reads:
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(B.37)
W∗t ' U∗−Vc∗+
1
2
UCˆ∗Cˆ∗ (1− σ) c∗2−
1
2
UCˆ∗Cˆ∗(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c∗− zc−αkc)2
]
− Vi∗ − 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆ∗Cˆ∗
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i∗ − zi − αki)2
]
A few things to note are as follows. First, the terms involving sectoral outputs dispersion
are nil in the flexible-price equilibrium because all firms set the same price. Second, under
the Woodford’s definition of natural rate beginning of period sectoral capital stocks are
identical to the beginning of period sectoral capital stocks under sticky prices. In other
words, the assumption is that when we enter period t + i, it is the capital stock that is
actually present, kt+i−1 that determines how in i∗t+i is defined; hence, in t + i the capital
law of motion in the flexible price economy will read:
k∗j,t+i = (1− δ˜)kj,t+i−1 + δ˜i∗j,t+i
Subtract the flexible price equilibrium, (B.36), to the sticky price one, (B.37):
Wt −W∗t '
1
2
UCˆCˆ (1− σ) c2 −
1
2
UCˆCˆ
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c− zc − αkc)2
]
+
1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(c∗− zc−αkc)2
]
− 1
2
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)
− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i− zi − αki)2
]
+
1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(i∗ − zi − αki)2
]
(B.38)
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Since the steady state of the sticky-price model is undistorted, the steady state terms
cancel out. Also, terms involving only flexible-price variables or exogenous disturbances can
be omitted since these are independent of policy (in fact these can be added and subtracted).
Equation (B.38) can be rewritten as:
Wt −W∗t '
1
2
UCˆCˆ (1− σ) c2 −
1
2
UCˆCˆ
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
UCˆCˆ(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)(
c2 − 2(zc + αkc)c
)]
+
1
2
UCˆCˆ(1+η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(−2(zc+αkc)c∗)
]
− 1
2
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f)
− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)(
i2 − 2(zi + αki)i
)]
+
1
2
[
1− φ
φ
UCˆCˆ
]
(1 + η)
[(
1
1− α
)
(−2(zi + αki)i∗)
]
(B.39)
Note that terms involving differences between sticky-price and flexible-price beginning-
of-period capital stocks cancel out, given that these two are the same.
By using Equations (B.11) and (B.12) to substitute out for the terms involving exogenous
disturbances in the cross-product terms in (B.39) and divide both sides by UCˆCˆ, one obtains:
(B.40)
Wt −W∗t
UCˆCˆ
' −1
2
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
(c− c∗)2
− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
](
1 + η
1− α
)
(i− i∗)2 − 1
2
(
θc
1 + θc
)
varfyc(f)
− 1
2
1− φ
φ
(
θi
1 + θi
)
varfyi(f) +
[
1− φ
φ
(1 + η)
]
(h∗i ) (i− i∗)
Also, Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) shows that the terms involving the variance of output
dispersion are proportional to the variance of price dispersion, and in turn to the variance
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of inflation. That is, for j = {c, i}
varfyj(f) =
(
1− β˜ξj
1− ξj
)
1
κj
var(pij)
where κj =
(1−β˜ξj)(1−ξj)
ξj
. Also, when summing over infinite time the terms involving the
squared gaps are nothing but the variance of the relative gaps. Therefore, the resulting
welfare function is:
(B.41)
E0
∫ 1
0
[∑∞
t=0 β˜
t(Wt(h)−W∗t (h))
]
dh
UCC
' −1
2
[
(1 + η)
1− α − (1− σ)
]
var (c− c∗)
− 1
2
[
1− φ
φ
(
1 + η
1− α
)]
var(i− i∗)
− 1
2
(
θc
1 + θc
)(
1− β˜ξc
1− ξc
)
1
κc
var(pic)
− 1
2
1− φ
φ
(
θi
1 + θi
)(
1− β˜ξi
1− ξi
)
1
κi
var(pii)
+
[
1− φ
φ
(1 + η)
]
cov(h∗i , i− i∗)
which is Equation (2.18) in Section 2.4.
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Information Acquisition and Self-fulfilling
Business Cycles
C.1 Detailed derivations of the model
The production function of firm i can be written as:
Yi,t = Ai,tAt
(
Kt
Nt
)α
Ni,t (C.1)
Recall that the demand function reads:
Yi,t = P
−θ
i,t Yt (C.2)
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and the optimal price setting solution is:
Pi,t =
θ
θ − 1 Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)
C(Wt, Rt, At) (C.3)
Use Eqs. (3.5) and (C.3) into Eq. (C.1):
(
θ
θ − 1
)−θ [
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)]−θ ( 1
Ai,t
)
[C(Wt, Rt, At)]
−θ Yt = At
(
Kt
Nt
)α
Ni,t (C.4)
Recall that the zero profit condition in the final-good sector is:
(∫ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi = Yt
)
(C.5)
Use Eqs. (3.5) and (C.3) into Eq. (C.5):
C(Wt, Rt, At) =
(
θ − 1
θ
)(∫ 1
0
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
di
) 1
θ−1
(C.6)
Use (C.6) into (C.4):
(∫ 1
0
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
di
) θ
1−θ [
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)]−θ ( 1
Ai,t
)
Yt = At
(
Kt
Nt
)α
Ni,t (C.7)
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Sum over i on both sides:
Yt
(∫ 1
0
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)1−θ
di
) θ
1−θ ∫ 1
0
[
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)]−θ ( 1
Ai,t
)
di = At
(
Kt
Nt
)α ∫ 1
0
Ni,tdi
(C.8)
Note that: ∫ 1
0
[
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)]−θ ( 1
Ai,t
)
di =
∫ 1
0
[
Ei,t
(
1
Ai,t
)]1−θ
di
Thus, one can obtain Eq. (3.10) in the main text.
C.2 Consumer confidence index and sunspot shocks
Figure C.2.1: Consumer confidence index and sunspot shocks
Note: Consumer confidence represents the OECD Confidence Indicator for the United States. I eliminate
its trend using a one-sided HP filter.
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